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When Dr. Vijayalakshmi mooted the idea of an Indo-US Workshop
that looked at all dimensions of Indo-US Relations in March 2005
none of us even remotely imagined that momentous events were
going to transform the basic structure of the relationship. As I and
my colleagues at NIAS (Prof. S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar
and Dr. Sonika Gupta) along with Prof. Vijayalakshmi struggled to
put together a workshop package that would capture the gamut of
the relationship, major events slowly started unfolding. The Joint
Statement of 18th July 2005 issued by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh and President George W. Bush was the first sign that there
was indeed going to be a paradigm shift in Indo-US relations.
As the debate within India on Indo-US relations and on the civilian
nuclear deal was hotting up, our desire to try and ensure that we get
the best people in India to come to the Workshop and share their
insights with us became more and more important. The motive for
this was of course the desire that the inputs from the Workshop
would influence policy and decision making on this matter of great
importance to the future of the country. We were lucky in both
respects. We did get the best brains in India from both academia and
members of the strategic community to come to Bangalore and take
part in the Workshop. We were also fortunate that the dates of the
Workshop February 9th and 10th 2006 just preceded the visit of
President George W Bush to India that took place on March 1st,
2006. One of the issues that was engaging the attention of the whole
country was related to the Indo-US nuclear deal. The International
Strategic and Security Studies Programme at NIAS put together a
short briefing paper that looked at all dimensions of Indo-US Relations
with a specific focus on the “nuclear deal”. This briefing paper did
reach the highest policy and decision making levels in the country.
We believe that it helped in improving our understanding of the drivers
of the relationship between India and the US. We also believe that it
did contribute in a small way in getting the deal through.
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The initial two page brief was followed by a more elaborate twenty
page “Workshop Brief” addressed to the larger strategic and
academic community in India and abroad. This has been widely
distributed and is also available on the NIAS website.
There was also a great deal of interest that the proceedings of the
Workshop be brought out as quickly as possible. This edited volume
of the Workshop Proceedings has been brought out to cater to this
need of the strategic community in India and abroad.
Before I conclude, I would like to thank all the participants at the
Workshop who took time off from their busy schedules to come to
Bangalore and participate in this important event. I think their
contribution did make a difference to our understanding of a complex
issue. I would also like to specially thank my former colleague







The International Strategic and Security Studies Programme of the
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore organised
a two day National Workshop on “Changing Contours of Indo-US
Relations” during 9-10 February 2006. The objectives of the
Workshop were to exchange views and generate opinion on a wide
spectrum of issues relating to Indo-US relations. The themes for the
debate included:
• Perceptions and misperceptions in Indo-US relations
• Indo-US economic relations: emerging dynamics
• Changing security environment and implications for
Indo-US cooperation in defence
• Prospects for Indo-US cooperation in high technology
• US and Indian legal systems and their implications for
Indo-US relations
The participants for the Workshop were drawn from academia, the
strategic community, scientists, technologists, diplomats, practitioners
and the defence services.
The major focus of the Workshop was to critically assess the paradigm
shift in perceptions reshaping Indo-US relations. The purpose was to
get different perspectives on the commonalities and differences that
would govern Indo-US relations in the near and distant future. The
visit of the US President George W. Bush to India and the possibility
of an accord between the US and India on civilian nuclear cooperation
provided the backdrop to the organization of the workshop. The output
from the workshop was meant to feed into the policy making and
decision-making processes. This in fact did happen.
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Workshop Highlights
• His Excellency Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, Governor of Karnataka,
inaugurated the Workshop on the 9th of February 2006. His
Excellency also delivered the Inaugural Address.
• Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Chairman Task Force on Global
Strategic Developments, Government of India, gave a special
Public Lecture on “Challenges and Prospects for Indo-US
Relations” on the evening of the 9th of February 2006.
• In a special session, Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary, Department of
Atomic Energy addressed the Workshop participants and
shared with them his views on the status and prospects of
cooperation between India and the US in the civilian nuclear
field.
Following is a detailed report of the workshop. At the end of each
session a summary of the main highlights of the session is provided.
This is followed by a discussion on how the different strands of
thinking addressed in each of the sessions intertwine to provide an
overall understanding of the critical drivers of the relationship between
the US and India. We conclude with a brief section on the implications
of this understanding for policy making.
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Inaugural  Session
His Excellency Shri T.N. Chaturvedi, the Governor of Karnataka
delivering the Inaugural Address
10
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Inaugural Session
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Friends, His Excellency Shri Chaturvediji,
Governor of Karnataka, Dr. Kasturirangan Director National Institute
of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Professor Chandra, and all of us at
NIAS welcome you to this two-day workshop on Indo-US Relations.
I am sure you will all agree that this workshop is both timely and
appropriate - a major initiative that needed to be done. This morning
we have with us His Excellency, Shri Chaturvedi, Governor
of Karnataka to inaugurate this Workshop. I now invite
Dr. Kasturirangan of NIAS to give us his welcome remarks.
Welcome Remarks - Dr. K. Kasturirangan: Good morning. Your
Excellency Shri Chaturvediji, Governor of Karnataka, Shri
K. Subrahmanyam, Chairperson of the Task Force on Global Strategic
Developments, Shri Vijay Nambiar, Shri Venkateswaran, Admiral
Jacob, Professor Arunachalam, Mr. Lalit Mansingh, Srimathi
Arundhathi Ghose, distinguished ambassadors and diplomats,
members of the Task Force on Global Strategic Developments,
respected professors from various academic institutions, participants
of this workshop, my colleagues from the National Institute of
Advanced Studies (NIAS), members of the media, ladies and
gentlemen.
It gives me great pleasure to welcome all of you to Bangalore and to
the National Institute of Advanced Studies. As many of you are aware,
NIAS was born out of the vision of the late J.R.D. Tata. He saw
NIAS as a place where talented men and women from different
disciplines and different walks of life could get together and work
together on problems that affect us all. NIAS, under the leadership
of its Founder-Director Professor Raja Ramanna and subsequently
under the distinguished leadership of Professor Narasimha has scaled
great heights in multidisciplinary research.
The International Strategic and Security Studies Programme is only
about a decade old. It was the brainchild of Professor Narasimha,
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my predecessor as Director NIAS. Over the years, this programme
has established a name for itself as an independent high-calibre
technology-focused think tank in the domain of international strategy
and security studies. NIAS played a critical role as a track-two
dialogue partner with the Committee on International Security and
Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States after the nuclear tests of 1998. This workshop is, in
some sense, a logical corollary to these traditional NIAS activities.
It, however, departs from the past in one significant way. When
Dr. Vijayalakshmi here mooted the idea of a workshop on Indo-US
relations, the only decision we took about its nature was that it should
not only look at the strategy and military dimension but also at the
economic, political and institutional dimensions as well. At the time
we started looking at the design of the Workshop – and this was
around July-August of 2005 – we had no idea that Indo-US relations
were likely to undergo a potentially major paradigm shift. We hope
that during the course of the next two days, this collection of
outstanding talent from all over India can collectively engage in a
constructive debate over the many thorny issues that confront the
two great democracies of the world – India and the United States.
With your help I think, we can come to some terms with these complex
problems.
We have with us today His Excellency, the Governor of Karnataka,
Shri T.N. Chaturvediji. We thank you, Sir, for taking time off from
your very busy schedule to be with us today. We know that Karnataka
is keeping you very busy recently. Sir, your scholarship, your erudition
and your love for knowledge will be a source of inspiration to all of
us in the tasks we are setting for ourselves. We look forward to your
continuing and lasting involvement with NIAS and our activities.
This Workshop has been made possible because of the generous
support extended to NIAS by my erstwhile colleague Dr. Madhavan
Nair, who is currently the Chairman of the Space Commission. I
would like to thank Dr. Madhavan Nair, Chairman ISRO and many
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other colleagues from ISRO for helping us with the organization of
this Workshop.
I should, at this point, also mention the good wishes that Mr. Jaswant
Singh has conveyed to the deliberations of this Workshop. He was
supposed to be a part of this session but could not finally make it
because of some schedule problems during his recent visit to Pakistan.
In his letter to me he has wished the Workshop all success.
I would be incomplete in my welcoming remarks if I do not place on
record my appreciation for the work of my colleagues - Professor
S. Chandrashekar, who heads the International Strategic and Security
Studies Programme here as a Visiting Professor and two of his
dynamic colleagues, Mr. Arvind Kumar and Dr. Sonika Gupta.
I would also, before I finish, like to thank each and every one of you
who are participating in this workshop for taking time off your busy
schedules to be with us at NIAS. I look forward to a very interesting
two days of lively, stimulating and illuminating discussions.
Thank you.
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Thank you, Dr. Rangan. I am sure that all of
us will be eagerly waiting to hear His Excellency, Governor of
Karnataka, Shri Chaturvediji.
Inaugural Address - His Excellency Shri T.N. Chaturvedi,
Governor, Karnataka:
Dr. Kasturirangan, very distinguished participants in this important
National Workshop on “Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations”,
Professor S. Chandrashekar, Professor K.P. Vijayalakshmi, and
other colleagues and Professors from NIAS, esteemed ladies and
gentlemen.
It gives me great pleasure to be here at this great institution. As
Dr. Kasturirangan mentioned and as most of you are also aware,
NIAS was founded by one of our great countrymen, J.R.D. Tata
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and imparted vitality and creativity by another great Indian, the late
Dr. Raja Ramanna. NIAS represents in a quintessential way the
multiple dimensions that characterize and shape much of our lives, a
seamless blend of the arts and the sciences with the practical,
the philosophical and the human. I am extremely thankful to
Dr. Kasturirangan for his very gracious remarks earlier.
I understand from Dr. Kasturirangan that all of you are present here
to take stock of and chart the future course of Indo-US relations.
This initiative of NIAS, in the context of the forthcoming visit of
President George Bush to India, comes at the right time. We stand
today at the threshold of a new era of cooperation with the United
States that promises much for both sides. I am sure this meeting of
some of the best minds in India through their deliberations will
contribute significantly to the betterment of our relations with the
United States.
I shall also take this opportunity to thank Dr. Madhavan Nair,
Chairman of ISRO who has collaborated with the International
Strategic and Security Studies Programme of NIAS in organizing
this Workshop.
Friends, as a layman it has always been a great puzzle to me as to
why the relations between the US and India have seen so many ups
and downs. The US, as you all know, was one of the firm backers of
the India’s quest for independence from colonial rule. It supported
post-independent emerging India and helped us during many situations
of stress and strain during the early years. As two of the world’s
largest democracies there were obviously many more commonalities
than differences between India and the US. Yet, as India tried to
make the transition from a developing country into a developed
country in the midst of several regional and geopolitical challenges,
the relationship between the two countries became mired in many
problems. At times these problems and perceptions appeared to be
overwhelmingly difficult to resolve. Though we in India had much
sympathy for the United States, we found that the US was following
Inaugural Session
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the path of our former colonial masters and was therefore perceived
naturally by us as acting against Indian interests. Clearly, the Cold
War era and the division of the world into different ideological regimes
created different worldviews and different perceptions of national
interest. In spite of these differences in the political and strategic
dimensions of the Indian relationship with the United States, let us
also not forget that the USA has supported and helped India in many
ways. The US is our largest trading partner. Many of our
contemporaries as well as our children, maybe in some cases
grandchildren, now live in that country.  Many Indian students go to
the United States to pursue higher studies in some of the best
educational institutes in the world. The portals of Stanford, M.I.T.,
Harvard and many other world-class educational institutes that dot
the landscape of the USA have been open to Indian talent. But even
here, even in this sphere, and not infrequently, our highly endowed
young men and women have to face difficulties and hurdles as regards
grant of visas, extension of visas, mandatory occasional returns and
so on. India on the other hand has been much more open, relaxed and
liberal in its approach to scholars coming from other countries. I
myself, if I might make a personal reference, had a number of
occasions to speak to successive US Ambassadors, their Deputies
visiting Congressmen and other dignitaries about this matter while
working with the Government or even as a Member of the Rajya
Sabha.
Friends, Bangalore is now as well known as many of the other
knowledge centers of the world, thanks to IT sector and its phenomenal
global impact over the last fifteen years. US needs have also largely
driven the growth and development of this new knowledge industry.
Yoga, Indian music, films, literature and many other aspects of our
culture have always played a role in promoting our relationship with
that great country. It is my belief that these unifying and integrating
elements have not been stressed enough in examining the relationship
between India and the United States of America. I see from the
programme worked out by Dr. Kasturirangan and his colleagues
that you are going to grapple with the issues of Indo-US relationships
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in a holistic and multidimensional manner. It is my belief that it is
indeed the challenge facing our country in dealing with the United
States and that the multidimensional approach adopted by the agenda
of the workshop is indeed the way to address this issue. The sessions
of the Workshop - as seen from the schedule of the Workshop – talk
about perceptions, problems and potential. I think these are important
not only in respect of the past but also while we look to the future.
Friends, as we all know, the world of today is very different from the
world of the Cold War era. At one level, the economic forces of the
world are trying to integrate the world into one big market place.
Equally challenging are problems of equitable distribution of the gains
of economic development and the destruction and monopolization of
the scarce valuable resources that all of us have to share. Global
warming, the ozone hole, depletion of the global forest cover, other
forms of the environmental and atmospheric pollution affect us all.
At a social level there are problems of identity and alienation that are
the sources of conflict and war. In this new context many of the
considerations that conditioned and drove our past relations with the
United States are no longer valid. These global forces of change not
only provide us new opportunities but also raise new threats. We
need different maps to navigate through these new and untested waters.
The US too, has seen these changes in the global arena and is now
looking at India in a slightly different way. We can even argue, though
some may not agree, that there is indeed the potential for a paradigm
shift in the relationship.
Ladies and gentlemen, while there is much to be hopeful about, there
are still many differences between India and the United States that
could act as roadblocks. Indian national interests and US national
interests may now have many converging strands but there are still
differences that at times could exacerbate our relationship. Past
mindsets that find it difficult to cope with the new realities could also
pose problems. One of the challenges before all of us gathered here
is to identify such bottlenecks and suggest ways of dealing with them
so that we can move the relationship with the United States to a new
Inaugural Session
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and higher level that is mutually beneficial to both sides. To chart this
new relationship with the United States through the relatively
unknown unexplored emerging world order that is in our national
interest and that is beneficial to both sides is the real challenge. I am
sure that over the course of today and tomorrow, this august body
will address these complex issues and come out with conclusions and
approaches that would be useful to the country in finding solutions
to many of these tangled issues.
I take this opportunity to congratulate Dr. Kasturirangan and his
colleagues for a very well conceived and well-designed schedule for
the National Workshop that is both focused as well as comprehensive
in its coverage. Dr. Kasturirangan and his colleagues also merit our
appreciation for their persuasiveness in bringing together such a
galaxy of knowledgeable and experienced experts to participate in
this National Workshop. I would once again like to thank NIAS for
asking me to make a few observations as a layman before such a
distinguished gathering at the commencement of the Workshop. I wish
this National Workshop on “Changing Contours of Indo-US
Relationship” every success. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Jai
Bharat! Jai Karnataka!
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Thank you, Your Excellency Shri Chaturvediji.
I now invite Professor Chandrashekar to propose a vote of thanks for
this session.
Vote of Thanks - Prof. Chandrashekar: Your Excellency Shri
T.N. Chaturvedi, Governor of Karnataka, I would like to thank you
personally for having taken time off to come here. We have always
banked on you to bail us out of difficult situations and so far you
have not disappointed us. I would like to take this opportunity to tell
you that we will continue to make many more such requests and I
know that you will help us in the complex problems and tasks that
we have set ourselves to do. Thank you once again, for taking time
off to come and be with us and to deliver the inaugural address.
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I would like to take this opportunity to particularly thank
Dr. Kasturirangan and Dr. Vijayalakshmi. The idea of organizing
this Workshop was Dr. Vijayalakshmi’s. It was she who persuaded
Dr. Rangan that we should go ahead and do this. I would like to
place on record my personal appreciation of the immense amount of
hard work that she has put into this workshop. I am sure that with all
of you here we will convert it into something that makes a major
national impact.
I would also like to thank all the people who have come from all over
India. I would like to thank Mr. K. Subrahmanyam particularly and
the Task Force members for really giving us the stimulus to go ahead
and do this on a fairly big scale. We had originally thought of a much
smaller kind of programme.
I would also like to thank all the people who have come. I would
particularly like to thank Ambassadors Lalit Mansingh, Arundhati
Ghose; I would like to thank Ambassador Venkateswaran,
Ambassador Ranganathan and all other ambassadors. I also see a
lot of familiar faces. Dr. Arunachalam is here. Dr. Aatre is here.
Dr. Ananth from IIT is here. We have a lot of distinguished Defence
people. Air Marshal Patney is here. Admiral Jacob has always been
a great source of inspiration. I would welcome all of you. Air Chief
Marshal Krishnaswamy is here. So we are really grateful to all of
you to be able to come and take part here.
On behalf of NIAS and Dr. Rangan I welcome you all and I hope
we are able to do justice not only in terms of the Workshop itself, but
also in terms of all the arrangements that we have made to make sure
that your stay is comfortable.
I would also like to place on record my special appreciation to
Dr. Siddhartha. He has always been very provocative and some of
the provocations have always been very useful. We have in our
planning of the Workshop generated lot of heat but in the process
we have also generated sometimes a little bit of light.
Inaugural Session
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I would also like to place on record our special appreciation to
Mr. Vijay Nambiar for taking time off from his very busy schedule
to be with us today. We all know that we are dealing with a very
important issue and his presence here would be very useful to the
Workshop. Thank you very much, Vijay for the effort you have taken
and for coming here.
I think I have done enough and maybe we all need a break. I think we
will have some coffee and then come back. Thank you very much.
Workshop Overview – Prof. Vijayalakshmi:
Distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to
this session. This session will provide an introductory overview of
this Workshop. We are delighted that all of you found it possible to
come here. This workshop is the initiation of an internal national
dialogue to speak freely, frankly and exchange views. The objective
is to get our narratives into a structured form so that when faced
with upcoming policy decisions we are better informed and are clear
about the stakes involved.
Let me just begin by giving a brief overview which we hope will set
the tone for this Workshop over the next two days. I am going to
request you for a written input so that we can bring out a report of
this W orkshop. An executive summary will be brought out at the
earliest and presented to the government before the Presidential visit,
which is almost upon us. This Workshop is therefore very timely.
With the help of the wealth of experience and scholarship that we
have present here we will be able to put together this report. So we
would like this to be a no-holds-barred meeting in some ways. But
this is really a workshop, which is like a chakra. It is supposed to
spin and send off many more such workshops or seminars and
conferences. We ourselves are thinking of this as a series. So with
that let me just quickly run you through an overview of the workshop.
The basic idea about the changing Indo-US relations is that the oldest
and the largest democracies need to get together. We share the values
of rule of law and essential, inviolate and equal dignity of all human
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beings. These two values speak much more than the other political,
strategic, social, cultural similarities. I believe that we want to hold
on to these values as the basis of active engagement. We hope that
this active engagement should serve the interests of peace, stability
and maintenance of mankind’s democratic rights. So in a sense, we
should focus very critically on the way we want to interact with each
on the basis of our shared values.
The complexity of the landscape of Indo-US relations prompted us
to look afresh at the bilateral relationship. In the past, the trajectory
of Indo-US ties has had peaks, troughs and plateaus. The words
‘peaks, troughs and plateaus’ sometimes capture much more quickly
than anything else, the restraints and the constraints, and the progress
and the levels at which Indo-US ties have moved in the last fifty
years. In particular, the Cold War has seen the famous American tilt
towards Pakistan that kept the United States estranged with India
and proved to be a major problem in our negotiations with them.
Given the current scenario, the first session can tell us what and how
they actually thought of us and why they are negotiating something
different now.  An historical overview would, I believe, help us to
understand what kind of problems we are going to face in the future.
During the 1960s our relationship was characterized by hostility,
resentment and disdain – these are the words one keeps hearing in a
very evocative manner. Sulochana and Nathan Glazer’s book on Indo-
US relations titled “Conflicting Images” captures this. It explains
the sad state of Indo-US relations. Many Indian scholars as well as
diplomats who have also been US academic Fellows have also written
about it. There are papers with evocative titles like “Difficult Legacies
- Positive Trends” – which are self-explanatory. The central question
was why should this have been so? The US Foreign Service has also
been very much in evidence explaining what this difficult puzzle is
all about. Significantly, both sides came to the conclusion that the
relations were one of estrangement rather than confrontation.
However, there was evidently a minimum level of interaction between
the two sides despite all the problems.
Inaugural Session
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The end of the Cold War provided a fresh start to building new
equations with each other as significant changes occurred in both
political and economic domain. As we moved towards economic
liberalization and reforms, the demise of the Cold War resulted in
very significant developments in Indo-US relations. The workshop
needs to focus on some of the following questions in order to find out
the difference between myth and reality of a transformed relationship.
For instance, questions such as: Are fresh winds of change bringing
about a major transformation or is it temporary change? What are
the key forces or the key drivers of this relationship? What are the
sources of tensions? What are the sources of these perceptions? And
what are the sources that help you get over the premised perceptions.
A question regarding the strategic partnership centers on the theme
that asks whether there really is a substantial change or is it only
peripheral? These need to be looked into urgently.
We need to also debate the potential of Indo-US relations. One keeps
hearing about a “watershed in Indo-US relations”, and “we will help
India to become a major world power”. We need to ask ourselves, is
this evolution in Indo-US relations a welcome change for us? What
context is it taking place in? There is a configuration of international
power in which our interests are going to be clearly defined. What is
at stake for us? What are our interests, and where and how do we
want to articulate our interests and how do we protect them? And
what is the methodology we have? This is what this workshop is all
about. How are India and the US going to talk to each other in getting
together about how do we define and defend our national interest?
This would pertain to the reality and potential of Indo-US relations.
One also keeps hearing about the “existence of common interests”
between India and the US in policy communiqués or through the
writings of scholars, observers and analysts in this field. This
proposition may lead to the assumption that common interests would
lead automatically to a better relationship. I want us to examine why
we need to be more careful and put in more effort in the bilateral
relations despite the so-called commonality of interests.
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What we are looking for is the way we can integrate the several
strands that impact Indo-US relations and I do believe that a
multidimensional approach will help us do this. For instance, whether
we need to develop conditionalities before we speak with the United
States in economics and trade or do we have to have an understanding
of the configuration of power in the international arena and develop
common interests with the US as the nation we want to work with.
These are some of the theoretical as well as practical issues that one
would have to face despite working in a bilateral context about Indo-
US relations.
Many more questions can be posed in the context of current changes
in Indo-US relations. If there is a substantive transformation in the
quality and intensity of consultation and cooperation, for example,
in strategic areas, what is driving that? Is it sustainable? We are
hearing that the unfolding of the NSSP has confirmed that the
relationship has moved forward rapidly. Now we need to ask
ourselves, is that really so? I think we are moving to an area where
we have robust and fast-paced developments in military relations.
This has been a continuum from 1992 onwards. Can military ties as
one segment become a pillar, and the economic as another pillar,
which will actually jointly develop confidence with each other? Will
the understanding provided by these two pillars enable India and the
US to confront jointly multilateral security issues? Will it enable them
to jointly conduct peacekeeping and combat terrorism? For me, there
is a question mark on ‘jointly’, how jointly can we do this? We have
separate sessions that would deliberate these issues in detail.
Economic aspirations of countries in this integrated world, in my
view have impacted both the terms of bilateral investments and
multilateral negotiations and agreements in trade and commerce.
Therefore, this is such an important element and very often I keep
wondering that if we had a better trade relationship with a country
such as the US, would it give us leverage on our political negotiations?
We are looking to our esteemed colleagues present here to tell us
how we can integrate this apart from critiquing the potential and
Inaugural Session
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reality of Indo-US economic relations and trade relations. We would
also like to understand how we could deal with this aspect with the
United States, which is now according to many people in the world
almost a hyper power.
Cooperation in high technology is now a critical part of the ongoing
dialogue as well. I am not sure that these dialogues have reached any
sort of major conclusions. Maybe they are in a process. Maybe they
are beginning something. We need to understand this because this is
something that India has held very dear and so has the United States.
There has been a history, which has, I think, a great impact on this
ongoing dialogue. So, we need to examine this as a very critical aspect
of Indo-US relations. We are going to have Sri Anil Kakodkar to talk
to us on this issue along with experts from the field in a dedicated
session.
The legal framework and IPR is a serious issue in Indo-US relations.
US domestic laws and institutions are not the same as WTO
obligations. India is a member of the WTO. But when we negotiate
with the US, the issues of compliance to US domestic laws do figure.
This needs to be elaborated, clarified and perhaps we need to work at
what are the linkages between IPR protection and the overall political
dialogue. Legal and institutional barriers have played a part in the
way Indo-US relations have developed in the past; for example the
issues relating to the application of US domestic law popularly known
as the Super 301 have clouded Indo-US dialogue in the past. We
need to debate what role legal frameworks might play in the ongoing
US-India dialogues in the medium and long-term future.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience. These are very
simple questions that I have but you can add much more richness to
them. We are talking about ideological absolutes, which were really
shaken at the end of the Cold War. We know that the Cold War has
ended. But has it affected us deep down? That’s one thing. What
does it really mean when we say we envisage an extraordinary
change in Indo-US relations? For, many a time I find that different
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people have different answers to that question. There is no one voice
in India. So we need to really ask ourselves, are we moving from
estrangement to engagement, and then define the terms of our
engagement. I think that’s really the task for this Workshop.
We are also looking to you to help us understand what are the problem
areas and roadblocks that require attention. How do we assess those
opportunities and challenges that are ahead for the two of us?
These are, in some ways, partial questions. There are many more
that I have not asked which may get highlighted as the workshop
proceeds. I have actually prepared a very big speech but as I know
that you are waiting to start the first session I am winding up. I hope
this workshop will produce more initiatives which will follow up on
what we have started. The idea of this Workshop is that each of the
sessions or radials, if you will, can indeed provide meat for a whole
seminar by themselves. I believe that we need to do this as a country
and take it forward in a manner that can benefit policymakers. I am
delighted that I have an opportunity to be a part of this. I am just a
volunteer in this whole great thing that India is doing and I am really
keen to hear all of you and I once again take this opportunity to
welcome you and thank you for sparing your time, for your erudition
and everything else that you will be giving to us in this workshop.
Thank you.
Inaugural Session
Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations
25
Session I
Perceptions and Misperceptions in
Indo-US relations
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Dr. K. Subrahmanyam, Ambassador Lalit Mansingh
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Session I
Perceptions and Misperceptions in
Indo-US relations
Chair: Ambassador Lalit Mansingh, Former Foreign Secretary
Ambassador Lalit Mansingh: Thank you, Vijayalakshmi, for that
overview. We are going to discuss this morning the theme “Perceptions
and Misperceptions in Indo-US Relations”. And to present our
perspectives, we have a star-studded panel here. Let me briefly present
them to you. Dr. K. Subrahmanyam, who requires no introduction.
He is regarded as the Bheeshma Pithamaha of the strategic community
of India and currently is the Chairman of the Task Force on Global
Strategic Development. Then we have two absolutely outstanding
diplomats, ambassadors who have had long, distinguished careers -
Ambassador Vijay Nambiar, whose last assignment was as
Ambassador to the U.N. in New York and he is now with the National
Security Council, and the next is Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, also
a very well known figure in the strategic community. She was
Ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva. And then we have Dr. Lawrence
Prabhakar, who is an Associate Professor in the Madras Christian
College, Madras University.
Let me thank Dr. Kasturirangan for his dynamic leadership of NIAS
and for having brought us all together. I am particularly impressed
not as much with the quality of our panel as with the quality of the
audience. It is really a galaxy or who’s who of people. So let me start
the ball rolling on these issues by sharing some thoughts on Indo-US
relations with you.
Having been associated with the United States throughout my
diplomatic career but in a greater focus for at least fifteen years it
has never failed to amaze me that in an affluent and knowledge-
driven society like the United States, there can be such a massive
deficit of knowledge of the outside world and particularly regarding
India.
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Here let me make a distinction between two types of misperception.
One is at the level of society. It is how the average American looks at
India and Indians. Second is the political perception or how the
leadership of that country looks at India. I will not get into the societal
misperceptions because that is not strictly what we are here to discuss.
But I just make a passing mention of a book that was published by
M.I.T. in 1958, titled ‘Scratches on Our Minds’, which is based on
the survey of Americans at all levels of society and  is a record of
what they knew and thought about India. The results are simply
amazing about the extent of ignorance that prevailed in the United
States right up to the late fifties on what India is about. The survey
mentioned that the principal source of information of most Americans
was Kipling and therefore their knowledge of India was that of
maharajahs, fakirs, tigers and snake charmers and so on. We are
talking about the late fifties. It was a heroic effort on the part of our
embassies and consulates to try to dispel some of this lack of
knowledge and information.
In this session, we are going to focus on the attitude of the leadership.
In this group I will include not only the administration, i.e. the
government of the country, but also the Congress, which is very
much a part of the decision-making process and also the think-tanks
because in Washington they have a particular place in the decision-
making process.
If you look back at the five decades of the Cold War, one can identify
four major areas of misperceptions and consequently four major areas
of differences between India and the United States. For the sake of
convenience I call it the four Ps because they all begin with the letter
P. One is Political ideology, the other is Pakistan, the third is
Proliferation and the fourth is Private enterprise.
Let me first take up the issue of political ideology. It goes back to the
roots of the Cold War and the US inability to appreciate India’s policy
of non-alignment. The Grand Ayatollah of American ideology of the
Cold War was John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State
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under President Eisenhower. It was Dulles who issued the fatwa
that non-alignment was immoral and therefore you had to be with us
or against us. There was no middle ground. The roots of the
misperceptions started right there. Washington regarded India as a
hostile country because India would not join the United States in its
political alliances. If Dulles was speaking from his inner conviction I
would probably respect him. What shocks us is the extent of
ignorance that he had about our part of the world and the basis on
which he took all these major policy decisions. Here is a small
illustration of this. Many of you may have already read about this. It
is a conversation between Dulles and the famous columnist and
journalist Walter Lipman. This is a dinner conversation in Washington
where Dulles triumphantly tells him, “We were looking for a country
in South Asia which has people who could fight wars and thank God
we have discovered that country. It is Pakistan”. Dulles adds, “The
Pakistanis can really fight. Thank God they have got the Gurkhas.”
Lipman says, “But, Foster, the Gurkhas are not in Pakistan, they are
in India.” Dulles said, “Well, Never mind. They may be anywhere
but at least, they are Muslims”, whereupon Lipman again says, “But,
Foster, they are not Muslims. They are Hindus.” At this point John
Foster Dulles gets very impatient and says, “Never mind” and sort
of dismisses him. This was the information available to the Secretary
of State of the United States based on which we had fifty years of
differences on political ideology.
Let me get on to Pakistan. The image of Pakistan was that of a
country dedicated to fighting international communism. This is what
the Americans believed. The Pakistanis made them believe that they
were actually the warriors who were going to fight international
communism. For those of us who have known Pakistan and read
about Pakistan know pretty well that the Pakistanis had no interest in
fighting communism; their only exclusive and sole aim was to fight
India. Therefore it suited Pakistanis very well. For some strange reason
the Americans went along and believed that the Pakistanis could help
them in fighting communism. So, the choice of strategic ally in South
Asia was not democratic India but a country like Pakistan, which
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was ruled by military generals. That was the beginning of the
hyphenated relationship of the subcontinent. Pakistan - India was
what the US was dealing with, and it was also the beginning of the
zero sum game where as Pakistan’s image improved, India’s image
diminished in American eyes.
Let me now talk about the role of private enterprise. While this was
never explicit in American foreign policy, it was an important influence
in their decision-making. What the Americans did not or could not -
understand was our socialist pattern. The very existence of large
public sector undertakings in India was anathema both to American
private enterprise and to the American leadership. Even a popular
and powerful president like Jack Kennedy was unable to get support
either within his cabinet or in the US Congress for the Americans
setting up a steel plant in India. Eventually that steel plant went to
the Russians who had to build the second plant even though that was
earmarked in our policy for the Americans. The Americans thought
that we were following a kind of socialist or communist pattern of
economy and therefore they had little interest in investing in our
country.
Finally on the issue of proliferation. This has been the most persistent
misperception amongst the political elite in the United States,
especially after the first Pokhran test in 1974. India was treated as a
nuclear outcaste for nearly three decades. This restriction was lifted
only last year when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to
Washington and the July 18 agreement was concluded. The non-
proliferation lobby was very powerful in Washington. It was not only
powerful within the government it also had bipartisan support. It is
strange that even in the time of President Clinton who, as we all
know, enjoys a great public image in India, the US pursued a policy
of “cap, roll back and eliminate” India’s nuclear programme. First it
has to be capped, it has to be rolled back and given up altogether. It
is only after the Jaswant Singh – Strobe Talbot dialogue that
Americans finally understood the reasons why we had gone nuclear,
even though they did not condone it. After George W. Bush became
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the President of the United States it was a fortunate development
for India. The Ayatollahs of non-proliferation were finally requested
to quit the administration. They left the administration but they joined
the think tanks. They are still very powerful and the think tanks are
still active preparing their doomsday scenarios from the imminence
of nuclear war between India and Pakistan to India being a potential
rogue state which can wreck the delicately balanced nuclear non-
proliferation regime and so on. Now, I will not go into this in great
depth because I am sure that Dr. K. Subrahmanyam and others will
be throwing more light on this. So, this in sum, are the four major
areas of misperception which caused the divisions between us and
the United States.
To be fair, we had misperceptions on our side, too. This is what has
also complicated the situation. At the societal level, the American
have always enjoyed a very positive image. There is no question that
the US has been regarded by our public as a land of opportunity, as
a land of superior education, a land of promise where merit is not
only recognized but rewarded, and therefore it came as no surprise
that last year when the Pew Research Organization did a global
survey, they came to the conclusion that the image of the United
States is, in fact, the best in India, better than in many of the European
countries which are friends of the United States. But Delhi’s political
perception was certainly not in sync with this popular perception and
throughout the Cold War there was this belief that the United States
was an evil force. There was a mirror image of how Dulles looked
at India, in the perception of our own Ayatollahs here. Even people
like Pandit Nehru who went on an official visit to the United States
in 1949, came back convinced that the Americans were an evil force
and they could not be trusted. At one point Pandit Nehru even wrote
to the Chief Ministers saying, “Make sure that not too many people
travel to the United States and also make sure that not too many
people come from the US to India”. So, there grew over a period of
time a kind of paranoia within the government where the US was
regarded as the supreme evil force which was trying to destabilize
the world, trying to overthrow the government and so on. It was a
32
demonized picture of the United States. Of course, the CIA was
seen to be an all-powerful force, the foreign hand was behind every
corner and this was the kind of perception that the US enjoyed. The
Cold War is over, but the Cold War mindset has not gone. We still
have a lot of explaining to do on both sides in order to bring our two
images in focus.
Now let me address some of the common misperceptions of the US at
the moment, especially when people react to the agreement of July
18 last year. Now, one of the criticisms I have seen is that the
relationship is asymmetrical and therefore, inherently of disadvantage
to India, to which my response would be that in international affairs
most relationships are asymmetrical because it is almost impossible
to find two equally balanced, equally strong states. If you do find
such states they are more likely to be adversaries than friends.
A second criticism, which is commonly heard, is that a partnership
with India will result in India being reduced to a client, a satellite, a
regional surrogate of the United States, to which my response would
be that one must make a distinction between partnership and alliance.
What India is going in for is a partnership with the United States, not
an alliance. In an alliance may be, a country would be obliged to
follow the strategic interests of its ally. In a partnership the partners
decide what is in their interests and what is not.
That brings me to my second point, the suspicion that India is becoming
a client state of the US is based on an unfortunate assumption that
India is a passive state, a pliant state that does not have the courage
to stand up and say ‘no’ to a stronger power. This is not borne out by
the facts of history. Let me give you a few examples. In the early
fifties when the West was scouting for allies, India definitely said
‘no’ to the United States. Similarly, when the Soviet Union requested
India, invited India to join the Asian Security Pact, our leadership
had the courage to stand up and say ‘no’, even though we were
dependent in many respects on the Soviet Union. In 1974 and 1998
India defied all the big powers and went ahead with its nuclear tests.
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Three years ago when the Americans requested us to send troops to
Iraq we decided it was not in our national interest and refused. So,
there is no question in my mind that India is not a country, which has
to say ‘yes’ even though something may be against its national
interest. Therefore the danger that India might one day become a
client state, a satellite of the United States is really far-fetched.
There is a third argument, which says that the US wants to use India
as a counterweight to China and this is against our national interest.
To this my response would be that the China-US relationship seems
to be much closer than even the Indo-US relationship seems at the
moment. In particular, the Chinese economic relationship with the
United States is certainly many times the size of the India-US
relationship. Our total trade, which is the highest so far with the
United States, last year was 22 billion dollars, compared to China’s
trade with the US, which was 125 billion dollars. It is not a question
of India being used as a counterweight to China, but there is an
interesting aspect that we must keep in our mind. It is true that our
relations with China have improved considerably since 1988 when
Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing. However, there are certain aspects of
Chinese policy, which are of concern to India. These are China’s
militarization and its interference in domestic affairs of our
neighbours. China is said to be building a ring of military facilities in
our neighbourhood. All these are matters of concern to India. The
Americans too have their misgivings about China’s military
programme and its aggressive posture in many international issues.
Therefore, I think we have a common interest, not in containing China,
which would be foolish, but in keeping an eye on China and finding
out how China’s policies may impact India.
Finally there is the argument that we should discourage American
investments in India because that will bring in American multinationals
and their presence is not a very desirable thing.  This is, of course,
something that our business community has to deal with. I think, the
best answer to this argument has been given by the Chief Minister of
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West Bengal, Shri Buddhadev Bhattacharya. When he was posed
this question Mr. Bhattacharya said he was not interested in what is
called the colour of capital. That, I think, is the right answer.
When we look at the present situation, there is certainly less of
misperception on both sides but there is still a lingering of the Cold
War mindset, which we have to deal with. To me, it is not so much a
question of misperception as, what I would call contravision. This is
something that I would like to present before you. In this entire
dialogue in the last five years with the United States, the Americans
are taking a very long term, very strategic view of how India fits into
their global framework. From India’s side we have taken a somewhat
shorter-term view of it and we are focused on the concrete advantages
that we can derive from the United States in the short run. We are
taking a somewhat tactical view of it as against the American strategic
viewpoint. This is a gap, which has to be bridged, and this is how
discussions like this in this kind of audience will bring the focus
together so that we do not have misunderstandings of the past.
I will stop at this. We have a time constraint and we are anxious to
hear our panelists. I will turn over to Dr. K. Subrahmanyam. I am
very pleased that he spent the better part of his life removing
misperceptions in American minds about India, and I find that he is
devoting a lot of time now removing Indian misperceptions about the
United States.
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam - Historical Overview of Indo-US
Relations
Thank you, Mr. Mansingh, and what you set out was a very
enlightening piece. Let me take it a little further. On the 26th of March,
last year, an American official, Mr. Philip Zelikow, first talked to the
press and said that that the United States proposes to help India to
become a world-class power in the twenty-first century. If such a
statement had been made by any other major power in the world, I
think the intelligence assessment machinery of that country, first of
all, would have been taken to task “You didn’t anticipate that this
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was going to be announced”. Secondly, it would have burnt midnight
oil to see what did the Americans meant by it. But in India we are
saying, “No, there must be a trap in it. There must be a conspiracy
behind it”.
The Americans are not noted for their charity. Therefore, if they are
saying this, they must be looking at their own self-interest. When
you look at the whole thing from their self-interest then you would be
able to have a better understanding of the United States and its policies
towards India - rather than if we continue with the bad memories we
have of the United States from the days of the Cold War. During the
days of the Cold War, the Americans despised India. Why? We were
dependent for food on them. We were beaten by the Chinese and they
thought that even the Pakistanis were going to beat us. It was later
that they started changing their views about us, because we were
able to beat the Pakistanis in 1971. In the eighties India’s economic
growth improved and this was followed by economic reforms. The
US realized that this was a new India that had survived fifty years as
the only democratic power in the developing world. Therefore the
US started looking at us seriously from 1989. As the Cold War was
winding down they started commissioning studies on India. There
was a whole series of studies on India that suggested that India had
no strategic thinking. These were followed up by subsequent studies
arguing the same.
As Ambassador Mansingh said, when the Americans take a long
term view of something, they prepare themselves. They have set up
a National Intelligence Council - which is a think tank attached to
the CIA, to provide long time assessments. This think tank has come
out with a document called ‘2020’ which says that the Chinese GDP
will overcome the American GDP in about twenty years’ time.
Thereafter China will continue to rise and the Americans are
reconciled to the Chinese GDP overtaking the American GDP. The
US is worried that China should not in any way overtake the United
States in its preeminence in terms of competition, including industrial
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production and innovativeness. The United States should remain the
foremost competitive and innovative power in the world.
Secondly, the American view of the world today has been set out
very clearly by Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice in an article on
11th December 2005 in the Washington Post, of which unfortunately
I found no mention in this country’s media. She says, “Today’s world
is a balance of power”. She doesn’t talk about a hyper power or
super power. On the other hand she uses language, which the
Americans have not used for sixty years. She says, “Underlying the
above policy is the limitation of our power and the justification for
our humility”. These are not words you have ever heard from the
United States. This is the first time a Secretary of State is saying
this. With only fourteen divisions, the US cannot do anything in Iraq.
Therefore, they are looking at the world. In the world of six powers
which constitute the balance of power, China is the nearest competitor,
breathing down their neck. Europe is the second competitor. Europe
is not an ally any longer because Europe does not need American
protection against a mutual enemy. If China and Europe are going to
be competitors, then the US needs other partners. They find India as
an English-speaking country, which has got the largest population in
the world, which will have a young age profile compared to China
and Europe and which has got a talented population, which has
contributed to the American science and technology, as a natural
partner. Condoleeza Rice has gone on record saying that if long term
US economic problems, including its social security problem, are to
be solved; the US will need partnership with India.
We should find out what is the US’ stake in India, in this partnership
and not look for traps. Rice has also said, “Since the signing of the
Westphalia Treaty in 1648, for the first time, among the major powers,
there cannot be talk of a war or violence. On the other hand there is
competition among them.” She goes on to say that terrorism and
pandemics are threats common to all. Bad governance in weaker
states can also create potential threats to the rest of the world. She
does not rule out war between a middle power and a great power,
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but rules out war among the six great major powers of the world.
For the first time India is included as one of the six major powers.
Unless we have a correct assessment of what the Americans are
trying to do, we will not be able to formulate effective policy. We
need to re-examine our assumptions on their good intentions and on
their being charitable. We must assume that they are doing everything
in their own interest. However, in pursuing their interest, what do
they need from us? How can we benefit from this? That is statecraft.
Unfortunately, we have not been used to statecraft, which was taught
in this country by Bheeshma or Chanakya. For instance, for the last
sixty years we knew of only one world, the world of bipolarity and
non-alignment. Therefore we are a little behind the times. We are still
trying to formulate policies to handle the new world and its new
balance of power.
The US realizes that it cannot contain China. Rice says, “You cannot
contain China. You have got to engage China”. As she said, how can
you contain China when you have over 200 billion dollars worth of
trade with China? The US never traded with the Soviet Union and
therefore could contain it. She understands and accepts that today
the US cannot contain China. Therefore you need a balance of power
in Asia, in which she says India must be there. They are doing this
because they have a larger vision, a larger scheme, a longer-term
plan, as Ambassador Mansingh rightly pointed out.
With regard to the nuclear deal, we are concerned that “they don’t
want us to go ahead with our fast breeder reactors.” Or “They want
to cap our arsenal.” The American interests now do not require capping
of our arsenal. The Bush administration doesn’t talk about our nuclear
arsenal. We take seriously what the Ayatollahs there are saying, and
not what the Bush administration is saying. The Bush administration
has never told you what kind of arsenal you should have. Bush has
announced a change in the thirty-year-old American policy of not
using plutonium. He says that is the only way in which one can solve
the future energy problem of the world. Therefore all the big nuclear
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powers should get together to use the plutonium. Use of plutonium
means fast breeder reactors. Therefore, the American policy now is
not to throttle fast breeder reactors anywhere in the world. Anybody
having done advanced research in fast breeders as we have done
would now be welcome. Of course, there remains the little problem
of getting exception from the existing US laws and getting the sanction
from the Congress. In negotiating the deal, our approach whether
fearful of the US or confidence in the US, will make a lot of difference.
At a recent Indo-US conference an Indian pharmaceutical man told
the Americans, that if the US cooperated with Indian pharma
companies, in five years, it will bring down US medical bills by 350
billion dollars – three percent of American GDP. Cheap Chinese
goods in America keep American inflation down by half a percent
and the Americans know that. Therefore, today it is not about the
military but about economics and technology. It is about scientific
research. The Americans are in a position to import brains and they
want to import Indian brains. They have taken note of the fact that
even as China ages India will remain young. Indian scientific-
technology community is also English speaking and has established
a major human bridge between the two countries. There are two
million Indians living in the US today. Despite problems in the past,
there is a major Indian Diaspora in the US. Whatever may have
been people’s view about the US, it still remains a preferred
educational and immigration destination over any other country. The
Americans are interested in outsourcing, establishing their R&D
businesses in India. They are pushing to implement this strategy
whether the Government of India agrees to it or not. You are not
going to be able to stop it.
It is this continuing obsession with the bipolar world and the
non-alignment, which, of course, was effective in the bipolar world.
But, today the bipolar world doesn’t exist. Today there is a balance
of power world. Therefore we have got to learn how to handle it.
The balance of power world itself gives one the flexibility to handle
it. One can buy things from anybody. One can trade with anybody.
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The American calculation is that in the next twenty years, India will
be within the first four trading nations of the world. The Indian market
will be the fourth or third largest market in the world.
There is another point I must emphasize. These are not the popular
views in the United States. The situation today is like the situation in
1971 when Kissinger went to Beijing. He kept his strategies so tightly
to himself; he would not share it even with the US Secretary of State,
William P. Rogers. Kissinger landed in Beijing and put forward his
strategy to Mao Zedong. He said that the US was prepared to help
China against the Soviet Union and asked the Chinese to switch over
and join them. The Chinese didn’t delve into history to say that just
fifteen year back the two had fought a war where two hundred
thousand Chinese and fifty thousand Americans had died. Mao
Zedong’s own son, a MiG pilot was killed in that war. Mao didn’t
suspect a trap in this American initiative. The same people who
conducted the ‘Hate America’ campaign previously were prepared to
take that step. How far did they go to please the Americans? How
many people in this country know that China gave military bases to
American to watch the Russian missile tests? The Chinese supported
Pol Pot regime in the U.N. China started a war with Vietnam to
please the Americans. There are people in this country who say that
we should have an independent policy like China. God save us if we
are going to have an independent policy like China! Therefore we
have got to think about this. This is totally a new situation.
The Americans started with a strategy of containment of the Soviet
Union in 1949-50. Their objective was to win that war without
fighting. Forty year later, they succeeded. The second strategic step
they took was befriending China and winning it away from Soviet
Union. They made China shed its communism and become capitalist.
They succeeded in this too. Of course, one may argue that the Chinese
got more out of it than the Americans. Now, they are trying to
strategize the other major world power, India. The US wants to see
how much its relations with India would help America to keep up its
pre-eminent position. It is our duty to see how much we get out of it.
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This is the present situation. If we look at it that way, then you would
find that many of the things that the Americans are doing fall into
place. Many of the overtures they are making are not traps but make
sense, because they are not hyper power or a super power. They
are the leading power in a balance of power world of six.
Chair: Thank you, Dr. K. Subrahmanyam. It is always a pleasure
hearing from you. Let me request Ambassador Nambiar to briefly
make his presentation.
Ambassador Vijay Nambiar - India’s Negotiating Approach and
Strategies in Foreign Policy
I shall certainly be brief. Let me first start by disagreeing with
Mr. K. Subrahmanyam in one respect at least when he says that
many people say India should be an independent power like China. I
think that China’s policy has been one of independence and that
independence has provided the confidence to take steps that it has
taken. China has not lost sight of some of the strategic problems that
it will have with the United States despite the fact that it is building
up very strong links on trade and in other areas. At the same time it
has built up a momentum in trade relations which makes it almost
impossible to have a confrontationist relationship. The kind of change
in the US policies is perhaps today a reflection of China’s extension
of its own policies of power in this evolving situation.
Both Ambassador Mansingh and Mr. K. Subrahmanyam have made
points, which make it less necessary for me to bring out any of the
elements to which they have referred. Let me refer first to “Perceptions
and Misperceptions” in terms of prisms. I am reminded of the Japanese
film Rashomon where six characters look at a single event from
different perspectives. Similarly, India and the USA look at things
from their own prisms and even the description of events tend to take
on a different dimension. There have of course been differences of
perception during the Cold War.
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There is a certain binary approach in terms of a negotiating position
with the United States, it doesn’t take the ‘neti-neti’ approach which
India does, which is an evolving, a very tenuous and tentative sense
of closing out certain areas and moving into areas of lesser and lesser
uncertainty. In our negotiations as well as in our approach to truth
we tend to be a lot more tentative and therefore we are much more
open-ended. This is expressed even in our diplomacy and in our
approach.
Ambassador Mansingh talked about the four Ps and he talked about
proliferation as one of them. Mr. K. Subrahmanyam also talked about
proliferation. I want to refer to that aspect in terms of the US approach
generally to proliferation. In the earlier years it was a very “nuanced”
approach. There are political reasons why the US adopts a particular
approach with regard to proliferation with each country. In 1961 for
example, there was a reference to what is called the McGeorge Bundy
memorandum, which talked about the anticipatory action pending
Chinese communist demonstration of a nuclear capability. This
showed that while the US would like to limit the number of nuclear
powers, so long as they lacked the capability to do so, they would
prefer that the first one be India and not China. But in 1974, after its
détente with China, following India’s underground nuclear explosion
the attitude changed. In a meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Kissinger
said that one of his colleagues suggested, in jest, that to oppose Indian
hegemonism they should think of supplying arms and nuclear weapons
to Pakistan and Bangladesh. Winston Lord was supposed to have
made that statement but it was mentioned in a political discussion to
the Chinese and the Chinese did not take it as a statement made in
jest. It showed the overall approach of the United States to
proliferation. Again in January of 1998 Robert Einhorn - now one of
the Ayatollahs of non-proliferation - talked about how China was
becoming an increasingly responsible state in the area of non-
proliferation. When Mr. Einhorn’s attention was brought to the fact
that ring magnets had been sent to Pakistan, he said that it must
have been done by non-state entities and in any case it was a very
piffling, a very small thing. A few months later the attitude towards
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the Indian underground nuclear test was diametrically opposite. So
the US does not really have any dogmatic commitment to non-
proliferation, but follows its larger political objectives in its non-
proliferation policy.
Today, in the context of post-September eleven, there is a new prism,
which emphasizes a lot more than just the traditional bipolar politics.
As Mr. K. Subrahmanyam has said, there is the question of keeping
US dominance in global affairs through innovativeness and
competitiveness. The question of democracy is a new element, which
has found renewed resonance. Condoleeza Rice’s article states, that
the fundamental character of regimes matter more today than the
international distribution of power. Supporting the growth of
democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of
fancy. It is the only realistic response to the present challenges. This
accounts for the increasing reference to the Indo-US global democracy
initiative. Another element in the new, let us say, the Bush prism, is
‘big democracy’, the sense of India being a big democracy of a billion
people with 600 million voters. Apart from this, the liberalising
economy, the common pluralistic societies and the melting pot are
similarities between India and the US. The US is also looking at
India as a countervailing power against China.
While the question of confronting China is obviously out of place in
the present context, but there is a real concern about the impact of
China’s growth. This was graphically emphasized by Professor Ken
Lieberthal recently in one of his articles. He argues that as China
becomes the global manufacturing center, America’s dealing with it
requires addressing domestic changes involving education, wages and
pensions issues. These issues are now calling into question, elements
of America’s domestic social contract. This is the way in which the
Americans see the emerging economic impact of China on the US
and its society. Lieberthal suggests that China is beginning to
exemplify a different global development model – a Beijing consensus
as distinct from a Washington consensus. While the latter posits open
economies and financial systems, and is premised on the superiority
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of democratic politics, the Beijing consensus posits far more state
intervention in the economy, concern for political stability, and strong
government to guide the development process. Therefore, while China
makes this major engagement with the United States, it hasn’t lost
sight of its essential base, concerns and priorities. That is essentially
what should inform and is, in a sense, informing the Indian negotiating
approach as well as our overall foreign policy strategy. However,
there has not been a deep kind of study made of the long term of the
evolution of Indo-US relations. Perhaps the Task Force is one effort
to try and see the long-term implications of these global strategic
developments.
One should identify at least three elements of this long-term
development. Firstly, the continuing salience of democracy and
institutions of the open society despite the obviously binary approach
which the United States will adopt in its engagements. The US has
adopted a binary approach in terms of whether or not institutions of
democracy in a particular situation are going to work to their
advantage or not. Obviously there will be those kind of differences
which we will have in our interface with the United States. The
essential fact is that the salience of democracy is increasingly accepted
by the United States.
The second is, of course, the question of keeping the strength and
economic power of the United States. It is to meet these challenges
that the US needs the strength of India. In some ways, there is a fit in
terms of the emerging relationship between India and the United States.
Here the demographic dynamic is an important aspect. In addition to
what Mr. K. Subrahmanyam has said, I refer to George Bush’s recent
statement where he argued that it would be a mistake to not to
encourage more bright people who can fill the jobs that are not getting
filled up in America. He called upon the Congress to be realistic and
raise the H1B visa cap.
The US idea of a partnership is obviously different from ours. It is a
question of looking at things from a common perspective. It is their
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expectation, from their prism, that if you are going to share a
partnership you are going to look at issues in a similar fashion. Even
when India and the US might have concerns that are not very different
for example in the case of Iran, but there is an inability to appreciate
some of the nuances of our geographical location, cultural interaction
and our diplomatic constraints. I think, it is up to us to be able to
impart some kind of education to diplomats in the United States of
our concerns and of our constraints. I think that is happening. The
question of whether or not in the actual pursuit of their objectives
their drive is a little overwhelming. They try to divide Indian opinion,
individuals have been commenting on division of public opinion in
India. This again one should say is fair game because that’s the job
of any diplomatic activity. I would say that if some of the rigidity,
some of the gaucherie, as it were, of diplomatic practice, it should
not affect the larger relationship. That perhaps is at the nub of some
of the controversies that arise in our dealing with the United States in
terms of the diplomatic interface. Having said that, I think, I will
stop. Thank you.
Dr. Lawrence Prabhakar – Major Milestones and Turning Points
and Their Implications for the Future of Indo-US Relations
At the outset I thank God for the opportunity to speak at this seminar.
I thank Dr. Kasturirangan, Professor Chandrashekar, Professor
Vijayalakshmi and Arvind Kumar for enabling me to do this. Indo-
US relations stand at the threshold of a transformation. I would like
to highlight three points for discussion. I will look at Indo-US relations
from a perspective of the neo-realist theories and the balance of power
paradigm which Dr. K. Subrahmanyam eloquently elucidated.
Secondly, there is the competitive dynamics of bilateral relations and
the respective national interest which has been waxing and waning.
The demands of respective national, political and economic
considerations have determined the strategic perspective of India and
the United States. Thirdly, there have also been cooperative initiatives
that have fostered bilateral interdependence between the United States
and India that have worked in terms of the national, regional and
global concerns. The specific visions of grand strategy of the United
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States and India have both reinforced and acted against the interests
of both these countries in the pursuit of transformed relationships.
That brings me to what we could call the major milestones and turning
points that have implications for future India-US relations. First, I
would like to mention the epochal years of the Indo-US relations,
which span fifty years and the various issues and challenges that
have been eloquently elucidated in various works by Indian and
American scholars. Secondly, there are what we could call the issues
and challenges of the global milieu, the global arena, which have
impacted on the United States and India. Thirdly, what is now being
envisioned as the transformational dynamics and what are the future
pathways in India-US relations?
Looking at these three major objectives, we have about five different
variations coming in India-US relations. The aspect of estrangement
to engagement is one of the most important issues that has been
debated. In this context, there has always been strong autarchic
formations in India’s economic and foreign policy that determine the
pace of India-US relations. Indians have always had what one author
says “the power of argument” where non-alignment was the premise
rather than the argument of power. Of course, there has always been
the US obsession with Pakistan and the hyphenation between India
and the United States. This basically puts us into what is called the
first phase of ‘the roots of estrangement’. I am not going into the
details but there are several milestones of the roots of estrangement,
which starts as early as the Asian Relations Conference of 1947,
India’s drift to the Soviet Union, India’s reliance on US food aid.
Those have been major trigger points that led to the estrangement.
The second point is what you could call the realms of convergence,
where India had to rely on the United States. This refers to the Chinese
aggression of 1962. Then we find limited realms of convergence.
Between 1965 and 1989 there have been very strong reasons for
divergence even as India began to reassert its own autonomous foreign
and security policy. Starting from the 1965 war and running all the
way down to the US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978.  This is
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the period of India’s reassertion to be an autonomous power. 1990 to
2004, I call this as the ‘reemerging engagement’ between India and
the United States because the transformed geopolitical and geo-
strategic milieu. This led to increasing convergence between India
and the United States. In this whole process, it has been India that
has offered leveraging strength to the United States than the other
way around. This re-emphasizes the fact that India’s strategic
autonomy has always been there whether it is in cooperation with the
United States in the global war on terror or in terms of a specific
role, like the unique Indian role in the India ocean. There is much
maritime convergence between India and the United States in the
Indian Ocean in securing the sea lanes of communication. With these
paradigms, I look into the basic changes which have come into Indo-
US relations there.
I’d just like to mention a few important points, which will be possible
pathways in India-US relations in the transformed milieu. We could
expect perhaps not competition or cooperation but strategic
convergence. Convergent security today is the dominant paradigm of
international relations theory. India has to address the asymmetry
deficit between India and the United States by looking into convergent
areas and avoiding incongruent areas. There are core competencies
of India that basically leverage India into better negotiating position.
The buzzwords of today in terms of India-US relationship have been
jointness and interoperability that would be the basis for a pragmatic
basis of India-US relations in a transformed view. Thank you for the
opportunity.
Chair: I now invite Ambassador Arundhati Ghose to identify some
of the points that came up during the panel discussions and to offer
her comments, after which we would like to have a discussion.
Discussant- Ambassador Arundhati Ghose: Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman. It is very difficult to comment on these excellent
presentations, which have been made. I’ll try and make a few
comments about the issue we are dealing with which is really this
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session which is ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions’. I think
Ambassador Mansingh and Mr. K. Subrahmanyam have dealt with
these misperceptions of the US. One should not look only at the
facts. What is the impact? The world has changed. We have to
adapt to a changed world and what is the situation in which we do
this adaptation? Mr. K. Subrahmanyam said that one could approach
it with fear or with confidence. We all know fear is a very dangerous
thing on which to take decisions. In my view, so is overconfidence. I
think prudence has a role to play because where does the ability or
any strategy to deal with a new situation come from? It comes on the
basis of experiences of the past.
There have been changes in the US policy. One believes that the
Bush Administration is friendly towards India. They would like to
help India in our efforts to become a big power for whatever reasons.
Mr. K. Subrahmanyam has identified what their reasons are likely to
be. What our reasons are is not so clear, apart from wanting to take
maximum benefits out of the current situation. More important, to
be able to cope with a single superpower or maybe a leading power,
may not be a single superpower. The US is the leading power, which
has a lot going for it vis-à-vis India. India has much less. I mean, the
Indian expatriate community is as much of an influence on Indian
decision-making as it is on the US decision-making. In fact, it has
more influence on Indian decision-making. Similarly the US market
is of interest to us just as our market is of interest to them. Politically,
the US dominates the world and these are not misperceptions, if you
don’t mind.
I would like to make one or two points which have to do with what
Professor Vijayalakshmi mentioned earlier. You know she has done a
whole series of questions, like ‘common interests’. Mr. Nambiar
mentioned ‘a binary approach’. This is true. Language means different
things to different people. The India and the US may understand
‘partnership’ differently. Just because we speak English, doesn’t mean
we think in English, or think English or think American. We are coming
from elsewhere. There is a gap, which needs to be consistently,
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steadily overcome. When we have common interests, what does
this mean? The way to achieve these common interests, let us say in
Iran or in Vienna? Neither the US nor India wants a nuclear-armed
Iran. This is the government’s position. Our way of achieving it is by
de-escalation, persuade Iran to not go the nuclear weapons way,
keep the United States within the multilateral process. The US’ way
is to take the issue to the UN Security Council, where there is a
threat of sanctions. We are both right in our own ways, but we don’t
agree on the way in which to achieve the same objective. So, we
have that kind of a problem, which will arise. It will arise between
two friendly countries.
There is a multilateral process, which is where India also situates
itself, which can be put into action if the rest of the world does not
agree with the US point of view. It has happened in the Chemical
Weapons Convention. If the rest of the world does not agree with the
US point of view, they will do it through the enabling legislation
within their own country. In law, domestic legislation has primacy
over international. I am talking about a difference, not in the interest,
but in the way in which you achieve the interest. It is not necessarily
either estrangement or confrontation, not hostility.
We have a Defence agreement with the US. I do not know how
many people know anything about it. Nobody talks about it. Without
that Defence Agreement, I do not believe July 18th Statement was
possible. Of course, the Defence Agreement would not have been
there unless these sanctions were going to be lifted. But we never
talk about the Defence Agreement. We need to study it in detail and
see what it means.
Finally, in the context of the nuclear deal, I would suggest prudence
rather than confidence. Or fear, because confidence may become
overconfidence. It does not mean that we have a wide vision and for
that we give up our strategic alternative. No government can take a
decision on what our credible minimum deterrent should be, unless
they are faced with a particular situation. At the moment, somebody
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might say two dozen weapons are fine for us. However, this may
change five years down the line or ten years down the line. Can you
take any actions today which would stop future governments from
taking a decision on a credible minimum deterrent? So, all I am saying
is, one is not against the Indo-US nuclear deal. I think July 18th was
a very good deal. I am just worried that if we think that it is going to
solve our problems, it is not. Even if it takes a longer time I think it is
worth it, if we get the sanctions lifted against which we have fought
for thirty years.
The issue really is that we are two different cultures; we are talking
to each other. It is not to do with just misperceptions. We are different
cultures. When we try and understand each other speaking in a
language as ambiguous as English, I think, you do have a problem in
understanding on an issue, which affects your national security, it is
natural that we would be somewhat wary.
Finally, this question about whether it is fair for an embassy to divide
Indian public opinion. Yes, I did say that. I do not think that it is fair.
If the embassy feels it is fair, I do not think it is fair for us to be
divided. What the embassy tries is its own business. I do not think
that any negotiator, be he the National Security Adviser or the Prime
Minister himself, can go forward with a split country behind him.
The idea is to build up this consensus, showing what is in India’s
interest. There is not that consensus. That is quite clear to all of us.
Chair: Thank you, I want to thank Ambassador Ghose for those
comments. I am sorry that constraints of time prevent us from hearing
more from her. But we now have a very brief period of discussion.
Let me request the audience to raise queries or make comments.
Question: The United States is very different from the Bush
administration. Today Mr. George Bush is in the sixth year of his
term. He is virtually a lame duck. He is an extremely weak president
who is going to find it very difficult to get a consensus on any issue,
within the Senate, the House, and with US public opinion. Our time
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will probably be better spent meeting corporates in the US than meeting
people in the Congress. These groups may be much more helpful to
India than the Administration. We should take diplomacy beyond the
narrow confines of dealing with the Administration and take it in a
much broader context and build up opinion there.
Question: That there may be a terrorist group in possession of an
atomic weapon anywhere from Multan to Maghreb is very much
operating in the European and American mind here. We probably
don’t react in the same way here. There is a different in perception of
how things will be twenty years down the line. There is an energy
crunch giving rise to tough competition for energy resources. So,
how should India evolve its thinking in terms of these factors?
Question: I have got a brief question for Mr. K. Subrahmanyam. In
the context of the recent Russian-American Cooperation Agreement
on processing of the spent fuel and the delay in the finalisation of the
India-US nuclear deal, there are two aspects - one is the strategic
aspect of availability of plutonium for India. Second is the economic
and commercial aspect of India being a partner in selling and dealing
with the spent fuel. In the absence of the finalisation of the agreement,
would India lose out in the commercial and economic sphere while
we may still gain in the strategic sphere?
Comment: I just wanted to comment on the question of perceptions
and misperceptions. As it was rightly pointed out, there are two levels
one can look at it – in terms of societal perceptions and misperceptions
and the political world. The political world has been amazing in terms
of the transformation that you see now. Going back to the fifties and
sixties, if I may just take one or two minutes, I am reminded of
statements made like Dean Acheson in his memoirs “Present at the
Creation” where he has said in the context of non-alignment, “If
the world is round, the Indians must be standing on their heads”.
Then there is this unfortunate statement by Daniel Patrick Moynihan
who said that all that India has to export is communicable diseases.
Getting back to Kissinger’s comment about the meeting between
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Mrs. Gandhi and Nixon where he says it was a dialogue of the deaf.
I am also reminded of another statement made by Scott Reid, the
former High Commissioner of Canada to India, in terms of the
perceptions of the Americans about Krishna Menon, whereby they
said Krishna Menon used the fuzziness of his expression to deceive
the Americans. But Scott Reid said, “I did not get that perception at
all in dealing with Indians or in dealing with Krishna Menon.” My
point here is that I think, we see perhaps the type of misperceptions
that have surfaced in the political world, in the official circles are a
reflection of the state of relations between the two countries at that
point of time. We don’t see that happening now as often as we have
experienced in the past.
Chair: Let me ask Dr. K. Subrahmanyam to respond first. Firstly to
the question regarding the twenty-year perspective, whether there is
any such perspective available, then on the proposed Russian-
American cooperation on the use of spent nuclear fuel and then the
question about the strategic and tactical aspects, whether any studies
have been undertaken to identify these two areas.
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: Thank you very much. First, on our side
we do not have any such long-term studies or long-term perceptions.
Let us be very clear about it. We do not even have a structure for
these things. Just as Mr. Nambiar said even the very creation of this
taskforce is considered to be a first step. Whether it would get
thereafter institutionalized in some form or not, we don’t know. But,
as a whole, in this country, one must finally agree with George Tanham
that we do not have a strategic culture as yet. What was the second
question?
The Russians and the Americans evidently have been talking about
this energy policy in which the plutonium will be put into use and
will be made available to other countries commercially, and then they
will take it back, even the reprocessed material and in due course
that will finally bring down the amount of waste material which has
got to be dealt with to a much smaller quantity. This has been under
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discussion for quite some time. Ambassador Ronen Sen said he knew
of these discussions when he was Ambassador in Moscow and
therefore evidently this is something which the Russians and
Americans have been talking for quite some time. Now they have
brought into it other countries including China and Japan. The question
whether we would get into it or not will depend upon whether we are
able to successfully conclude the agreement with the Americans on
the nuclear issue or we want to plough a lonely furrow on that. That
is a question which people may raise with Dr. Kakodkar when he
comes.
Thirdly, what is the threat perception? The threat perception of other
countries today is not about a major war among the major countries
but there is threat perception of two kinds. One is the role of non-
state actors. There is a threat of non-state actors using either a dirty
bomb or chemical or biological weapons. Some of these rogue nations
and rogue scientists being involved in it and handing it over to jihadis
is a real concern.
Then there is a perception of what they call ‘the failing states’. In
this, of course, sometimes they have included Pakistan in that category,
being a passage for various kinds of threats to the stable international
order, and passing through those states. Today even if you have got a
weak government, even aviation flu can be a threat and a weak
government may not be able to tackle it, and therefore it is those
kinds of threats which dominate the thinking of people these days.
Chair: About the question on information on nuclear, defence and
other issues and does the government plan to disseminate such
information? I have looked around, I can’t see anybody from
government and therefore I will ask Ambassador Nambiar to respond.
Ambassador Nambiar: I am not from the Ministry of External Affairs
or the Ministry of Defence. I can say that much. I don’t know if in
the present instance whether there has been any deficit of information
as compared to other occasions. Perhaps there is a difference in
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terms of the extent to which it has been covered in the press. The
polarization of opinion which has taken place within the country has
perhaps led to a questioning which leads to the impression that there
is a deliberate hiding of information. My impression is that there is
no such thing at all.
Chair: Professor Arunachalam, do you have some comments?
Dr. Arunachalam: I think most of the information is available if we
are really looking for it. I think I will leave it at that.
Chair: Any other questions or comments? Happily none. So, thank
you very much for your patience.
Summary of the session
Many participants felt that Americans by and large were ignorant
about India. There were misperceptions at all levels about India - its
people, its society and about the overall economic growth of the
country. Indians too have not been able to understand Americans.
Cold War compulsions reinforced misperceptions on both sides.
India’s pioneering role in the Non Aligned Movement created
misperceptions in the minds of key policy makers in the United States
about whether India could be trusted. Cold War rivalry and John
Foster Dulles’ labeling of NAM as immoral added to these
misperceptions.
US – Pakistan relations also further reinforced misperceptions. The
US belief that Pakistan was dedicated to fighting communism has
shaped the thinking of the members of the strategic community in
the US However, this assumption was never true. The emergence
of Pakistan as a strategic ally of the US created many irritants in the
Indo-US relationship.
The US could never understand India’s obsession with socialism
and the adoption of a mixed economy model for development. In the
past the US has also, at times, linked economic aid to India with
conditionalities of compliant political behaviour.
54
On nuclear proliferation, the US has always been against India
becoming a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). It has consistently
proposed a “cap, roll-back and eliminate” policy for India. Even after
the end of the Cold War, proliferation related high technology controls
have been a major obstacle towards the building of mutual trust
between the two sides.
There were also differences within India about how to view the US.
Many Indians saw the US as a land of opportunity. The US has been
a preferred destination for Indians seeking higher education for nearly
five decades. However, Indians occupying official positions have
largely held negative opinions of US Government intentions. To many,
the CIA hand or some hidden agenda was possibly behind every
negative happening within the country.
These misperceptions between the two countries have created a
historical divergence in Indo-US relations that has significantly shaped
and dominated strategic thinking on both sides.
There was consensus that the Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush
Joint Statement of July 18th, 2005 did represent a significant shift in
the US position with respect to India. There was also agreement that
this shift has been able to create a positive atmosphere that might be
able to change some of the misperceptions on both sides.
All participants agreed that the “civilian nuclear deal”, part of the
July 18th Joint Statement was a major contributor to the current
positive climate. The tacit recognition of India as a de-facto NWS
lent credence to the major shift in the nature of the relationship. Many
participants felt that the nuclear deal and its successful culmination
would be an important element in testing the robustness of the new
relationship.
Participants differed in their views on how the emerging relationship
was likely to unfold. Some participants felt that the relationship is
asymmetric and likely to be dominated by the US. They felt that the
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Indo-US partnership would reduce India to a client state. They drew
subtle distinctions between partnerships and alliances.
Others felt that the US needs India as a counterweight to China and
that the relationship would be more interdependent giving India some
leverage in managing the relationship. Key policy makers in the US
want to help India become a global power. Instead of understanding
and exploiting this initiative, India has been looking for conspiracies
behind US intentions. India must not suspect the US in the way it
used to during the Cold War years. India needs to stop looking for
traps in all American initiatives. The US seems to have a long-term
view of how India fits in with their larger global strategic interests.
Does India have a long-term plan for developing a cordial and healthy
relationship with the US?
Participants pointed out that the issue was not about dealing with
misperceptions in Indo-US relations. The real issue was how India
should deal with the changed security environment. How can India
reposition and adapt herself to the new geo-political milieu? The
problem was not with India becoming a world power. The problem
was rather what India would do after becoming a world power.
Most participants felt that there was no doubt that the US is and
would continue to be the most important player in the geopolitical
arena – at least as far as India is concerned. Therefore, improving
Indo-US relations was crucial for long-term development and growth
in the country.
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Chair: Prof. K.P. Vijayalakshmi
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: I have some announcements. Dr. Anil
Kakodkar is arriving shortly that is by one o’clock. So we thought
that instead of breaking in between for lunch, we could accommodate
the economic session and then go straight with Dr. Kakodkar’s special
discussion at one and have lunch after that. It would save us a little
bit of time because if we break now and then wait, the economic
session gets delayed. But he is going to be here definitely by quarter
to one. So we are starting our economic session where we have two
presentations. I am sorry that the structure that we had, has
somewhat taken a different dynamic by itself and we will have to
adapt to changes to the original programme. This session is actually
called “Emerging dynamics of Indo-US Economic Relations” which
will start now. I imagine that with a lot of allusions made to the
power of economics, the power of trade and all that we will find this
session illuminating. We are going to begin this session with Professor
Manoj Pant, who will focus on prospects for larger trade with the
US and also the challenges and opportunities that face India as it
moves forward in the trading world. Professor Chandrashekar, will
present Professor Agarwal’s paper on “Suspicious Cooperation to
Uneasy Negatiations in Indo-US Relations” and critique it for us.
Thank you very much.
Professor Pant is from the School of International Studies. He is a
specialist on international trade and development and has several
articles and books to his credit and he is also well known for writing
columns in the newspapers and periodicals in which he tells the
government what is it that it can actually do to prevent any kind of
take over. So I think with that small introduction I will leave it to
Professor Pant to start this session. Thank you.
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Prof.  Manoj Pant – Indo-US Trade Relations and Potential for
Future Cooperation
Thank you, Viji. I would also like to thank NIAS and Dr. Kasturirangan
for inviting me here today. The session suits me because I have to
leave by the four thirty flight because I am off Saturday again
somewhere.
I was asked to speak on Indo-US Economic Relations. Since the
morning, I have been listening with great interest because like all
economists we are so busy with our own terminology that we often
forget that the other world is also building up its own terminology. It
was quite fascinating hearing what people were saying - what someone
thinks we should do, what person A said to B and person B said to C.
I ultimately came to realise that trade is fortunately never between
persons A, B and C. Trade is between a whole lot of companies and
consumers in one country and companies and consumers in the other
country. The issue therefore really is - has the end of the Cold War
changed economic relations perceptibly? That is of course the issue
that I am going to talk about. But I would also look at the more
important issue - what do economic relations grow out of?
Challenging perceptions
Speaking anecdotally, I remember in 1991- 93 that I was visiting
Columbia University. I was having dinner at the house of a friend of
mine from the Indian Embassy. A lot of people from the Indian
delegation including the security gurus were there. It was the year
when Pakistan was trying to raise the human rights issue in the UN
Human Rights Committee. Now during dinner after getting involved
in all the discussions, the whole question of what we must do to
change US perceptions came up. “We must do something. We must
send so-and-so to talk to so-and-so”. I said “I think I have a simpler
solution because I have lived for many years in that country. The
simpler solution is what we must do to change US perceptions”.
Further, the even simpler solution is “Try to change perception of the
US in the US. Don’t try to change the perception outside the US. Try
to change the perception of the US people and not just of a few
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individuals because ultimately that is how change originates. The
best way of doing that is by trying to engage the universities and
that’s where opinion is formed rightly or wrongly”. A start could be
made by making a few appointments of people who teach about
Indian issues in American universities. It is good to see that this has
been happening since then. I think that this is very important.
Let me tell you some of the aspects of India’s strategies in changing
US perception today. We recently completed a course for the Bush
School of International Relations at the University of Texas, Austin.
They had asked a colleague of mine (then in Maine) if he could conduct
some courses for their students. They wanted to know that if we
could do some short-term courses for them, as they wanted to be
aware of the Indian political, economic and legal issues. They actually
paid a fair amount to our university for us to conduct these courses.
The minute they got back we got a whole host of people asking us
whether they could also have courses conducted for them. We said “
No, we don’t normally conduct this course. This was a one-of-a kind
thing.” But these are ways of engaging an institution that will have a
multiplier effect in changing perceptions.
Now, the difference is that the Americans today are extremely
perceptive that the Indian mindset is very different. Indian mindsets
do not understand the American and the Indian mindset still thinks of
the “ugly American”. I think, they (the Americans) are trying their
very best to do something about it. Yet we always think about how to
change a Strobe Talbot’s mindset or somebody else’s mindset and
not about changing the thinking of people as such.
Indo-US Economic Strategic Relations
I have heard a lot about Indo-US strategic relations. Now from the
economic perspective the relationship could possibly be strategic in
the long run for the US. I think I do agree by and large with what Dr.
K. Subrahmanyam said earlier. But can it be strategic for India?
Certainly not. Strategic is something, which you can leverage for
your own benefit. What is India’s economic relation today with the
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US that you can leverage for your own benefit? I will be happy to
give you a few numbers later on if somebody wants but it is important
to ask whether there has been a change.
First of all have the economic reforms of 1991 made a change in
India. Certainly. From a total trade (total value of exports and imports
on GDP), which was 10% in 1991 it is now near about 30% after
India opened up to the world economy. This is very important because
it says that out of every three rupees earned or made by the inland
economy, one comes from someone engaged in trade. In other words,
India is a trading nation - not a very big trading nation yet - but
certainly a trading nation. The first important thing to understand is
that India is in the trade world. Secondly, can India afford to ignore
US in the trading world because we felt our strategic partnership is
not a good thing? No, we cannot ignore the US, as the USA constitutes
30% of the world market. Now, I have heard a lot of talk about
China. But China only constitutes about 5% of the world exports.
So, it is not the same thing. You cannot say I am going to be part of
the world trade environment, I am going to trade but I am going to
ignore the US. That is obviously not possible.
Now where have we gone as far as trade is concerned? Well, as far as
I know, the last figure I know is for 2004 - a figure that was supplied
to the WTO by government statistics. The USA is not India’s major
trading partner. India’s major trading partner is the European Union
(EU), which accounts for about 23% of India’s exports but the US
with about 18% is very important. Of course, if you take the fact that
the EU is not one entity but a divided house, (particularly France and
some other countries) then I guess the single largest trade partner of
India would be the USA followed by the UK. And the next big partner
who has emerged only in the last three years is China / Hong Kong,
which accounts for almost 10%. So you do have to think about trade
relations with China, which I will comment on later. That is the first
statistic as far as the partnership is concerned.
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The second statistic that might be worth looking at is that India has
always had a balance of trade surplus with the US in recent years.
Now this was a great thing in the seventies because India was really
constrained by the availability of foreign exchange. Anyone who was
involved in the planning process in the seventies and sixties would
know that whenever any particular programme which involved foreign
exchange outflow was suggested to the Planning Commission the
government said, “No., No, No. That we can’t do. The one thing we
don’t have is foreign exchange.” But foreign exchange is not a
constraint any more - at least not in the near future. So one cannot
say a trade relationship which is based on the surplus, - India has a
fairly large trade surplus as far as the US is concerned - is a good
thing. I think we have to think of ways of buying many other things
from them. But it is a fact that the trade surplus has been very much
in India’s favour and they don’t buy very much from us. They buy
about one third of what we sell to them. That is the second statistic as
far as bilateral trade is concerned. The bilateral trade is about 21-22
billion dollars. The second highest bilateral trade is India-China at
about 13 billion dollars or so. One thing however is interesting to
note though. It is too early to talk about trends. In the last one year or
so US exports to India increased by about 20%. This is a much higher
increase in their exports than the increase to any other country in the
world. There does seem to be some engagement taking place here.
Foreign Direct Investment [FDI]
One other aspect of the relation is also very important, and that is
Foreign Direct Investment or FDI. Of course, we know that the US
by far is the largest single foreign investor in India. Actually the
numbers tell you that roughly about 20% of the stock of FDI in India
is held by the US. I think it is higher because one of the largest
partners of India as far as FDI is concerned is Mauritius but as we
all know Mauritius does not do anything. Mauritius is basically a
tax haven. If some one could disentangle the effect of Indian investment
from Mauritius into the UK investment from Mauritius and the US
investment from Mauritius then I think the figures will be still higher.
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But certainly in foreign investment USA is the largest investor as far
as India is concerned.
Services and Trade
Now we come to one more statistic namely the role of services. This
is really the big thing, which I will talk about. Not just because people
talk about IT services. Now, notice one thing. IT services have nothing
to do with the strategic partnership between India and the US. In fact
IT services have nothing to do with either the Indian government or
the US government.
In 1995 when the export of IT services from India started, the Indian
government in WTO was arguing that we should not have services as
part of the WTO. Now they are of course having some problems
with that. But India was the most vocal opponent of including services
as part of the WTO agreement, because they did not know what was
going to happen. Ironically, the joke in the economic circles is that
we were doing quite well so far but now that the government has
heard we are doing well, IT services might start dropping because
the government is actively involved in the process. The exports of IT
services from India to USA had nothing to do either with the US
government or the Indian government. But it had a lot to do with the
Indian Diaspora. The fact remains that had there been no Silicon
Valley there would have been no Bangalore IT Valley either. For
instance, the clusters we have seen - Bangalore is one and of course,
Delhi, Gurgaon is the other big cluster - these IT-centered clusters
that have developed, are only the relocation of Indians from Silicon
Valley to India. Today when companies in the US ask for Indians to
want to head offices in India, they have a waiting list. So it is not as
if it has got something to do with simple plain labour or cost saving.
It has got nothing to do with any strategies. It is simply that the US
economy, in order to remain competitive vis-à-vis their biggest
competitor (not China but Europe) they have to go to India for the
IT services because of the labour costs on which they have to
spend money.
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IT, Outsourcing issues
The second reality before I leave the numbers about the US is
something that I discovered a few days back. I am told (it is reported
in many talk shows in the US) something that I think is an amazing
reality. 42% of single unwed US women are below the poverty line.
It is an amazing statistic. 42% of US women, single women,
workingwomen, all women are below the poverty line. Now that is
something, which has to be addressed by the people of the US. Frankly
many of them are in the poverty line because the jobs they have lost
have all gone to India. The problem with IT services is they are so
easy to relocate anywhere in the world. You don’t have to close down
a factory. It takes only days to move an IT industry from one location
to another. It doesn’t take too long. But that’s a problem that they
have to address, too. I don’t think the American Administration is
aware of this. This is now being aired very popularly on television
and believe me the US President worries more about what comes on
the “Johnny Carson show” or the” Oprah Winfrey show” than what
comes from Rashtrapati Bhavan in India. So that is one very important
thing and one statistic that one might remember.
Strategic Partnership in Economics: Major irritants
Now coming to the issue of what is this strategic partnership that
India has with the US in the domain of economics. I have already
mentioned that it is almost zero in terms of India’s leverage. But
that’s not the way to look at it. It may be zero for the US. What is it
for you? There are two major issues where trade with US is going to
be very, very important. One is in the field of textiles. Now textiles
are the most crucial sector in India as far as poverty removal is
concerned because they are mostly small-scale industries. Now there
may be some displacement of the small-scale industry by the large
scale, but still there is a partnership between the large and small. The
country, which can determine your future as far as textiles are
concerned, is the US. There is a EU market too for textiles. But the
EU is a very small niche government market.  The big mass market,
which the Chinese exploit, is the US. So, this is going to be a major
area where India is going to keep after the US. Unless you reduce
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tariffs (in some areas where India exports to the US the tariffs are
as high as 50%) you are going to have problems. Now, people will
tell you that the average US tariff is about 3 to 4 %. It is however
close to 50% - between 20 and 50% - on items exported from India
to the US.
The other major irritant in Indo-US trade relations is in fact fisheries.
This is of course now the subject of a separate agreement. If you
actually go down to some of the coastal areas such as Kerala or
Tamil Nadu or maybe in Orissa, for heavens sake do not talk to them
about Indo-US strategic partnership. They will either shoot you or
themselves or do both. The fishing industry is extremely upset because
some of the detention procedures, some of the traceability requirements
– I wont go into all the boring details - are really creating problems
for poor Indian fishermen.
Indian Interests and Initiatives
Give these constraints and the logic of Indo-US economic relations
what assessment can be made on the causes and trajectory of economic
relations between India and the US. More fundamentally - what is
India’s initiative? What is India’s interest? Obviously the Indian
Economic reforms after 1991 are not a guarantee to better economic
relations as they were supposed to be. There are still a lot of forces
that would like to reverse it. The danger is that while one cannot go
back to the pre 1991 situation we can come pretty close to that. The
fact is that until there are reasonable grounds to show that economic
relations - whether strategic or real - are going to make a difference
on the ground level it will not become critical. As Dr. K.
Subrahmanyam also mentioned this is precisely the American position.
One thing I think the US and in particular the Republican government
is serious about, is that they are actually opposed to any barriers to
the IT trade though it is creating some differences at the ground level.
The IT trade may make a major difference in the US not only with
respect to relations with India but with other countries too. It could
be the Philippines or some other place. Does the same logic hold
good for India? Both India and the US have one thing in common.
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We both have to be democratic societies. The Chinese do not get
affected in the same manner. Unless these gains are projected at the
ground level, it is going to be the “big irritant”. From the Indian
point of view, if IT exports do fall, then there is going to be a big
problem because it is a very big item. I may quickly mention that
tourism, which used to be a big foreign exchange earner till the mid-
nineties, is now replaced by service exports. In fact India’s current
account surplus, except for the last year, has remained positive only
because of the IT exports as part of services exports. Here two things
are important in the India-US partnership. One is that there should
be no move to try to prevent this. This can be done. Remember that
the Services Agreement is still not finalized. The modalities are all
being worked out. This is also not going to last for ever. The English
advantage will last for some time, maybe five years more. This
advantage will be replaced by other countries and by machines in the
next five years. India needs to move up the value chain. India cannot
do this without strategic technological partnership with the US, who
is the major partner, because, it is in their interest, too. Not in the
interest of the Administration, but the interest of the American
companies. They had a problem in the eighties and nineties as all
their studies showed that the US productivity and competitiveness
were declining vis-à-vis the European countries. It is therefore evident
that they need this partnership to improve their productivity.
The second issue of significance is that of technological partnership.
The third important factor in Indo-US economic relationship is this
cultural person-to- person contacts. The US is where almost all the
migrating Indians are. One can easily ask “ Why don’t I start a
strategic partnership with let’s say, Papua New Guinea? No one knows
where it is.” In fact, amazingly, almost every single politician or
senior bureaucrat, who do make a difference to these things, has
some relative or the other who is actually in the US or works in the
US. It is an important factor, very difficult to change. I don’t see how
any government can change that. I don’t think even the Left could
change that. So that’s very important – these cultural people-to-
person contacts actually move India.
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Finally, why is this particular Indo-US relationship more important
than let us say the Indo-China relationship or the Indo-Australian
relationship? Because it is based on the fact that India has a labour
cost advantage. Indo-China trade is not based on a labour cost
advantage. India is not going to be able to sell the option of more
trade in this country unless people get involved and unless people get
jobs. They are only going to be able to do that if some country comes
to your country and buys from you something that their own labour
cannot provide economically.
Indian and Chinese models: A Comparison
However it is not possible to expect that India is going to have a
great India-China partnership in trade. In what commodity will they
trade? Let me give you one small example. It is well known that in
the WTO there is a lot of fighting going on about agriculture.
Agriculture is at the centre-stage of all negotiations. An Indian
commerce minister, of course, rightly said because he was in a political
mood, “We will never sacrifice the interests of our farmer”. Where
are the imports that are affecting Indian farmers in the last few years
coming from They are not coming from developed countries; they
are coming from developing countries. For instance in Goa, they are
worried that the Vietnamese are exporting spices and cashew to India
using the Indo-Sri Lanka bilateral agreement. The Indo-Sri Lanka
bilateral agreement is not an economic agreement. It is a political
agreement. It is required for stability in the subcontinent, which is a
perfectly legitimate reason. You try explaining this to the Indian farmer
who has to find a job as his cashew farm collapsed due to the strategic
partnership between India and Sri Lanka and there will be
disagreement. In the same way the Northeast Indian states like
Nagaland are complaining about what’s happening to ginger, because
ginger imports are going to China, and China was not even part of
WTO at that time. So the problem is actually going to come in these
sensitive sectors, not from developed countries but from developing
countries. Therefore it is trade with developed countries like the US
that are important given that Indian interest right now is in employment
related to trade. It is not the trade with developing countries. This is
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why, just to end this issue, in the Doha Agreement when India was
holding out till the last on health, education and so on , every single
non-aligned country and developing country who had fired the guns
from Indian shoulders left, as soon as they got some sops from either
the EU or the US. All these countries always stuck to India till the
end in WTO including Pakistan. Now, the point I am trying to make
is that if trade is going to impact on poverty and on development, it
has to be trade with the developed countries. Trade with developing
countries is not going to have the same impact because the nature of
the trade is different in the two cases.
To many the question of what are the lessons that India can learn
from China in managing trade with the US has become the key to
India’s own strategy. Yet, the answer to this is quite negative as the
lessons from China are zero. The reason is the following. At an
UNCTAD educational workshop for bureaucrats in Asia, I was
speaking on the investment issue to bureaucrats from China, South
Korea and Cambodia. A question raised by the Chinese participant
related to the competitive nature of Indo-China relations. My answer
was that in my opinion, we are not in competition. I also pointed out
that for Indians, the parallels that we see in Chinese behavior with
other countries makes us uneasy. If the Chinese start on a fifty-year
issue with Japan (which is the largest investor in China and a fairly
powerful force) then where are the Indians? If China can fight with
Taiwan (which operating through Hong Kong is the single largest
foreign investor in China) then obviously economics doesn’t seem to
matter. The perception is that it may matter in the relations China
has with the US but it may not matter in Chinese relations with India.
My question to the Chinese was, “if therefore you change your stand
overnight like you have changed over there in South Asia, I have no
recourse, because I don’t have a democratic system in China with
which I can fight you”. In India, an unpopular President like G.W.
Bush will be fought through the US democratic system. In my view,
how does India fight a non-democratic country if it ever has a problem?
This is the primary concern with most or many Indian people. The
fact is that they don’t know. Despite boundary disputes, China’s
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relations with India have been good, except for a brief interlude in
the sixties. The fundamental question remains; no one knows what
the Chinese are going to do next. In the context of trade, they are
perceived as very unreliable.
Another answer to the question - can India learn from China - is
positive. For one the Chinese do set targets. In India when someone
sets a target, everyone spends time knocking down that target. I mean
a target is something you keep trying to achieve. Not something that
is knocked down. The approaches towards setting growth rate targets
reveal the wide gap that exists between India and China. While Indians
hesitate to set a final figure and hover between 8 to 10% rather than
15%, the Chinese believe that when they say 8% they would land up
with 5 to 6%. In other words the Chinese try to say 8% and maybe
you get to 5%. But Indians say 2%, you try to achieve about 1% and
actually end up getting 0%. This difference in the Chinese and Indian
approach towards growth is not related to projections alone, but also
to the psychology of the two countries. One thing we could learn
from the Chinese is: Start believing in yourself. I think those of you
who do engage in trade might start doing so.
Recently my travels have revealed that there are no economic seminars
without Indian participation. Today the reaction of the trading world
includes a definite interest on India and its actions. Most analysts
agree that ignoring the Indian experience would lead to the drawing
of wrong perceptions. This can have a strong impact on export trade
regimes. In the fifties, for very good reasons, India could not get on
to the export bandwagon. I don’t know how long this current “India
is the flavour of the month” bandwagon is going to last. However,
my perception is that while it is there India should enjoy the attention
instead of trying to wonder whether this must be a way to trap us and
kill us later on. In effect, I would argue that we should try and see if
we can get something out of it.
The second thing to learn from China: where did the Chinese
investment come from? The reasons for this are still not well known
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to many. A country, which till 1980- 81 was zero in the export map
and zero in the investment map, became the country with the largest
foreign investments by the end of the eighties. It also began exporting
- about 70-80 billion dollars by the end of the eighties. There are few
historical parallels to that. The reason for this is very simple. By the
early nineteen eighties, both Singapore and Hong Kong had lost their
GSP status and they therefore rerouted their exports through China.
In China many argue that this is round tripping. Many Chinese who
were living in Hong Kong were sending the money back to China
and exporting to China. This is the whole issue going on today of
round tripping, what India is saying is happening in export invoicing
too. But the fact remains that the partnership of the Chinese was that
the Chinese would provide the land and the people. There is no “Free
labor movement” in China. They provide the labor force and the
Hong Kong people provide the technology and the expertise. Think
of India. This is exactly what has happened in IT services in India. It
is the Indian who is providing the venture capital and the expertise
and the Indian cities (except Bangalore) are supposed to provide the
infrastructure. It is this kind of relationship that works. So that is the
kind of thing that one can learn. The Indian Diaspora outside India
could not contribute earlier to the economic benefit of India because
they were not paid as the Chinese were. Currently the Chinese are
not in a great position because of the way things are going - exports
in services seem to be dominating international trade. Thus the Chinese
are very keen to get into partnership with the Indians because they
say we have the hardware you have the software and if we combine
we would have the world. Maybe that’s true. But the fact remains
that this is the kind of NRI partnership that works. In short unless
the NRIs find reasonable returns, they are not going to do anything
for you. Herein too the Chinese experience has much to offer to the
Indians.
In thinking about the future of Indo-US economic relations one needs
to point out that as far as the strategy is concerned there has to be a
larger understanding of the role of investor perceptions on India. It
may be important for the US and for India that India is emerging as
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a very important strategic power in Asia. It could also be true that
the US has a hundred year plan in which they are going to use India
to counter China in Asia. However if the question whether by 2020
India is going to rival the USA is to be answered then it is clear that
such a projection is not borne out by any facts that I have seen. There
will have to be some amazing development in terms of suspending
the Government of India and democracy for some years – which may
not be a bad thing. But barring that I don’t see that happening in the
next twenty years. What does seem to be happening is that for some
reason, the global investor thinks that India is where the action is
today. Now instead of worrying why they think that is where the
action is, why not start figuring out what we can get out of the action?
I think I will stop at that.
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Thank you, Manoj. As expected, he has really
made a presentation, which can be followed by almost all non-
economists as well as by economists. As we ponder over things, two
things need to be borne in mind that would add to our understanding.
One is the statement by David Sampson, who was the Deputy
Secretary of Commerce of the United States. He has made a statement
that the volume of trade between India and the United Sates should
have the potential to move from $22 to $231 billion, which is
essentially a comparison between the trade levels that India and China
have with the US. The second is the statement by President Bush in
his State of the Union address where he has named India and China
as formidable economic competitors to the United States in the years
to come. So in a sense, this session is about India’s defining its stakes
in the new global order and how do we defend our interests and define
our interests as I said. So, thank you, Professor Manoj Pant. This
presentation has really used a huge canvass and yet compressed it
look at some critical elements that we can reflect on and raise questions
after the next presentation. Now I invite Professor Chandrashekar to
present our second paper for this session, which is sent by Professor
Manmohan Agarwal, who is Dean of the School of International
Studies, JNU. He is a colleague of Professor Pant. He is a specialist
on international trade and economy, also on the Indian economy, was
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taught by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, and is a graduate from MIT.
I request Professor Chandrashekar, who is our resident expert on
Business Practices, Corporate Strategy and of course, Economics to
present it first and then we will have Dr. Sridharan to comment and
discuss the papers and open it to you all for your questions. Professor
Chandrashekar.
Prof. Chandrashekar - Indo-US Economic Relations: Suspicious
Cooperation to Uneasy Negotiations
I would like to thank Professor Manoj Pant. I am going to have a
problem. I am going to actually have two problems. One is, Professor
Pant’s presentation is as the Americans would say, “a difficult act to
follow”. The second problem is that I am actually reading the paper
for somebody else and I hope I don’t make any major mistakes. Viji,
I must confess I am a technical person. I do have a Management
degree but I spent a lot of my time as a technical person. So the
problem is I am not at all an economist. I am not sure I know a lot of
economics. Anyhow I will give it my best shot. Indo-US economic
relations have always been what I would call “suspicious cooperation
to uneasy negotiations”. I think it is a very apt title.
There are three phases in Indo-US economic relations that clearly
help in understanding the politics and development of bilateral
relations. Though the US was a major supporter of Indian economic
programmes in the fifties and sixties, there were ups and downs in
the relationship. Fundamentally, the relations were marked by a
considerable amount of distrust. The defining feature of Indo-US
economic relations in this period was the state of India’s agriculture.
India came to depend on food aid from the US. In normal years, the
US was willing to provide food aid in order to reduce the burden of
its surplus food stockpiles. But occasionally the US tried to use the
food aid to coerce India to change its foreign policy.  Towards the
end of  the fifties the US did see India as a part of US Security
interest. You can see for example that the Mutual Security Bill,
sponsored by President Kennedy (at that time he was Senator
Kennedy) was something that was perceived as being very important.
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It was also important to the US that India did not go under during a
“Balance of Payments” crisis.  In order to help India in its Balance of
payments crisis of 1958, the US, through the World Bank, provided
major aid to India. The end of the fifties also saw the US persuading
other European countries and Japan to provide aid to India while it
provided 50% of the aid.
Despite an improvement in overall economic relations, which for a
while was bolstered by improved political and strategic relations
following the Sino-Indian war, elements of conflict over economic
policies remained. The US Administration, and more particularly the
US Congress, remained suspicious of India’s economic policies, plans,
and the role of the public sector.
The Bokaro steel plant episode was part of a larger difference of
opinion regarding the role of the public sector in India’s economic
development. The refusal of the US to support pubic sector firms
meant that the Indian Government had to depend on Soviet assistance
to build up the public sector. Despite some hiccups the Soviets did
provide technology for the public sector. Consequently during this
period, India needed the USSR not only for political support but also
to implement its economic development strategy. There were
shortcomings even in the areas of economic cooperation. Under US
pressure, the Indian Government changed its agricultural policies
along lines recommended by the US Government. The biggest bone
of contention, however, was India’s trade policy. Under the Import
Substitution Industrialisation strategy adopted by the Indian
Government, Indian industry was protected from import competition
by high import duties and controls. These restrictions limited US
exports. In the mid-sixties both the World Bank (WB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were in favorer of simplifying
the complex set of import duties and export subsidies levied by India.
They wanted the many rates to be consolidated into a few rates.
Furthermore, they wanted the average rates reduced and insisted that
the rupee be devalued. The World Bank produced a multi-volume
report with many suggestions for policy change to be incorporated in
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the Fourth Five Year Plan, for which preparation was underway.
The Indian Government succumbed to the pressure from the US
Government (pushed through the World Bank) in the mid-60s to
change economic policies, particularly its agriculture and trade
policies.
US food aid to India under the PL 480 Agreement was a major factor.
It was very, very positive in the beginning – and then it went into a
lot of problems. As the Indian perception of US interests and the US
perception of Indian capabilities failed to connect there were problems.
And if you look at the numbers, aid accounted for almost twenty
percent of the investment in the second and third plans. US supplied
more than 50% of this aid, which is substantial. So, contrary to
popular impression, the US has never been totally against India. It
has been very positive at least in the early part of our relationship.
We are looking at a very large investment at least in terms of the plan
size of those days. As I said, the “Licence Raj” and the issues
associated with that were the major problems and you can see that
maybe the strategic and the political dimensions of relationship that
was discussed in the earlier session did play a part in some of these
changing perceptions. The other major contribution that the US did
make to India – let us not forget it - is the Green Revolution. Though
a lot of it came through international channels, it was still largely a
US-driven initiative.
You can also see that economic pressures were also linked to political
behaviour. So, the US did apply economic pressure in order to change
the political part of India. Food aid was used as an instrument of
political policy and of course the repercussions on India were negative.
The second phase of the relationship, post the mid sixties post the
mid sixties, reveals the complexity of the economic interaction between
the two. In the seventies and eighties, the US had given up on India.
The control regime was back and in a starker form as the US and the
World Bank cut back on aid and a “Control Raj” made licensing
mandatory. There were differences of opinion regarding the nature
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of the international trading regime with the US wanting a stricter
patent regime and inclusion of services trade in multilateral trade
negotiations whereas India resisted these moves. Of course, after the
economic reforms, things have changed. It has emphasized the fact
that in the last fifteen years, India is one of the few countries in the
world that has been able to sustain an average growth rate of between
6 to 7 %. So there is a basic reawakening of interest in India. So
there is a huge opportunity for growth in India, if you are able to find
the right combination of price, performance and delivery of the
required service or product to the customer. So there is a lot of interest
at the micro level and that is really one of the major opportunities
that the US sees in India.
The Bangladesh War led to a further deterioration of the relationship.
We all know that the US sent the Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal.
The entire discussions between Indira Gandhi and Richard Nixon,
the memoirs of Kissinger give a lot of detail about this phase of the
relationship, reflect this mistrust. So, apart from the belief that India
was really not worth looking at in economic terms, the relationship
has also been clouded by the political perception that each country
had of the other. This came in the way of taking the relationship
forward.
Aid suspension had improved relations in a way since there was no
longer any constant friction because if India’s policies. Therefore
conflicts instead of being direct - it was no longer Indo-US conflict -
moved into the multilateral arena. What was the India position in the
UN? How many times has India voted in favour of resolutions
sponsored by the United States?  So we can compile a lot of statistics,
but clearly India was in the Third World camp. Now we are looking
at the Cold War problem and associated with that the issues of being
neutral or trying to be neutral in the Cold War environment.
On the international trade front, the US wanted a new round of
trade negotiations that stressed agriculture, TRIPS and TRIMS. India
opposed the new round and the inclusion of intellectual property rights
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and services in the agenda. We are looking at TRIPS and TRIMS
and the entire WTO-related issues such as the inclusion of services.
Indo-US relations now moved to a new low in terms of support. The
US actually voted against India’s request for a loan in 1980-81 from
the International Monetary Fund for balance of payments support;
but India got the loan because of the support of the Europeans.
The private sector has always been there in India but maybe during
the days of License Raj there were serious problems. Therefore growth
in business-to-business level and technology exchange did not take
place as much as it should have.
Everybody knows about the liberalization process initiated in 1991.
We now see a new way in which some of these problems are being
talked about. In the election campaign in the US recently – Business
Process Outsourcing – was a major issue.  It is seeing major growth
in India. It is really taking off. If you look at Bangalore five years
ago and now you can actually see the difference. So there is a lot of
concern in the US that jobs are going away to India. Politicians in the
US are trying to strike a delicate balance between job losses and
business requirements. All the software companies, all the IT
companies do want many of the knowledge-based kind of services,
to move to countries like India. In the future Business Process
Outsourcing is going to go up the value chain in terms of content.
For example, today a lot of work on things like Application Specific
Integrated Circuits, Chip design etc. - a lot of this high value work -
is being done in Bangalore. But, overall, I would argue that the US
corporate world is going to be pretty interested in making sure that
India continues to be a major source of people, knowledge people for
their economy.
I again come back to India-US positions. The WTO does represent
a common minimum position. And there is a lot of commonality and
after the WTO the level of commonality has increased significantly.
Therefore, I feel, even though there may be differences, this would
still be a major forum by which trade can be promoted.
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Developed countries are still maintaining high rates of protection
against exports from developing countries. I think that is a very valid
statement. If you look at the liberalization that has happened in India
and if you compare it especially in agriculture-related trade (we have
some people who will cover it later) you will find that there are lots
of restrictions on developed countries with respect to many of these
areas. A very telling statement that Professor Agarwal makes is: the
US collects more revenue from duties on imports from Bangladesh
than from France. This is another kind of problem that we have to
address.
As I said, India is becoming important in the global market. I think
the major impact we have had in the last ten or fifteen years - especially
in the last ten years - is making India a place where things are going
to happen. One view of that would be that everybody is going to
come to India. We really don’t have to do anything. As long as we do
not make too many mistakes things will be fine as long as India
promises to be a growth market.  Therefore the economic agenda in
terms of growth is absolutely important if you want to look at any
kind of strategic relationship or long-term partnership with the United
States.
I would argue that if you look at micro- data we have crossed the
threshold in many industries. I think Professor Pant was talking about
the drug industry and he was talking about the IT industry. If you go
back and look at the details of why these industries have taken off
what has really happened you will find that there is a very complex
combination of situations. Some of it is related to the Indian domestic
context and some of it is related to relaxation of constraints because
of the US domestic compulsions. For example, there was some kind
of a deregulation of the norms by means of which companies could
buy and sell licenses for producing drugs because of the high service
costs in the US drug industry. So the FDA guidelines became relaxed
a little bit and you could buy and sell some of those things. Many
drug companies in India used that opportunity to get into the US
market. So, that is the kind of thing that we can look at. But India is
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still small and as somebody was pointing out the US is much bigger.
One would therefore argue that the relationship, even if not equal,
will be relatively more equal or at least less unequal.
Of course, the Indian objective is very clear. We are interested in the
development of a more democratic international system of governance.
The increased power of developing countries would be at the expense
of Europe and Japan. The Europeans prefer a more rule-based system
than the US, and India’s preference is for a rule-based system. Of
course, we have a major concern on energy. Would the US stand in
the way? That is the kind of concern.
So we have a complex interplay of interests and conflicts. All countries
want greater entry access to the Indian market. I say this is a growth
market – no doubt about it. With greater market orientation, the
movement of goods and the factors of production will be governed
more by market forces rather than by government forces. The
government strategic community and the political community may
have less influence on the course of Indo-US relations than in the
past. So I think if you open up trade and economics, maybe
relationships between the two countries will move to a different level
where strategic differences may not be as critical as they seem to
be now.
Let’s now look at this again. India needs energy security. We have to
keep it in mind. In the short and the long term, we have to do a
delicate balancing act, and how we play it out is important. We need
to play a bigger role in the economic global international rule-making
process.
I thank you very much for listening to me.
Prof. Vijaylakshmi: I thank Prof. Chandrashekar for presenting
Dean Agarwal’s perspectives on the potential and the realities as
well as the challenges posed by Indo-US economic relations. I would
call it an appraisal, actually. Perhaps ‘hard-headed negotiations’ is
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the preferred title, and I think that’s where we are. I now very quickly
invite Dr. Sridharan to make his very brief comments, because we
have a few minutes before moving to receive Dr. Anil Kakodkar.
Discussant - Dr. E. Sridharan: Thank you, Viji. I’ll be very brief
because there were supposed to be four speakers in this panel. Two
of them haven’t shown up, so I have to comment on only two. So I’ll
be brief and to the point.
On Dr. Manmohan Agarwal’s presentation – it was an excellent
presentation. However I thought it would have been more helpful if
instead of a long historical account he had focused more on the theme
of emerging dynamics. This was compressed and only there towards
the end, so I don’t have very much to add to what he says.
On what Prof. Pant said, I don’t have any bone to pick with him. I
agree with most of what he said. But I would like this group to focus
more on the emerging political and strategic aspects and to take
forward some of the issues that he raised when he talked about the
key issue of leverage. I mean let’s look at Indo-US relations in terms
of where we have or can potentially have leverage which can be
exploited for serving certain wider interests.
Now, as he said, the reforms will go on.  I believe they will go on in
a sustained way, but gradually. It will lead to increasing trade and
investment. I mean the trade-GDP ratio will increase. FDI will
increase. All of these will increase as India starts looming larger in
the trade and investment profile of the US and the world. But the
problem is, as pointed out, that for the next few years, India still
remains very small. I mean that India will remain small in the foreign
trade of the US and in their global investment flows. So then, do we
have any leverage at all coming out of such an economic relationship?
Let me come to what he said correctly – that IT services is the
crucial thing. I mean, it is not the crucial thing from the viewpoint of
our development. What would probably make a much greater
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difference to employment generation and relieving mass poverty is
the growth of labour-intensive mass manufacturing not only in say
textiles but also in a whole range of other things. That is beginning to
happen in the last couple of years and is gathering momentum. Indian
manufacturing industry seems to be getting more export-competitive
across the board. We have pharmaceuticals and we have auto
components. Increasingly more and more sectors will get more
competitive and more export oriented. They will be able to attract
FDI and India will probably become the next mass manufacturing
platform in the next ten years.
But, coming back to leverage, I would like to actually take forward
the IT services point where Prof. Pant said that the US needs India’s
IT services. They relocate software and IT-enabled services to India
to help their competitiveness vis-à-vis their main competitors, which
is not China – because China occupies a different niche – but really
the other developed countries. This need will continue in the future.
Now, let me just focus on even a narrower segment of this outsourcing
that is now emerging to fit into the title of this panel, of “Emerging
Dynamics”. This is the relocation or outsourcing of R&D, and not
just software and IT-enabled services. This is a part of a very unusual
pattern of economic relationship that India enjoys with the US over
the last five years or so.
The Indian economic relationship with the US in terms of both trade
and investment is unusual, compared to the historical pattern of the
US’ relationships with other developing countries in two respects.
One is the very high ratio of services exports to export of goods in
the Indian case. This is not the case with most developing countries.
Even those that have enjoyed FDI and become successful exporters
– in East and Southeast Asia - trade is overwhelmingly in
manufactured goods.
The other unusual feature of US foreign investment to India is that it
is in software and IT-enabled services to a large extent and increasingly
in the outsourcing of R&D, which is a much smaller trend. But
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sometimes you have to focus on the small things – the leading edge
things. These can actually have a bigger multiplier, in terms of
leverage, than if you look at the whole picture.
This is also unusual because normally you find that FDI first goes
into low-tech manufacturing and assembly activities. It then upgrades,
vertically integrates backwards into more complex stages of
manufacturing of machinery and so forth, and then again backward-
integrates into design and R&D in stages. But here you find that
even before the growth of mass manufacturing on a significant scale
the beginnings of R&D outsourcing following closely upon the
existing pattern of software and services.
Does this give us any kind of leverage? I mean, you have these figures
just coming out that we had 6.5 billion dollars FDI in the last year –
in 2004-5. You already have announcements in the current financial
year of something close to 6 billion dollars in hi-tech manufacturing
design and R&D from just a few big companies. It actually would
add up to more than that. So that’s a very unusual trend that is picking
up fast. Though these investments are quantitatively small, it gives
them high-value stakes. This would, in my estimation, incline them
to take India more seriously than if we had a large volume of textile
exports going to them.
Now, let us take the recent defence co-operation agreement. I am
not clear about how it will actually play out and what the full
implications are. However if this outsourcing of contract R&D in
areas like advanced software, telecom software, semi-conductor
design, maybe a chip fabrication facility continues and if it cuts across
the board into other areas such as pharmaceuticals, biotech labs, life
sciences and so on would it not have an impact?  Under the
International Armaments Co-operation Program the US has 500-
odd defence R&D MOUs with other countries. These arrangements
have been extended from NATO to other allies and to any “other
friendly foreign country”, a new category introduced around 2001
by the State Department. Since 2002, we have been put into that
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category and therefore we technically qualify to be in that “other
friendly foreign country” category to which defence R&D
agreements can be extended. Could we exploit the leverage that we
seem to be acquiring through the outsourcing and contracting out of
R&D with the new defence co-operation agreement? That is
something I would just like to put on the table for this group to start
thinking about.
Israel, for example, has exploited this route to build up its defence
industry in a major way, although in the nuclear field, in terms of
transfer of nuclear equipment and technologies, they are subject to
the same sanctions as us because they are outside the NPT. But they
have an extensive program under a MOU which was negotiated from
1976 to 1981, and then again a major agreement in late 1983, where
they have a whole range of R&D co-operation in the defence field.
They have very successfully exploited this and become a significant
arms exporter.
So I am just putting forth something for this group to think about in
terms of where we can find leverage in the emerging dynamics of the
relationship. On the whole I agree with what Prof. Pant said that
overall we are very small on the US radar screen and will remain so.
So with that very brief forward-looking comment, let me finish.
Prof. Vijaylakshmi: Thank you, Sri. I think we really want to applaud
you for the extempore but very relevant observations. Keeping in
mind the interest of time, ladies and gentlemen, may I request some
very brief interventions, please – and indeed they have to be brief but
I would like you all to cogitate on what has been said so far. Prof.
Pant is here, so if there are any critical aspects and perspectives you
would like to share with us, we have a few minutes before we go in to
invite Dr. Kakodkar.
Question: I now live in Bangalore and the growth rate of Bangalore
- the calculations have lots of errors because some companies have
headquarters in Bangalore, some in Mumbai – making all the
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corrections, the growth rate of Bangalore, last year, the GNP of the
city, if you like, is 42 per cent. When you explain this to an economist,
he says it cannot happen; that’s why our roads are crowded, the
buildings are crowded, and every service is over-stretched.
But an interesting thing is, when we look into the global software
industry and the global IT-enabled industry, the market for software
is about 300 billion dollars, and we are not even about 10 per cent. If
we look at this amount in relation to what’s happening to Bangalore
(I think one of them said oh, it’s an impossible city) I say Bangalore
is blossoming. We are going to see the equivalent of Bangalore in
many other cities and this is an opportunity. In this kind of cooperation
nobody can really actively influence it. It has nothing to do with
nuclear control. But it has everything to do with a view. The American
view suddenly has changed from what Ambassador Lalit Mansingh
called snake charmers and maharajas to that of saying, “Oh, Indian;
oh, software” as you go through an immigration counter. Suddenly
you see recognition for the blue passport as that of a clever person.
You go to the store, you do some calculation there and then they tell
that you are the clever lot. This is so important for changing the
mental attitude of the citizens of the United States and that is beginning
to happen.
The second thing that Prof. Sridharan touched and it’s a very
interesting thing. For the first time, we have laboratories in Bangalore
– foreign-owned laboratories in Bangalore – doing cutting-edge
technologies. When I saw what they were trying to do in some
advanced jet engine blades and said does your country allow that,
they said no. These are the engineers who can do that, so we have
moved this work. Yesterday we heard about Shell Laboratories moving
in here and they said that’s going to be their renewal work While we
are afraid of the bottom kind of the service industry migrating to the
Philippines or Ghana, these are areas where I think things are going
to be very, very important.
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It is so important because we have General Motors doing very badly
abroad but doing very well in India. We are now talking about General
Electric, Google coming to India. I can write about a number of
them that are now coming in here, and that’s going to provide a very
unique opportunity. I think, while we’re looking at saying what will
happen if the service industry goes, the service industry is going to
have many new incarnations and we should cultivate this incarnation.
But the question that arises is – where are the engineers? And that
itself is going to be our problem.
Chair: Thank you. A very quick one, please?
Question: Talking about economic strategies, one thing comes to my
mind – the recent purchase of Boeing by Air India – 38,000 crores –
and another 11,000 crores is what Indian Airlines probably will buy.
There is an offset – something like 35-40 per cent or whatever that
is. That’s in the region of 15,000 crores. This is money that they
have to offset, largely from American industry into Indian industries.
This has to be done within a specified number of years after delivery
of the last aircraft – which is something like ten years. If you take it
as a ten-year period – even that’s not very clear – that means the kind
of offset that has to be absorbed is on an average 1000 crores a year.
Can’t we have a strategy here to absorb this offset? It’s very
interesting, that the Minister of Civil Aviation has given it to the
Minister of Commerce who in turn has given it to the State Trading
Corporation to manage this offset. Between all of us, I must voice
some concern about this. It is not that we don’t have brilliant people
there. But our way of doing things is an issue. We are unable to
focus, unable to have a strategy. I felt that I am an aeronautics man
and I’ve been taken up this matter with Dr. Kasturirangan to influence
the government into forming an Aeronautics Commission or a strategy
of that sort.
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But since we are buying aero planes can’t we put this so-called
focus as a strategy into aeronautics in India, or for that matter into
any one particular sector? But there is no one hearing. There isn’t a
strategy in this country, even when there are opportunities coming.
Do you know that at least from defence, not a single offset deal has
been converted 100 per cent. The last was the Jaguar offset. We
hardly converted something like 20% and by then the period got
over. And we’re going to lose this – that’s my fear.
I believe that we must also use this as a strategy to focus on some
specific areas of offsets. Thank you.
Chair: Thank you. Yes, but we’re really running out of time, so can
I give you one minute, please?
Question: Prof. Manoj was talking about R&D. I think you should
visit Honeywell, Bangalore and look at the amount of not just software
work but hardware work that they are doing for the US. How many
people have they employed? Three thousand highly qualified
engineers. Can they grow to 6000? The problem comes back to where
are we going to produce the engineers? But it’s not just software.
Even in the hard-core hardware areas foreign companies are using
Indian talent. Where are most of them coming from? Space, Atomic
Energy and Defence including DRDO. All of them are my workers –
people who were working for me – as everybody knows pretty well.
Chair: So in a sense, we are looking at separation of intellectual
abilities and facilities in India, perhaps, between the civil and the
military and the defence. But are there any specific questions to Prof.
Manoj?
Question: As was just pointed out by Dr. Aatre and the previous
speakers, intellectual capital is our real strength. That is why our IT
industry is doing well. I do not want to make any comment as regards
Bangalore or IT industry. But I would like to say this much. The IT
industry does not exhaust the entire economic capabilities of this
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country. Moreover, there are manufacturing and productive activities
that will also be sustained and improved through research and
development about which something has been said. We are aware
that this will really help to underline this strength and sustainability
for the future of the IT industry itself. The service industry does not
and will not always work in a vacuum. I feel, that particularly in this
session, there should have been some representatives, from either
ASSOCHAM or FICCI. Because it is in the framework of the policies
laid down by the government, (represented by the finance ministry or
the commerce ministry) that economic strategies or collaborative
strategies in economic co-operation will be worked out largely by the
private sector. I mean, maybe private-public sector co-operation, etc.
But it is no longer on the shoulders only of the government. That is
why I thought that probably this session could have had this. The
session could have been much more fruitful with some inputs from
these groups. Thank you very much.
Chair: Thank you, Sir. We do hope that this session was useful to all
of you. We do take the suggestion seriously. We are having CII
representation tomorrow on another session. So industry
representation has been included. But right now, I’ll have to call the
session to a close. Thank you all very much for your very, very
interesting and intricate arguments and the integration that you have
shown in terms of what multi-dimensional approaches have to be. I
will have to give you all a few minutes break while I go and invite
our star of today’s discussions Dr. Anil Kakodkar. So just give me a
few minutes. Thank you all for being a great audience. I thank the
panelists of the session as well. Thank you.
Summary of the session
The last five decades have seen more downs than ups in Indo-US
economic relations. In the fifties and early sixties relations were good
and the US was a significant contributor to India’s economic
development. It also provided critical food aid. India’s socialism and
the large role of the public sector in her economic development agenda
did not go down well with US business interests. India’s non-alignment
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policy and her inability to support US in Vietnam created further
schisms in Indo-US relations. Food and economic aid were used as
levers by the US government to make India behave. There was no
obvious and visible American business lobby that could argue India’s
economic case. Both political and economic relations suffered as the
Cold War heightened and both countries increasingly followed
diverging strategies in spite of many common interests including
democracy. As economic relations between the US and India moved
more into the multilateral domain and as India initiated initial
economic reform, trade between the two countries saw some
improvements in the 1980’s. The last decade has seen the emergence
of a strong pro India economic lobby in the US that has served to
moderate the impact of political crises between the two governments.
After the economic reforms of 1991 the Indian economy has grown
at a significant rate. The reforms have set at rest US business
misconceptions about the socialist nature of the Indian economy. The
IT revolution and the export of IT services to the US have created a
strong business lobby in the US to argue India’s case. India has become
a destination for US R&D interests. Cooperation in high technology
areas including strategic technologies could further increase
interdependence.
India is also beginning to emerge as a major market. The rise of India
as an economic power has made it a more important player in many
global fora. Given this emerging Indian trajectory of greater economic
interaction with the world, it is likely that economic relations will be
largely insulated from political problems in Indo-US relations.
India’s rising economic power is viewed seriously by the US. It now
depends on India for meeting a significant part of its services
requirements. It is evident that the US needs an active partnership
with India to improve its productivity. While the US has understood
the dynamics of the emerging world economic order it is not very
clear whether Indian strategic thinkers have understood these forces
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fully. Some participants felt that the US is actively trying to change
this Indian mindset.
The balance of trade is currently in India’s favour. The US has always
been India’s largest trading partner. However US exports to India
are picking up and as the Indian economy opens up to a freer trade
regime, opportunities in India are likely to grow. There could be minor
irritants between the two countries in areas like textiles or some non-
tariff barriers in areas like fisheries. However, these are not likely to
influence the growing trade between the two countries in any
significant way.
The imperatives of Indian economic development including its need
for energy, foreign investment and trade will force India to deepen
and widen its engagement the US. As India moves towards a more
market oriented economy and as mutual interdependence grows there
is likely to be greater convergence of economic interests between the
US and India. These could also spillover into co-operation in the
multilateral arena.
There was a consensus that Indo-US economic relations would grow
at an increasingly faster rate. Some participants felt that though there
would be an increase in trade, the relationship would be dominated
by the US. Others felt that the relationship would become more
interdependent giving India greater leverage over the US in other
areas. There was also agreement that Indo-US economic relations
in the future will be relatively immune from the negative effects of
geopolitical and strategic disagreements. If used wisely economic
relations could become a proactive stabilizing force shaping the larger
contours of Indo-US relations.
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Special Session
Dr. Anil Kakodkar Speaks on
 India’s Nuclear Technological Capability &
Potential for Collaboration
Chair: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: I want to call this special session to order.
We welcome Dr. Anil Kakodkar for this very, very special session.
We thank him for specially coming to NIAS – the NIAS team
resoundingly welcomes you – and we’re also hoping that you will be
able to satisfy, in some measure, some of these very critical issues
that we have been debating since morning. Of course, your very
special interventions will go a long way in helping us understand this
critical and important issue.
I invite Ambassador Ghose, who has already taken a great deal of
interest in this issue, to kindly chair this session. Thank you. Welcome
to this workshop on Indo-US relations on behalf of NIAS and
Dr. Kasturirangan.
Chair: Thank you very much, Vijaylakshmi. It’s a great honour and
in spite of people being hungry, I see that they are all agog waiting to
hear what Dr. Kakodkar has to say – I must say, so am I today.
One did speak in the morning about the need to build consensus in
the country before you enter into negotiations with any foreign party.
I think that one is looking forward to hear from Dr. Kakodkar, one
of the key elements in building the consensus. Nothing more from
me – Dr. Kakodkar.
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Thank you, Chairman. I must, first of all,
apologise to all of you, and particularly to Dr. Kasturirangan. I was
planning to be here tomorrow, and it was late evening yesterday that
I came to know that it can’t be; so I requested, actually I telephoned
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Dr. Kasturirangan to request my leave of absence. But then, whatever
you say, I can’t say no – and so I’m here. I also recognize that because
of the delay in the flight, it’s now well into lunchtime. So I shouldn’t
be speaking for too long and that makes my job easy. What I intend
doing in a very short time – maybe 15 or 20 minutes – is to run
through my own perspectives on what’s happening in the US, what’s
happening in the world at large and of course, what’s happening and
what we would like to see happen in India, and then from there, pick
up areas of convergence – areas where we can define a win-win
situation, because it’s only win-win situations that are really lasting.
I want to start with the way things have evolved and are likely to
evolve in the US in so far as the nuclear area is concerned. We are all
aware that the US was the country where nuclear power grew very
rapidly. In fact, in comparison to other power technologies, nuclear
power did rise very rapidly in the US. Even today, the US produces
as much nuclear electricity – nearly as much nuclear electricity as
we produce total electricity in the country. This is in spite of the fact
that, for the last decade, no new nuclear power station has been added
in the US. So obviously, in spite of such rapid growth, they got into
a period of stagnation. When the time came for the reactors to be
taken off the grid because the license period was over, they went
through a major exercise of plant life extension. At one stage this
appeared to be a formidable job, but the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the industry, in what I think was a remarkable
partnership, re-adjusted their frameworks and today we are seeing
reactor after reactor undergoing an additional 20-year licensing period.
Some of them have even been upgraded. So if you now see nuclear
power generation in US, although no new plants have been added,
nuclear power generation has in fact gone up.
About eight or ten years back, there was, I think, a reversal in
approach to nuclear power in the US. The NRC started talking about
a new licensing policy. The US Government gave special incentives
for getting new reactors licensed. In fact they did say that in ten
years’ time, they would like to see at least one reactor - one new
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power plant - coming on stream and I think they are moving on
course. The US Government also launched the Nuclear Energy
Research Initiative under which they created special funds to be
given to the universities and invited a large number of ideas on which
research projects could be funded. This was essentially to ensure
that the almost zero state that they had reached in universities in
terms of nuclear engineering gets revived and reversed, and this has
started happening.
Then of course, came Kyoto, and as you know, the US rejected Kyoto
for its own reasons – reasons which I think are valid. There was this
Committee chaired by the Vice President which looked at the energy
situation in the US in the years to come and that gave a very important
place to nuclear power in the US Energy Future. In fact, there was a
slogan in the US at one stage that said that the US answer to Kyoto
is more nuclear power back home. Then they quickly got into the
Generation Four Initiative Forum, which is a consortium of ten
countries that is looking at new reactor designs – innovative reactor
designs – which will possibly go on the grid maybe thirty years from
now. It’s not a short-term program – it’s a long-term program.
Different ideas are on the table as a part of the Generation Four
Initiative Forum. The interesting thing is that out of the six proposals
which are being worked on, four are (some people call it four-and-a-
half) are fast reactors, which is a kind of a big change from the
traditional US policy. This is because the US has not been adopting
and had in fact shunned the reprocessing and recycle in fast reactors.
You cannot conceive of a fast reactor without recycle. So, starting
from the time of the Jimmy Carter policy change, the circle is fully
reversed, as it were.
There are of course a lot of other activities. They are very concerned
about knowledge management because the professionals are all old.
They are all retiring. Even if one were to continue running the existing
reactors or, for that matter, even if the reactors were to be shut down,
you have to make sure that everything is safe, till the entire thing gets
de-commissioned. This in itself is a process that takes several decades
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because you go through a period of mothballing and then the actual
de-commissioning operation takes place. The question is from where
would they get the people to ensure that things are safe. They also
realized that if the technology or the industry is in a stagnant mode,
you cannot get young people to get into the program. And that has
led to, I think, a new awareness in terms of how to get on with the
nuclear business in the US.
So to sum it up, there is, in fact, a significant shift in the energy
perspective in the US. From a perspective which was based on the
premise that there is plenty of uranium, there is plenty of oil, and one
can do without reprocessing and recycle, there is now a recognition
that energy, worldwide, is going to be in short supply and one has to
look at options which give much larger energy potential and that this
cannot be obtained unless one adopts the closed nuclear fuel cycle.
Of course, this has also been driven - I would say primarily driven -
by the growth of the economy in Asia. If you look at the requirement
of energy in the industrialized countries in the West their population
is stable. There is no need for them to enhance their per capita
electricity consumption and therefore, there is not likely to be a net
increase in the energy requirements in these countries. Of course they
would need new systems to replace the old systems. You will bring in
new technology for the new systems, but one does not see large energy
additions in net terms at this time. But the growth of economy in Asia
and the demand for large-scale energy worldwide has led to the
thinking that there would be an escalation in prices, that this would
hurt the economy unless there is a much larger increase in energy
availability. The situation is likely to be difficult even for the western
industrialized world in the absence of large-scale use of nuclear power.
This is the way I see the US mindset as it exists today.
On the R & D plane, there has been sustained awareness in the US
about maintaining technology leadership. For a short time in between,
commercial factors drove the US away from basic research. But I
think this was only for a short time. This was the time when the US
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started the super-conducting super-collider project and stopped it
halfway. That was also the time when the US, although it was a
partner in ITER, withdrew from ITER. I am aware of several basic
research activities in the US that were being questioned in a very
harsh manner on whether the funding of these activities was justifiable.
I think that things have changed since that time. Today, not only is
there R&D in some very select areas where they see their direct
interest, but across the board you see a lot of growth in R&D. The
question again for them is from where would they get the scientists to
run these research programs. The latest case in point is the linear
collider, a very ambitious project. On a technology plane, it is beyond
the large hadron collider, which is just coming up at CERN, Geneva,
which will become operational some time next year. This is going to
be the state of the art machine. Residual fundamental questions that
would still remain to be answered after the capability of the linear
hadron collider is taken into account would be the big issue. The
answers to these questions, would determine the new form of the
charged particle accelerator machine. There are, of course, many
other proposals, but the linear collider is the one which the world
community is looking at. At least for the last two years, I have a
series of letters from various labs in the US. They have visited us
several times. They have met DST.  As a matter of fact, in the month
of March, they are going to have a big meeting right here in Bangalore.
A very large group is coming to India. They all come with a very
specific agenda of creating ties with us.
I am sure all of you know that as a result of our work at the large
hadron collider in CERN, India is today an observer country at CERN.
Only European countries can be members of that European
organization and all other countries have to be observers. There are
only some four or five observer states. The United States is one.
Japan is another. There are a couple of others. India is also one.
So there is this renewed awareness in the US about ensuring
technology leadership and I think there is also awareness that the
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young Indian scientific human resource is an important factor in the
US getting that technology leadership.
The third element of what drives the US nuclear policy is, of course,
non-proliferation. Now, from a technical perspective, I think things
really changed after TMI, when Jimmy Carter enunciated the policy
that fissile material will not be separated. The US had already
determined by that time that they had excess fissile material over and
above what was needed for their security requirements. They also
felt that having fissile material floating around, even if it was under
safeguards, could pose risks. So they started a restrictive regime
where fissile material should not be separated. So there was this no-
recycle policy. Back then the US stopped a good number of fast-
reactor research facilities There was also a lot of preaching done
worldwide, that reprocessing is expensive, and that the “once-through
fuel cycle” was the best.
But I think they realized as they got close to the completion of the
design for Yuca Mountain storage facility that the repository would
be full even before it was commissioned. They would still need to
handle a lot of spent fuel. Some years back, there was a study – it
was not a decision - but there was a study. According to the study it
would be best for the US to follow a mixed option - a once-through
fuel cycle where the spent fuel is conditioned and put in a repository;
along with some of the spent fuel being re-processed and recycled.
It’s only now, in the last few days that you see that they are trying to
introduce a Bill and they have asked for some sanction to be able to
get started on that activity. I think this is also prompted by the Russian
initiative dealing with the reliability of fuel supplies. Now there is of
course a gorgeous name given to it – the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership. It was earlier called the Global Nuclear Energy Initiative.
Anyway while there was recognition on one side that one cannot
escape recycle, there were also serious concerns with regard to
proliferation issues. They, of course, assumed a bigger proportion in
view of the so-called US perception of the axis of evil. You also had
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these proposals – seven-point proposals from President Bush – where
some additional conditions were articulated, constraining the rights
of countries who are part of the NPT. Although a NPT country is
fully eligible for carrying out its own peaceful development, this
proposal prohibits the transfer or development of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to a country unless the country already
possesses them. This is a new transformation of the same argument
that now says that one can assure fuel supplies to a facility provided
the country does not get into its own fuel cycle activity. There are
different shades to this. But the point is that a new regime is emerging,
which is beyond what NPT would expect of NPT signatories.
So to sum it up, I think there is now recognition for the closed fuel
cycle. New arrangements to prevent the spread of fuel-cycle
technologies are likely to be put in place. The Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership is a new term, but there are many other partnerships that
the US has floated, essentially to make sure that the additional security
issue arising out of the large-scale circulation of fissile material in
civilian use does not become a serious problem. Typically, these other
partnerships include a Regional Radiological Security Partnership
that is more concerned with issues related to nuclear terrorism such
as the dirty bomb. There are things like the PSI, the CSI and others,
which I am sure all of you know better than me.
Now the question is, in this whole thing, where does India position
itself? Before we go into that, I think it is better to take stock of
existing areas of cooperation between India and the US. I want to put
forward some salient points. It all started with Tarapur and here I am
talking about the institution-to-institution cooperation. The scientist-
to-scientist collaboration has been always going on and there are
strong individual-to-individual links between Indian and US scientists.
So I am not going to talk about that. I am talking about the large-
scale country-to-country linkages. I think it began with Tarapur. All
of you are aware of the history of Tarapur, so I am not going to deal
with that. Then sometime during the time of Secretary O’Leary, there
was a very high-profile visit to India that triggered collaboration
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between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the US and
the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) that I think, started
moving quite well. They had a few rounds of very interesting and
useful discussions. It of course stopped following the ’98 tests and
again got revived, about two or three years back. It has been, in my
mind, a very intense and very fruitful cooperation. Prof. Rama Rao
is here and it all started at the time when he headed the AERB. Today
it is a productive co-operation. There are, in fact, opportunities for
Indian scientists from AERB to spend time in US facilities and there
have also been visits from the US people and now we are talking
about some joint activities. I think they are very impressed with the
way we have managed the Indian reactors, particularly Tarapur. I
still think they are finding it difficult to believe that we could maintain
such an old reactor and run it in such a good condition. They are
absolutely amazed about that. So this is one thing that started, had a
break in between, but is still going on.
At the Brookhaven National Lab (it’s one of the US Department of
Energy laboratories) - and this is again very interesting - we have a
long-standing collaboration on the Relativistic Heavy-Ion Collider.
The Indians have been participating in a fairly old experiment,
PHOENIX. Even today, if you go into that tunnel, at the place where
the detectors are located, you would find maps signifying the countries
who are participating in this project. You can find the Indian tricolour
there. It has been there for the last ten years. It’s there even today.
Following the 1998 tests, it became difficult for Indian scientists to
go there because they couldn’t get visas. However, as a part of the
collaboration, we had already agreed for making some equipment in
the central workshops at BARC. These had to be delivered for some
experiments there. You will not believe this. The equipment was made
and delivered to the Brookhaven National Lab after 1998. The US
scientists followed the procedures given for assembling the equipment
in the experimental station and the equipment was put to use. Indian
scientists and their US counterparts were in e-mail contact to share
ideas on what to do and how to do it. After this they have published
papers – scientific papers - that carry the names of both American
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and Indian scientists from BARC as co-authors. Though the scientific
collaboration did continue there are of course still difficulties for
BARC scientists to go to the US because of visa restrictions.
More recently, the same Brookhaven National Lab, has another
experiment, STAR.  The scientists from the Variable Energy Cyclotron
Centre have, in fact, made a fairly large segment of the detector.  A
lot of experimental data gathering is presently on using that detector.
And of course, there is a very live discussion in the context of the
linear collider, as I mentioned to you.
Worldwide, as I said earlier, in the nuclear energy arena, there may
be work going on in Europe and North America. However the real
growth is taking place in Asia – India, China, South Korea, Japan
and Taiwan. There is therefore a race for being in the forefront of
technology, a race in terms of energy economics and also a race for
positioning one’s country in a proper place in the new emerging world
order. I think we should look at whatever we do in terms of
international nuclear cooperation keeping in mind this context.
Now coming to India as you are all aware, the Indian program is
ambitious. It may be small in megawatts, but I think it’s very tall in
terms of its technological achievements and ambitions. There is not
only recognition about our excellent performance in the area of thermal
reactors; but there is also a lot of recognition in terms of our strides
in fast reactors. In fact, if you scan the scientific literature (I am
talking about peer reviewed papers) and then classify them under
fast reactors or heavy-water reactors, you would find that Indian
publications would be the best or very near the best in terms of both
quality as well as numbers. This may have perhaps missed the attention
of the Indian community but it has not missed the attention of the
international community.
There is of course our long-term interest in thorium. Everybody knows
in the rest of the world that at this moment thorium is not an area of
priority interest because they have plenty of uranium. Now that the
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rest of the world has reconciled itself to the recycle of uranium,
there is an equally large energy potential in thorium. However I must
inform this gathering that there is an important technical difference.
Once you decide on a recycle option and you ask yourself a question
- if I want to compare fertile material (Uranium 238 versus thorium)
and I am living with a given amount of fissile material to start with,
which is a better fertile material? The answer would be, that at a low
level of technology, when you cannot go to high burn-ups, uranium
is a better option. However at an advanced level of technology, when
you can go to high burn-ups, thorium is a superior option. I have no
doubt, that in the years to come as recycle technology comes to stay;
people will start getting attracted to thorium on its merits, rather
than from considerations of the availability of the energy resource.
For us, of course, there is no option, because we do not have too
much uranium. So our interests in thorium are, of course, quite clear.
So with this background, what should we do? I think there are multiple
options. You can talk about fast reactors, you can talk about thorium,
you can talk about a number of other technologies such as for example,
accelerator technologies that I was talking about when discussing
basic research. Accelerators have a role in energy technologies because
through them you can get better growth rate in thorium. Or you can
talk about accelerator technologies because accelerator-driven systems
are excellent incinerators that can burn long-lived radioactive waste
very effectively.  Even with regard to fast reactors you can talk about
them either in terms of breeders to grow the energy potential or you
can talk about them as plutonium burners. You can also talk about
fast reactors as waste transmutation systems. You can of course deploy
these technologies in different ways. I am very certain that the West,
till such time as they position themselves well, would drive all these
technologies from the point of view of not energy, but non-
proliferation, which means burn plutonium or transmute waste. I am
sure many of you are aware of the history of Superphoenix. The
Superphoenix is a French reactor. A 1300 megawatt system, which
they decided to de-commission. I think it’s an excellent technology
that came little ahead of time. They had a problem on the secondary
Special Session
Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations
103
storage side. At that time, the French government was strongly
influenced by Greens and they decided to de-commission that reactor.
When the discussions were going on about that decision, a big
argument was made that the Superphoenix can be used for burning
excess weapons grade plutonium. After a lengthy debate even this
argument did not succeed and they decided to shut down that reactor.
The point I am trying to make is that these technologies can be
deployed for a variety of purposes and that it is the national interest
and not the international interest that should drive the way in which
we deploy these technologies.
So the important point is that we should remain autonomous in terms
of how we would want to develop and use these technologies. We
must maintain a very high S&T strength in our country so that we
can chalk out our future path in an autonomous manner. This should
really drive our negotiating strategy. We must maintain strategic
independence; we must ensure the integrity of the three-stage fuel
cycle. This is needed, not because Bhabha suggested we follow that
route, but because of very fundamental reasons. These fundamental
reasons are embedded in the energy resource profile that exists in
India. Above all, I think we must maintain autonomy in our research
and development work.
So I view Indo-US cooperation from this broad perspective. I
deliberately avoided getting into the immediate nitty-gritty because I
think this is a community of strategic thinkers. Maybe I think you
should all take yourselves to a very high plane and think about the
way things evolve. I must also tell you that I am a champion of the
Indo-US treaty. The media in some places makes me look as if I am
an obstructionist. I am a champion. But I am also a champion of
using that treaty from an Indian standpoint and I think we must
negotiate that treaty well and I think it’s possible to get into a win-
win situation.
There are several symbiotic relationships between imported
technology and Indian technology. For example, if you have light-
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water reactors, the energy that you can extract per tonne of uranium
can increase manifold if you take a fuel – enriched fuel – put it
through a light-water reactor. You then take the fuel that comes out
of the light-water reactor and use it in a heavy-water reactor. The
fuel that comes out from the heavy-water reactor can then be used
in fast reactors. I think there are a lot of such benefits that one can
derive. I would for one suggest that you do not restrict your thinking
in terms of options to what has been said by the West. That is because
they have been talking about options from a stagnant position. I think
the options they suggest are surely there. But there are many more
options that one can think of. Since we are equally interested in
uranium since without uranium thorium cannot start and of course
we are very interested in thorium, I think we have many more options
and that we should keep them open.
Thank you very much.
Chair: We have a few minutes of time. I hope Dr. Kakodkar would
agree to take maybe one or two questions from the floor?
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes – as many as you like.
Question: Dr. Kakodkar, thank you for that very lucid and very
logical exposition. The draft report of the Planning Commission’s
Committee on Energy has recently been released. They say that in
the next thirty years, the bulk of our energy requirement will continue
to come from coal. Except that in thirty years’ time our coal deposits
– domestic coal deposits – will be exhausted. Hydro can be increased,
but it can’t provide more than five to six percent. They have come to
the conclusion that the bulk has to be provided by nuclear power.
Now do you agree with that, and how much of nuclear power do
you think we’ll be able to produce, let’s say in the next thirty to fifty
years?
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Well, I not only agree, but whatever is there in
that report is entirely consistent with a report that we prepared in
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DAE. We prepared a report on a fifty-year perspective – in fact, it’s
available on our website – and the Planning Commission study is
with a thirty-year perspective. So if you segment the fifty-year
perspective and take only the thirty-year period, whatever is said
about nuclear energy in the Planning Commission study is very similar.
That is because we have been a party to that discussion.
The point is like this. There is an energy crisis in the country, and
that crisis is bigger than what most people think. This is again arising
essentially out of the same consideration that the economy is growing
fast and if you want to support the fast growth of the economy, you
must have the matching energy resources. Although there is this
perception that India has plenty of coal, even this stock of coal may
be inadequate in the light of the fast energy growth that we may see
over a thirty or fifty year horizon.
What we have done in our study is that we looked at the programs of
all ministries – all energy-related ministries – and accounted for the
most optimistic projections made by different segments. We of course,
worked out the total energy requirement based on economic growth.
If you subtract one from the other, that tells you what is the niche
area for nuclear and that was the purpose with which that report was
made. It looks to us that the niche area for nuclear in the fifty-year
horizon is around 20-25%. In a thirty-year horizon, that percentage
is a little smaller.
Though finally it will be the economics that will decide what source
takes what share, if we can do better, we should certainly make that
attempt. This is exactly where this international co-operation comes
in. I look at anything coming as a part of international co-operation
as an addition. Now, this addition is important in the near term, say
over a twenty, thirty or forty year horizon. In fact this certainly is the
most important rationale for developing such co-operation. Of course,
co-operation is important in its own right.
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But there is another important part to this and that is, you go forward
maybe another thirty-forty years. Ask yourself a question on whether
in the long run, energy production in the country should be based
more on indigenous resources or based more on imported resources.
In the case of hydrocarbon, we have the situation today: where in
spite of having gone aggressive on exploration of hydrocarbons, we
still import a very large part of our hydrocarbons. Now energy is a
thing where you can justify import very easily because it has a large
multiplier effect on the economy. So it’s not as if you have to produce
everything indigenously. Japan is in fact, surviving mostly on imports.
However, for a large country like India, I think there will always be
this question of balance of payments. I wouldn’t call it an issue, but
if you produce that much within the country, you have an advantage
and that advantage is not small. So it is important that, in the long
run that we should be in a position to produce more nuclear electricity
from indigenous fuel resources. It’s absolutely important. If we allow
ourselves to be driven to a position where in the long run we cannot
produce energy from thorium then for all time to come, we would be
dependent on imported uranium. It’s not going to happen today. It’s
going to take time. If however we lose that option, then we will be
virtually in the same situation as we are with respect to hydrocarbons
today. So that is where this balance is required. I think co-operation
is important, but we cannot accept each and every demand that is
made as a price for that cooperation. For the reasons I have stated
here I think we have strength enough to get into a more balanced
negotiation.
Chair: Thank you. I think there is something wrong in the figures
that you quoted. Isn’t it true that from either the Planning Commission
30 year perspective or the DAE 50 year perspective ‘you will continue
to rely on coal and hydrocarbons.
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Yes, even in 2050 we would be heavily
dependent on coal.
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Chair: That’s right. And your nuclear just goes up – a bit. I think
there is – there was a question here? Yes.
Question: Does separation mean, for example, when you do a fuel
fabrication, you have to duplicate everything – one for the civilian,
one for the military? I mean, the American demand reminds me of
what you have in the religious festivals, one kind of food you make
for the Brahmins and one that you make for the other people. You
mix it and there’s some pollution and that kind of stuff.
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Let me share with you the way I see the
separation between the civil-and the military. The interpretation of
the July 18 statement is that you carve out a civilian domain with
which you can have full international civil nuclear cooperation. You
organize a framework that will assure everybody that there will be
no diversion from this civil domain into the Indian military domain, or
for that matter, to any other country. That is the meaning of this
separation, the way I understand it.
Now having agreed to that we identify a few facilities (few or some
or whatever) and then put them voluntarily under IAEA safeguards.
Through this mechanism we create this assurance that there will be
no diversion of any material because it will be subject to oversight of
an external body. As long as that requirement is met, that there is no
apprehension of any diversion, I think that should suffice. Now, you
can have a civilian activity in a military facility. Something from a
military facility can be brought into the civilian domain. The reverse
is not true. Something in the civilian area cannot be taken to the
military domain. Now, this is an important point for us to make our
decisions. The argument that anything that produces electricity is
civilian because power generation is civilian almost amounts to mean
that military does not use electricity. So I think there is no definition
of what is a civilian facility. It is for us to decide and create a credible
assurance that there will be no diversion and that there be no fear
that there will be diversion. And as long as it is recognized that India
has her own strategic needs and that India should be free to fulfill its
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strategic needs and requirements there should be no problem. I think
the discussion of what is on the strategic side is not on the table. In
fact, I would not even want to discuss that. That is what the July 18
statement means. I hope I have answered your question.
How did the Indian program begin? The Indian program began as a
civilian program. Whatever one might say, I have been living in this
program since the year 1963. It was all along a civilian program. But
it was a comprehensive program in the sense that the possibility of
having to make or derive some benefit on the military side, should it
become necessary, was always kept open. But it was not as if
something was built essentially for a military activity. So this whole
program is very intertwined. Today if you decide and separate, it
virtually means that either you cripple your strategic activity or create
duplicated strategic activity. Now, the question is – why should we
do that?  So that is the point.
If, for example, you take the fuel cycle facility, they provide supplies
on both sides. So I must keep it outside the civilian domain. In fact,
if you see the US, they also had defined some criteria. There are
some four or five criteria. Even if you apply those criteria, I am
okay. Now, the important thing is to many separation means you
divide the DAE into two (I’m quoting from what the media has used
to attack us) In the United States, the Department of Energy (DoE)
is only one. DoE does not only the civil nuclear and the military
nuclear, it also does coal, oil and everything that connects with energy.
In France, it is one organisation, in Russia it is one, in China, it
is one.
Chair: Yes – there is one hand up there. A very brief one, very fast.
Question: As a complete layman, I’ve been seeing a lot of media
reports that we absolutely have to go through this agreement.
Otherwise there’ll be a catastrophe, a decline in our program, and
we’ll be in very serious trouble if we don’t agree to this agreement.
In a worst-case scenario, that this agreement does not take place, is
this catastrophic scenario accurate?
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Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all, I think approaching any
negotiation from a desperate position is bad. So even if we are
desperate, I think approaching it that way is bad. But I must tell you,
that we are not desperate. But that does not mean that we are not
keen. We are keen. But the Indian program is there and it will go on.
For me negotiating cooperation or preparing conditions for cooperation
is not new. It’s not a few months old but several years old. I have
been always sending a message to everybody that the Indian program
will go on – with you or without you. So that’s the answer.
Chair: Dr. Kasturirangan wanted to ask a question
Dr. K. Kasturirangan: Dr..Kakodkar didn’t answer the questions
that I was looking for. This is really related to a long-term strategy
which I thought they would have already evolved. Notwithstanding
the suggestion of the US under this agreement that you have to
separate the civilian, the non-civilian and the research component, I
thought that such a separation must already be an integral component
of your long-term strategy on how to develop the civilian program.
In our experience we always found that when you have a civilian
program, it is an accepted program in which international cooperation
naturally becomes a feasible and you do get technologies that are at
the cutting edge and there are no inhibitions on cooperation. The
question is, what kind of diffusion takes place between the civilian
and the military? What kind of institutional mechanisms should one
establish, not because the DAE is a proliferator, but because there
could be other known means through which a proliferation could
take place and both the parties know this very well. So if this separation
is for form’s sake only, maybe one should look at the agreement in a
different way, with the proviso that we are confident enough to do
what we want, irrespective of the outcome of the deal. Today there
are fifteen and odd reactors that are operating and a few more are
likely to be commissioned. This is still far below the targets that have
been set by the DAE. To meet those targets you are really looking
for systems that are available in the country with fast turn-around
times. The turn-around time is one question – I don’t want to go into
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the details of that. But taking advantage of the agreement in terms
of what you said and keeping in mind both a long-term and a short-
term perspective, you do need whether one likes it or not, a larger
amount of power from nuclear sources. So this is the sum total of an
overall programmatic direction that one analyzes today. How do we
go about reconciling these tradeoffs?
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: That’s already a part of strategy, but just to tell
you about the turn-around time. Today NPC is constructing reactors
in four-and-a-half years. No other country has built it faster. NPC is
currently constructing eight reactors simultaneously. No other country
at this point of time is constructing so many reactors at one point of
time. There are of course constraints of fuel.  We have been working
on the possibility of bringing in the private sector for at least three-
four years now. We have to go through amendments to the Atomic
Energy Act, and that itself is such a long-drawn exercise. But it’s
there in the pipeline already. I must also caution about the realistic
situation. I would like to give examples of Argentina and Brazil. When
these countries joined the NPT, or before that, the pseudo-NPT,
there were a lot of promises that they will get all kinds of things. So
many years down the line, they haven’t got much. Of course, they
don’t require energy so much they have a huge hydro base. That is
another story. On the other hand, Brazil recently developed a new
enrichment technology. Of course now that they are a part of the
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, it is to be subjected to IAEA
safeguards. There is a huge debate raging about how much Brazil
should reveal in terms of its technology to facilitate safeguards.
So these are some of the points that we have to deal with in this is
real-life world.
Chair: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Kakodkar. I am going to
catch you, even if you try and avoid me, at some other time, to get
my questions answered. Thank you all very much and I know we
would like to thank Dr. Kakodkar very much.
Dr. Anil Kakodkar: Thank you.
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Maj. Gen Dipankar Banerjee (Retd.), Prof. Christopher S. Raj
112




and Implications for Indo-US
Cooperation in Defence
Chair: Admiral P. J. Jacob (Retd.)
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for being
here. In continuation of the national workshop on Indo-US relations,
this is our session on cooperation and defence and emerging security
challenges that India and the United States face. We have a very
distinguished panel, and to conduct the proceedings, I request Admiral
Jacob to take over as Chair. We have three panelists and one
discussant – Prof. Christopher Sam Raj from SIS, JNU, from the
Department of American Studies, General Banerjee from the Institute
of Peace and Conflict Studies, Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy –
and Dr. Lawrence Prabhakar will be our discussant for this session.
I now request Admiral Jacob to take over and chair this session and
preside over it. Thank you.
Admiral Jacob: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I know a
post-lunch session is always a drowsy session, but I understand that
one of the presenters has some very informative slides – that should
help to keep the interest alive.
The subject that we have today is ‘Changing Security Environment
and Implications for Indo-US Cooperation in Defence’. I felt, when
I was looking at this, that the most appropriate way to kick off this
session on the changing security environment and implications for
Indo-US cooperation would be to recall the preamble to the new
framework for the Indo-US defence relationship of June 2005, which
came as quite a surprise to a lot of people. This preamble states that
the United States and India have entered a new era. We are
transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and
shared national interests. As the world’s two largest democracies,
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the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political
and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law,
security and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two
countries are building a US-India strategic partnership in pursuit of
these principles and interests.
Ten years ago, in January 1995, the Agreed Minute on Defence
Relations between the United States and India was signed. Since then,
changes in the international security environment have challenged
our countries in ways unforeseen ten years ago. The US-India defence
relationship has advanced in a short time to unprecedented levels of
cooperation unimaginable in 1995. Today, we agree on a new
framework that builds on past successes, seizes new opportunities,
and charts a course for the US-India defence relationship for the next
ten years. This defence relationship will support and will be an element
of the broader US-India strategic partnership.
The US-India defence relationship derives from a common belief in
freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and seeks to advance shared
security interests. These interests include:
• Maintaining security and stability;
• Defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism;
• Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
associated materials, data and technologies; and
• Protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea
lanes.
Why has there been a sudden spurt in Indo-US cooperation, especially
in strategic spheres? After all, India has been a stable democracy
ever since independence, and indeed as a bulwark against the spread
of communism, epitomized what the US looks for in strategic alliances.
However, the perceptible thaw in Indo-US relations has only been a
recent phenomenon. While part of this shift may be attributed to
purely economic considerations, in that India is a vast market for
both commercial and military goods from the United States – it would
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be too simplistic to assume that there are no broader strategic
compulsions.
While some may not take India’s aspirations of becoming a global
player in the near to medium term too seriously, there can be little
doubt that its influence is spreading beyond the environs of South
Asia. It is equally obvious that the new security environment after
9/11, with its attendant issues such as drug and arms trafficking,
terrorism and insurgency, requires something beyond a unilateral
approach.
A study by the United States Naval War College states, “We need
tangible Indian support because our strategic interests and objectives
are global, while the military and other means at our disposal to pursue
them are not keeping pace. American force posture remains
dangerously thin in the arc, many thousands of miles long, between
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Okinawa and Guam in the
Pacific.”
This approach is further amplified by Ashley Tellis, the former aide
to Blackwill, who opined:
“In those Asian areas of critical significance to vital US interests
that would warrant the commitment of US resources, including force
on a unilateral basis if necessary, India will indeed remain a peripheral
actor. But as its capabilities grow, so will its influence, even if it is
limited. And that influence can help advance shared bilateral interests
if relations with New Delhi are adroitly managed.”
In these critical areas, he writes, “Indian power could be dramatically
magnified if it were to be applied in concert with that of the United
States. In such circumstances, Indian resources could help to ease
US operational burdens.” He goes on to say “Indian power will be
the most relevant in those geographic and issue-areas lying in the
interstices’ of Asian geopolitics. In those areas, great power interests
are neither obvious nor vital. Consequently, their incentives to enforce
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certain preferred outcomes unilaterally are poor. In such
circumstances, rising powers like India can make a difference because
their substantial – though not still dominant – capabilities can swing
the balance in favour of one coalition or another.”
For its part, the undeniable influence wielded by the United States in
the region cannot be ignored by India. The region is home to vast
geographical, historical and economic diversity. Inevitably, perhaps,
the region is an area where many differing cultures, religions,
ideologies and political systems compete and struggle to survive or
expand their own interests. As a result, it is replete with regional
conflicts, a struggle for power in the Persian Gulf, the Indo-Pakistan
conflict in South Asia, internal strife in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, to
name just a few.
Even before the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror in Afghanistan,
the United States maintained considerable presence in the region,
with the capability for power projection deep inland as envisaged by
their “Forward from the Sea” posture. They have military presence
or arrangements for access almost across the entire Gulf region. It
would be naïve to expect this situation to change dramatically in the
near future, or to discount the tremendous influence that is wielded
by the United States in the region, and indeed in the affairs of the
world at large.
In the uni-polar world of today, the US often acts without the
semblance of a consensus. Post 9/11, the “either with us or against
us” yardstick has been applied brazenly to use force to unilaterally
achieve their strategic objectives. Even in Iraq, the absence of WMD
and the worsening situation on the ground leads one to believe
that the invasion has probably caused more problems than it set out
to solve.
The road to democracy has also not been very smooth, and the
recently-concluded elections have yet to manifest itself in tangible
improvement for the country and its citizens. The invasion has also
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led to speculation as to who would be the next target of American
unilateralism, notable among them being Iran. Iran’s arguments to
acquire uranium enrichment expertise may be legitimate, but a mere
subterfuge for achieving the status of a nuclear weapon state to fulfill
its aspirations of being a great power, and also for becoming secure.
On the other hand, though India has a historical association with
Iran, it voted against Iran in the meeting of the Board of Governors
of the IAEA in September 2005, and again on February 4, 2006. The
future of the Iran-Pak-India gas pipeline also seems to be in jeopardy,
and, not only may India be forced to rethink on it, but recent statements
by the Pakistani Prime Minister in Washington suggest that they too
may ditch the project if the US offers them the same nuclear deal as
they have with us.
It is also apparent, despite statements to the contrary, that the United
States has a considerable role to play, even in reducing tensions
between India and Pakistan. A major hurdle in the development of
Indo-US relations in the past has been what has sometimes been
referred to as the ‘third country prism’. For a long time, US-Pak
relations had an adverse effect on US-India relations. Development
of the US-China relations had the same impact. In the post cold-war
era, strategic planners in both countries have obviously seen the
benefits of stronger ties and greater strategic and military cooperation.
To expand more on this subject, we have with us today three speakers
– Prof. Christopher Sam Raj of the School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University who would be speaking on emerging
security challenges and implications for Indo-US cooperation in
defence, then we have Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee, who is the
Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Delhi, who
will speak on the emerging security challenges and implications for
Indo-US cooperation – an Army perspective. Air Chief Marshal
Krishnaswamy, former Chief of Air Staff will speak on emerging
security challenges and implications for Indo-US cooperation – an
Air Force perspective. Since there is no separate slot for the Naval
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perspective, I have taken the liberty of covering it with a broad brush
in my opening remarks. Finally we have as our discussant,
Dr. Lawrence Prabhakar, Associate Professor, Madras Christian
College, Chennai. May I now request Prof. Christopher Sam Raj to
start his presentation.
Prof. Christopher S. Raj - Emerging Security Challenges and
Implications for Indo-US Cooperation in Defence
Thank you, Chairman, Admiral Jacob. I think from what you said,
we are all at ease after lunch; you have brought us to attention by
your presentation. My problem is that I am sandwiched between
two military men. I thought, rather than talking defence, I should use
the word ‘security’ implications. I am not an expert because I have
not fought a battle – they all have. I have not even carried a gun –
they all have. I am grateful to the organizers, and especially the
Director of this institute, Dr. Rangan, and also my colleague
Vijayalakshmi for inviting me for this important seminar today. We
have heard a lot of details. My interest has always been to make a
theoretical structure on the notions relating to behaviour of States,
nations and how especially a superpower formulates its own security
structure in the current context.
One needs to understand the global polarity concept. How the security
environment has been changing? In the context of polarity, we have
seen a major difference especially since 1991. The power structure
and the Indo-US security relations too have differed over the years.
In a nutshell, the terrorist attack or the destruction of the New York
World Trade Centre transformed the global security environment.
The end of the Cold War, implosion of the USSR, equally brought
bipolarity to an end. There has been in the American administration
since the senior Bush administration and subsequently Clinton a lot
of discussion as to what is the real threat emerging. In this new
configuration, America has emerged as a lone superpower. But, how
does it function in this existing environment is a challenging question.
The US in the current context believes absolutely in the realpolitik as
a tool of their diplomacy.
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Academic opinion is divided on this global theory that has emerged –
the polarity theory. One view says yes, there is a new realist theory,
that there is a unipolar world signaling to one superpower. Another
position is brought and analysed in the clash of civilisation by
Huntington – this is the academic debate which is emerging. He said
there is a uni-multilateral power situation. There is one power, that is
the United States, and there are many smaller powers. America has
not yet abandoned multilateralism and the aspects related to
multilateralism.
As the global situation emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
one finds one plus four powers in the whole political and global
structure. This had one superpower that is the United States, although
in the morning we heard from the doyen of our security community,
Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, saying there is only a leading power. I have
my doubts. If we go on the literature on what constitutes the definition
of a superpower, we just can’t deny that America is a superpower.
If you go into Morgantheau’s theory of what a country and a power’s
capabilities are, you cannot deny it. So these are realities. As an
Indian, we may find it very satisfying that it is a leader. But it is a
superpower. One superpower is emerging. Who are the other major
powers in this whole thing? China, European Union, Japan and Russia.
India doesn’t figure in the first ten years or the decade of post Cold
War in the literature or in the American foreign policy.
The American interest during the Clinton administration was only to
cap, roll back and eliminate our nuclear program. And what did they
threaten us with? The threat was, as you see, they looked at Japan
and the need to rethink on Japan. Re-structural rhetoric aspects of
Japan, China, and then the rogue the emerged. The concerns of the
post-9/11 – and the Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a new global
threat.
Now this is the existing global environment. You have one power
and four great powers (China, the European Union, Japan and Russia).
The post-Cold War global environment affirmed the rise of American
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unipolar power and the other major states are not making systematic
choice to pull away from and balance against the US. Hence, the
main security concern of these states, both in Europe and Asia, was
how not to distance from the United States, because it is a powerful
nation, but how to prevent the United States drifting away from various
structures of international community and world structures.
A set of academics who opposed and rejected the idea of polarity
upheld that post-Cold War phase has to be attributed to globalisation.
Indeed, the post-Cold War liberal triumphalism produced a
globalisation school of thought that attacked the state-centric, power
politics assumptions of realists and neorealists on which the core
idea of polarity theory rested. Globalists emphasised the diffusion of
power away from the state and military sector to other actors and
other sectors. The globalist perspective is generally understood to be
the antithesis of realism’s and neorealism’s statist, understanding of
the international system structure. Globalisation is rooted mainly in
cultural, transnational and international political economy approaches.
This is a globalization process which you also saw at the time when
America was not clear what is the threat. There we see these things
operating into a whole operation. As I see, perhaps de-territorialisation
of world politics appeared to be the guiding theme of these globalists.
There have been two versions of de-territorialisation or borderless
environment of the world politics. The stronger versions whether
Marxian or Liberal has upheld that de-territorialisation has taken the
state, and the state system, off the centre stage of world politics.
Milder versions leave the state and the state system in, but put lots
of non-state actors and systems through and alongside them. In a
globalised world, we see a borderless situation – borderless states
are all treated as one – and information and all the things move on in
that situation. And that’s why you found the possibility of Indo-
America relations taking place. In the ultimate analysis, the progress
of the globalisation phase is almost synonymous with Americanisation
of the world politics which once again affirm a unipolar view.
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In the whole ten-year period, the first decade of the post Cold War,
or until 1995, there is one Indo-US multi-cooperation stock-taking by
the American Foreign Office. As I was moving into this in detail – I
am just bringing it – having put the structures on our relationship,
there is a formal agreement in 1995. But that doesn’t operate on a
full scale till you have moved into another situation – the post 9/11
scene. That is where a list of a whole lot of – all kinds of joint
operations and joint inter-polarity – emerge after 2001. Hence, the
Indo-US defence cooperation agreement of 1995 has been
strengthened after September the 11 event.
In between, we are constantly under pressure on the issues relating
to NPT & CTBT. The only change we saw, was during the Kargil
conflict. One can even say – somewhere I have written saying that
Kargil almost changed what was felt in 1971 – the tilt of the United
States on Pakistan. There was a change – and there is a tilt of the
United States towards India. Now once again, the pressure is kept
on non-proliferation. Finally, it ends with Clinton going off from the
issue, because CTBT is no more an issue, even in the United States.
The Congress refused to accept it, refused to ratify it. It is more or
less, the Indo-American relationship in the changing structure of the
first decade of the post Cold War. The focus was more on Europe;
the focus was more on what was developing in Europe, as you would
see, because they were polishing the policy of intervention – policy
of humanitarian intervention – a new concept which the Americans
finally accepted for intervening even in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Simultaneously, where they disagreed on issues, you have another
thing developing in the international arena – democratisation of foreign
policy. You take issues out of the UN, and whoever is interested in
the global level, and out of that emerged the treaty which was called
Banning of the Land Mines.
So that is how things were in this situation where threats were not
there, but things changed after 9/11. The global security environment
changed – shifted – and citizens were shocked as they saw in real
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time, how the building – the most important building in the United
States – was collapsing. In a motion, you have President saying that
he is not going to allow anything to happen. And he is going to be
chasing whoever it is. The day after September 11 event, General
Richard Myers was asked at the Congressional hearings why the
mightiest military in history had failed to protect the heart of American
power from a group of men brandishing “boxcutters.” In those early
shocked hours, the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
had no ready reply but the unvarnished truth “we are pretty good if
the threat is coming from outside,” Myers said. “We are not so good
if it is coming in from inside.”
There is now a threat they never visualized as it emerged in the
current form. So you find that a new threat has been identified. For
this audience, I would like to say that this threat as it is identified, is
terrorism. The first major statement – even President Truman went
to the Congress – on 12th March, 1947 – the words that he used
were, “Terrorists supported by Communists”. The word ‘terror’ had
come up even in the containment formulation of the containment
policy. There, ‘terrorist’ was identified with ‘communist’. As we
now see, as he went before the Congress in September, he clearly
says, the ‘terrorist’.
For the first time, the United States has found something to pursue.
That’s very important. So you know, the only superpower now has
been able to identify the threat and out of the threat comes the
formulation of the war on terror. In 1947, it was containment, now it
is the war on terror, and declaring the operation Enduring Freedom
Military Campaign in Afghanistan. In 1947, they were looking for
allies. Now, a new term – you are talking of partnership and alliance.
The one thing that America is constantly looking for is a coalition of
willing partners. That’s also a new thing, that is okay, we don’t want
you as partners, neither as allies, but wherever you have convergence
of interests then I think the American policy makers have absolutely
a different take.
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Soon after the “Operation Enduring Freedom” Campaign in
Afghanistan, especially from January 2002, President Bush turned
American attention and resources away from Al-Qaeda to lead a
crusade against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. On 15 September 2002,
President unveiled the new National Security strategy of the US. It
highlighted the primacy and balance of power. It talks about organising
coalition and also about acting all alone for self-defence. The most
important aspect of the national security strategy is the statement
that codifies all the new aspect of exceptionalism. It adopts the
doctrine of preemptive action and has made no mention of the United
Nations in this context; presumes that the US. is the sole judge of
the legitimacy of its own or anyone else’s preemptive strike. The
document emphasised the deadly threat posed by the weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
In the current circumstances, how does the world superpower, having
come out with a theory of their operation, going to behave in the
international system. They are going to replace regimes which do
not contribute or do not see eye-to-eye with them. They will be
using the pre-emptive strikes and also unilateralism as a part of the
whole thing. What does this whole thing mean to us and everyone
else?
In the post 9/11 scenario, the world is in the midst of a great
geo-political adjustment process. Governments and people around
the world see that the United States is out of control.  You find literature
– even the American writers have written that the United States is
out of control. They don’t want to have discussions or consensus,
and want to take unilateral actions. The rise of terrorism has made
the United States respond by mobilising its military power, searching
out new enemies and threats. The United States is now at war.
Now, the security environment is in precarious condition.
Chair: Thank you Professor Sam Raj. We will now have General
Banerjee – for fifteen minutes?
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Gen. Dipankar Banerjee - Emerging Security Challenges and
Implications for Indo-US Cooperation: An Army Perspective
Dr. Kasturirangan, Admiral Jacob, distinguished friends. I thought
there’ll be 20, but there’s only 15 minutes for my presentation, but
that’s ample time Fortunately, I have a power-point presentation,
which allows me to skip certain portions. Hopefully, you’ll be able to
follow the thread of what I’m trying to present.  The presentation is
titled ‘Indo-US Strategic Relations in a Changing World’. There is,
per se, no Army view. The Army by and large does what national
policies determine. Within that context, of course, it shapes policies
of implementation and it provides more detailed guidelines. I think
we should need to look more on the Indo-US strategic relations in
order to understand as to where this relationship is really going and
why.
I suggest this should be seen really in the backdrop of tectonic changes
that have taken place in the last decade and a half. There’s no need to
go through this – there are several others who have done it much
better, but let me highlight some of its characteristics. These are the
emergence of liberal democracy, free-market economics, political
freedoms and the consequent general prosperity and well being
around the world of which India itself is a shining example.  In this
new world order the US is undoubtedly a super power, some call it a
hyper-power at least in a military sense.
Beginning with the demise of the Soviet Union in the end 1980’s to
the terrorist strike on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent global
war on terror, these changes include the emergence of new power
centres, realignments in the international order, dramatic changes in
the nature of likely future confrontations and the emergence of new
strategic issues. The changes have also been both substantial and
unexpected. In turn these have posed new questions about how to
shape policies and in the case of India how to change old mind sets.
With the demise of the Soviet Union the bipolar global confrontation
came to an end and the era when the world was divided in to two
opposing blocks also ended. The idea of liberal democracy, free market
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economics and political freedom prevailed over totalitarian systems
and state controlled economies.1 There was consequently an explosion
of democracies around the world and an attempt at finding new
moorings. While India had always been democratic and an open
society, it’s ideas of state power and economic policies were shaped
by the reality of the bipolar world and its own strategic compulsions.
The post Cold War world allowed it to reshape these policies.
The US found itself suddenly as the unipolar power in the world.
Yet, this power was not entirely unqualified. For a while it dominated
in most areas of political and military power, it did not still have
sufficient influence to shape the world order according to its wishes.
This was because one consequence of globalisation was the diffusion
of power among many countries and even actors, all of whom were
not easy to control. There also emerged a new category of non-
state actors, not accountable to the world community but who
nevertheless wielded power and influence to play a critical role in
world affairs. This would be clearer after 9/11 when the US
dependence on other countries for specific support would become
evident.
The end of the Cold War also found India in very favourable
circumstances. It’s many decades of investment in human resources
and in democracy finally came through. With dependence on the Soviet
Union removed, it began to emerge as an independent player able to
look after its own strategic needs without external support. Even
though it was among the last of the major countries to give up
1 Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis may not have been conclusively
proved. Indeed, we may presently be witnessing a tentative return to socialist
market policies and state control and hence a return to ‘ideology’ in some countries
of Latin America, Russia and in the former Soviet Union. Yet, the central thesis
of the superiority of liberal democracy and free market economy has been clearly
established at least for our times. It is also a powerful lesson for India never to
contemplate a return to rigid and outdated ideologies of an earlier era.
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antiquated state controls over its economy, it was able to do this and
restructure itself successfully because it had inherent advantages. In
turn this led to an unleashing of its economic power. Initially this
was hesitant and slow, but by the early twenty first century it had
reached a stage of hyper yet potentially sustainable economic growth.
A lot of this was led by information technology, scientific innovation,
entrepreneurial abilities and the ingenuity of a bright young leadership
keyed on to the world. Unlike China, its economic growth is not
through the less sustainable models of high foreign direct investment,
through joint ventures with international companies using indigenous
surplus labour for low cost manufacturing.  The jury is still out on
which will prevail, even though we need to acknowledge China’s
very substantial lead in most sectors.
It was natural that the combination of these several factors would
bring these two “estranged democracies”, the USA and India together
in a common global partnership.
To examine the potential and possibilities of Indo-US strategic relations
in the emerging era, it is important first to analyse the emerging
global power structure and examine a few important issues. First
one should be clear about the countries that will play a critical role in
the future world. Next, is a brief look at the changing security
environment. What are the long and short term challenges that nations
will face? Where are they likely to emerge in the future? Next, is an
examination of the nature, content and future direction of Indo-US
strategic relations. Where is it now and which direction is it headed
in the near term?
Finally, there are issues of Indian national interests, for it is entirely
irrelevant to pose the above questions in a vacuum. The goal must
be to clearly contextualise these to Indian interests. For too long we
have been accused of lacking a strategic vision and unable to articulate
our strategic needs and formulate policies over the long term. We
have to make a conscious decision now to do this. There is no doubt
that the future belongs to a new generation of Indians, whether in
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India or around the world. For what has been proved beyond a shadow
of doubt, particularly in the last decade, is that the empowered global
Indian is indeed second to none on this planet. How do we translate
this enormous potential to ensure that India itself emerges as a leading
country in the comity of nations in all its various dimensions? That is
a challenge to which the country and its leadership will have to address
itself with vision, clarity and determination. I have no doubt that
developing a collaborative strategic relations with the US on terms
that India itself will determine will facilitate this process .
Emerging Global Power Structure
The present global power structure is clearly unipolar with the USA
enjoying a clear lead in most elements of comprehensive national
power, a situation that is likely to continue for the mid term future.
Its strength lies in its democratic structure that can readjust policies,
the enormous wealth of its human resources and the lead it continues
to enjoy in the world in areas of high technology. As long as American
universities can attract the best brains and talent from around the
world in substantial numbers, it will continue to be the global leader.
Yet, slowly and inexorably this will change. First, China and then
others will challenge this lead, initially perhaps in one or two areas
and later over a wider spectrum. Even though India is in the lead
among countries supporting US policies and has the most favourable
opinion of it, yet there is an unwillingness to accept this reality in a
political sense.
Before proceeding further it is necessary briefly to look at the
elements of power that will shape destinies of nations in the future.
First, is knowledge and the intellectual ability of a nation’s citizens
to shape tomorrow’s world. This will call for scientific advancement,
ability to innovate, develop knowledge in the frontier areas of
technology and exploit these to successful commercial and
technological breakthroughs. It also calls for an ability to manage
and exploit this knowledge through entrepreneurial and managerial
excellence. It is a nation’s ability to exploit these frontiers of
knowledge rather than resources that will determine their position in
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the world. More than factories and industrial establishments, it will
be universities and research centres that will be the hallmark of a
nation’s advancement. While there are selected areas of excellence
in India and a culture of prizing individual scholastic achievements,
overall among major countries Indian education system is among the
weakest. This must change.
Second, is the availability of a critical mass of human resource. A
major power will always need sufficient numbers of well trained,
healthy and enabled working people well in excess of retired and
dependent population. While countries such as the European Union,
Russia and Japan have the numbers at present, the demographic
balance is slowly turning negative for them. Due to cultural factors
these countries will be unable to rectify this through immigration.
The one child norm is likely to decrease Chinese population even in
the near future, which though helping its per capita GDP growth
fairly rapidly in the short term, will begin to impact negatively soon
after. Only the US and India stands best in this category. In both
countries the challenge will be to ensure that the population is provided
good education and health care to ensure that they are a strength
rather than a liability. Again, more than any other country in the
world India has the largest numbers of disadvantaged people.
Third, is the ability to globalise and interact with the world. Here,
India and China have an advantage due to their large diaspora spread
around the world. But, India scores in its comparative mastery over
English, the world language. China is trying very hard to catch up
but still faces many years of work in this area. Other major countries
too lack behind India. The back office functions and information
technology support provided in India not only earns money and
provides employment, but has also a powerful influence in globalising
the young and spreading Indian cultural influence around the world.
Fourth, is the assured availability of energy at reasonable prices. It is
true that oil and natural gas are global commodities and will be
available at internationally regulated prices to all customers. But, it
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is also a finite commodity subject to control and cartelisation. All
emerging powers will require large quantities of oil and gas for the
next 30-40 years till cost effective and assured technological
alternatives are available. Hence, assured availability of energy will
be a critical factor for future growth and hence its denial to others a
likely source of conflict. Japan, the EU and India are the most
vulnerable. Both the US and China have made adequate provisions
and likely to be less affected by major turbulence.
Finally, are the other factors that determine comprehensive national
strength. Among others are; effective economic and foreign policies,
positions of influence in the global hierarchy, a military technology
complex, competence of the armed forces, cultural cohesion and
others. Here India along with Japan has major disadvantages. Neither
are permanent members of the UN Security Council, the official high
table in international affairs. India is not even a member at least as
yet, of the G-8 industrialised countries.
In considering the above, challenges for India stands out dramatically.
Even as it is poised to break into the top league through exploiting its
advantages, it has to address and rectify its major shortcomings.
Enormous efforts and resources need to be diverted towards
revamping the educational system, improving health care for all and
to dramatically transform its creaking national infrastructure. It has
to aggressively look out for energy sources, develop indigenous
capabilities and participate in global scientific experiments for
alternate sources. It has to aggressively search out a greater role for
itself in the world through participation in international organisations
and institutions. All this calls for a mind change in governance.
Efforts for all this will have to come from within India and no one
will help it achieve a greater role for itself in the world. But one
country, which has the maximum potential to help India in these
objectives and least objection to doing so, is the United States. Both
countries national interests happily coincide at this historic moment
and both see advantages in it for themselves. Condoleeza Rice’s
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statement in India in March 2005 committing the US to support India
to become a major world power is borne out of this reality and not
out of any sense of inherent goodwill. For, this is entirely in the US’
own strategic interests.
Considering the above, the candidates for global leadership in the
coming decades stand out. The USA will remain in the lead. China is
rapidly catching up and will remain the second most important player
challenging the US in a number of critical areas and particularly in
Asia. Its economic influence will be felt earlier than later. The
European Union is the next candidate. Although it is the strongest
economically, its weak political association reduces its collective
influence. It is expected to come together in trade, currency and
domestic policies as well as form a common foreign and security
policy. But, it will not have a common armed force and national
interests will still dominate and detract from the Union’s effectiveness.
Both Japan and Russia have major demographical problems. Japan’s
economy is back on track and still remain a powerful force, but may
weaken comparatively. Russia has turned the economic corner, but
it is still heavily dependent on its prime resource, oil and natural gas
from Siberia. Domestic governance, overall political weakness and
its comparative isolation are powerful negative factors. It still derives
its international position from the throwback of the communist era
and its possession of a large strategic weapons arsenal.
India is clearly the sixth power in this constellation. Its strength lies
in its youthful population, the enormous vitality of its people and
their knowledge potential, their entrepreneurial ability and all of which
is encapsulated in a vibrant and effective democracy.  India is clearly
a nation of the future.
Changing Security Environment
The threat to security in today’s world is less likely to come from an
aggressive war launched by a hostile power. For, an overt aggression
has become a much less effective form of inflicting lasting
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punishment on a country or to achieve political objectives. International
diplomacy, howsoever limited, faulty and hesitant still remains a more
effective and less costly form to affect punishment against an errant
state. Indeed the international strategic environment is characterised
by uncertainty and unpredictability. Threats to security will come
from least expected sources, from shadowy organisations, taking
shelter behind legitimate activities and organisations to strike in an
asymmetric manner.
These threats may be divided in to two broad categories. One set are
non-strategic and long term. The other threats are likely to be sudden
and more imminent. Let me try and explain.
Non-Strategic Threats
These may be characterised as distant and long term and come about
not necessarily through hostile actions but circumstantial changes.
These may be tabulated as:-
- Climate changes, such as global warming, environmental
degradation and others causing sudden and more frequent
natural disasters that are not targeted or caused by any
particular country or a group of states.
- Energy shortages leading to exorbitant costs and difficult
access. May come about due to economic factors or because
of disturbance or instability in major producing countries.
Apart from immediate adverse effects, it may have the
potential to cause long term economic down turn in targeted
countries.
- Health anxieties and spread of infectious disease either
through design when it becomes biological warfare or spread
through natural causes. These can become pandemic and
may cause loss of lives in tens of thousands.
- Narcotics and human trafficking, money laundering and other
effects of globalisation that can be taken advantage of by
non-state actors to terrorise and destabilise a country.
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Strategic Threats
These are deliberate efforts caused by definite acts of hostile powers
with the aim to destabilise and undermine a nation. It could be through
covert attacks or through blackmail or coercive threats short of actual
use of force. Some examples may be:-
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
- Domination and denying the use of oceans and space by
others.
- International terrorism carried out by ideological groups with
extremist views.
There are several such possibilities which cannot be precisely
identified and which will always attempt to use surprise and
asymmetric capabilities to inflict maximum damage. Even the threat
of use of force in many cases will have an effect of inflicting enormous
financial loss to a target country. The credible threat of anthrax
immediately after the 9/11 attacks caused the loss of several billions
of US dollars on the US economy due to shutdowns and expensive
precautionary measures.
Which countries or states or agents are likely to pose such a
threat?
It is hard to imagine a state in the comity of nations today, which
may pose such a major challenge to the international body. Yet, the
possibility of states suddenly changing character or being influenced
by hostile powers cannot be ruled out. Therefore, sudden accretion
of military capabilities particularly when not transparent or based on
sufficient reasoning may be an important cause for international
concern. The emergence of ‘rogue’ nations with little acceptance of
international norms or laws may be another. Finally, these may even
be ‘failed’ states which through its own failure become a prey of
non-governmental entities capable of taking it over and then using it
as a cover to mobilise resources for asymmetric attacks.
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Countering these threats will require international norms, legal
frameworks and robust preventive mechanisms. It will also require
credible early warning intelligence with global reach.
Developing a Counter Military Force
It may be argued that such threats are best left to the United Nations
to counter. Indeed India with its long involvement with peacekeeping
under the UN will probably find this option politically least
objectionable. With both legitimacy and an ability to muster an
international force, it has the potential to be most effective. Yet, there
are substantial limitations. It lacks credibility, cannot often work out
a suitable mandate and has limited resources. Besides, all nations,
particularly major states will always prefer an independent capability
to deal with contingencies affecting its national interests.
What sort of military force will India require then in the coming
decades? It will have to be a highly flexible force, capable of mobilising
with speed, with long range strike capability possessing top of the
line military equipment. Numbers of men in uniform are not the most
important as long as they are superbly trained to handle the complex
machines and equipment of tomorrow’s battlefield. The force must
be capable of net centric warfare on a 24/7 basis for sufficiently
long periods. Large portions of the weaponry will need to be
indigenous and all should be capable of being maintained in-country.
Space will increasingly become a platform for intelligence gathering
and deployment of communication gears and sensors. Hopefully,
substantial weaponisation of space will be prevented through
collective action in the near term. Other capabilities will need to
include long range manned fighters, blue water maritime capability
adequate for prolonged operations far from the shore. Ground forces
will have a very large element of Special Forces with support and
logistics capability to sustain operations for fairly large numbers well
away from the home base.
Such an overall capability will have to be acquired fairly quickly,
indeed to match India’s rapid economic rise. In the short term, this
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will only be possible through extensive cooperation in technology,
doctrine, weapon design and tactical collaboration with the US.
Indo-US Strategic Relations
Indo-US defence cooperation arrangements were shaped by
developments in the post Cold War era from the early 1990s. Lt.
Gen. Kicklighter of the Pacific Command in his initial visit to New
Delhi was posed a challenge by the then Vice Chief of the Army
Staff Lieutenant General Rodrigues, to come out with a framework
of cooperation between the two armies. In his next visit to Delhi
Kicklighter brought back an outline. In a few years these were to be
finalised and emerge as the “Agreed Minutes” that were signed by
the Defence Secretary William Perry and the Home Minister of
India in January 1995. This laid out the framework under which the
two armed forces were to cooperate in the future.
It visualised closer ties between the civilian defense leadership,
uniformed officers and defence production and research organisations.
An annual strategic dialogue was also set up. The burgeoning defence
cooperation and interaction particularly in this century have been
unprecedented and among the most intense activities that the US
armed forces have undertaken with any country in the world save
perhaps its closest allies.
Strategic cooperation with any country must be supported by a
common vision, shared values, and a convergence of interests. Indo-
US relations today is characterised by a happy convergence when
all three; vision, values and interests coincide. There may be
occasional differences on particularities and it is not likely that all
three will continue to coincide indefinitely in the future. Actually, it
may be possible to argue that in the first fifty years, neither our
vision nor interests converged even though we may claim that our
values were similar. But, this convergence today endows this
relationship with both hope and the prospect of longevity.
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On the basis of ten years of working these arrangements and based
on greater confidence and trust in each other’s armed forces and
respect for their capabilities, it is now possible to move forward to
the next ten years. The outlines of this future cooperation are based
on the New Framework for Defence Relations, an agreement that
was signed on 28 June 2005 at Washington, DC between Donald
Rumsfeld and Pranab Mukherjee. The concrete aspects merit a quote
in detail:
“In pursuit of this shared vision of an expanded and deeper US-
India strategic relationship, our defence establishments shall:
(a) Conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges; 
(b) Collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their
common interest; 
(c) Strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote security
and defeat terrorism;
(d) Expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote
regional and global peace and stability;
(e) Enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction;  
(f) In the context of our strategic relationship, expand two-way
defence trade between our countries.  The United States and
India will work to conclude defence transactions, not solely as
ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen our
countries’ security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve
greater interaction between our armed forces, and build greater
understanding between our defence establishments; 
(g) In the context of defence trade and a framework of technology
security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology
transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and
development;  
(h) Expand collaboration relating to missile defence; 
(i) Strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond quickly to
disaster situations, including in combined operations;
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(j) Assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful
peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other
countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations; 
(k) Conduct exchanges on defence strategy and defence
transformation;
(k) Increase exchanges of intelligence; and     
(m) Continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from
the US Department of Defence and India’s Ministry of
Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on
international security issues of common interest, with the aim
of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives,
and developing common approaches. 
This is a very long and an ambitious agenda. Two questions
immediately arise, answers to which will determine the permanence
or otherwise of these arrangements. One, is a strong, independent,
democratic and independent India in US interest? The other, is a
world of values and ideas under US leadership in India’s interest?
On the first set of issues, some sections in India have expressed
reservations. They are not fully aware of the magnitude of changes
that are currently in progress in the world and India’s role in them.
These doubts have for the present been completely demolished by
US commitment to help India become a major power. The logic of
this has been explained by others from an US perspective and need
not be laboured on here.
The second question too is relevant. Who sets the values and ideas
in the US? The values and ideas of the founding fathers in the US as
enshrined in its Constitution finds easy resonance in India. But not
those of the neo-conservatives with their grandiose dreams of global
conquest through US military supremacy and force of arms.
Therefore, some differences are bound to arise, particularly such as
over Indian troop contribution to Iraq. But, there are likely to be
several other possibilities where both India and US will find it easy
and mutually beneficial to cooperate.
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What then is this relationship all about? Let us first consider what it
is not. India will patently not be :-
- An eastern sea-board for the US.
- An alliance against China.
- A surrogate or subordinate to do the US bidding in Iraq or
elsewhere if it is not in India’s interest.
Some constituencies in the US, surely not the government, may well
have some expectations of India’s support in these areas. These should
be quickly put to rest. India is far too conscious of its sovereignty to
suffer any easy erosion. On China, India will always have its own
interests and concerns, which will be often independent of the US.
Instead what it must aim to be and there lie the challenge, are:-
- A partnership of equals based on shared strategic objectives.
- With neither side threatening the core interests of the other.
- Cooperating and supporting vital national interests of each
other.
- Ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Asia.
Continuous dialogue and interaction will shape the relationship and a
commitment to make it work. India’s value to the US and indeed its
true worth is based on Sunil Khilnani’s description of India, “as a
bridgehead of effervescent liberty on the Asian continent”. Within
the ambit of such broader perceptions it is not difficult to work out a
set of common interests in a diverse set of issue areas.
- Promoting democracy, particularly in Asia.
- Preventing single power domination of Asia.
- Eliminating threats from state sponsors of terrorism.
- Arresting further spread of WMD and related technologies.
- Advancing economic development and spreading prosperity.
- Protecting global commons, particularly SLOC and Space.
- Preserving energy security.
- Safeguarding global environment.
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Indian Strategic Interests in the Coming Decades
In addition to common and shared interests between India and the
US there are specific national interests for India which this partnership
should address and which will be an issue of continuing concern to
New Delhi. These may be broadly divided in to three categories;
world order and regional interests, economic interests and defence
interests.
Among world order and regional interests the following may be quickly
tabulated:-
- US support for permanent membership of the UN Security
Council and the Asia Pacific Economic Community.
- It should be possible to expand the G-8 to G-10 which would
include China and India.
- Closer consultation and dialogue on issues of concern in Central
and Southeast Asia.
- An informal trilateral consultation process between the US, India
and Japan.
In technology and economic areas a number of issues are of great
importance to India. Even though both investments as well as
commerce in the US are entirely a private enterprise, whatever
governmental restrictions on technology transfer and investment
remain should be done away with. Of particular importance are:-
- Joint collaboration in developing new energy sources. Facilitating
oil and natural gas pipelines where possible or at least not to
put any hurdles on the way. Much can be achieved through
joint projects on developing an energy grid in Asia.
- Creating leverages to ensure that savings, pensions and security
funds from the US are invested in the secure and burgeoning
Indian financial institutions.
- Further opening up of selected areas by India to permit greater
inflow of capital funds from the US.
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- Taking up joint projects for high technology cooperation in
advanced scientific areas in bio technology, nano technology,
pharmaceutical industries and other areas.
In strategic areas a number of opportunities lie ahead. Great progress
has been made in developing joint training and inter-operability
systems. We need to continue to strengthen these areas and build on
doctrine, battlefield support and establish cooperation on the joint
production of high value military equipment. Major strategic
cooperation cannot be achieved without larger projects on joint design,
development and production of major defence systems and equipment.
No strategic partnership can be sustained without greater tie up
between defence technology laboratories, research establishments and
design centres. Finally, there has to evolve a better arrangement for
sourcing weapons and equipment from each other. A conscious attempt
should be made to develop synergy in these areas. A suggested list of
possible future cooperation areas are listed below:-
- Joint development and production of a multi-role fighter aircraft.
- Greater cooperation in UN Peacekeeping operations.
- Joint development and production of theatre missile defence
system for India.
- Collaboration for protecting the SLOC in the Indian Ocean.
- Strategic Forces cooperation – doctrine, training and equipment.
India and the US are poised today to cooperate as never before in
the greatest endeavour of our times; to maintain peace and stability
in a world increasingly under challenge from a diverse and often
unpredictable threat. Some are caused by nature. Others by states
and yet others by shadowy non-state actors acting on their own.
Each country might well attempt to meet these challenges on its
own. Some threats that are intimately national will necessarily have
to be countered by each separately. But, a majority of these will call
for collective action consciously meeting the essential requirements
of each.
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This is uncharted territory. There are wide differences in perception
and policies separating the two nations. There are other priorities
and relationships. In each country there are competing domestic
interests. Yet, overall the benefits too are substantial and the prospect
of positive outcomes to both nations is large. The future is full of
challenge and not the smallest of these is nurturing this relationship.
As in all such cases it will require a heavy dose of pragmatism,
maturity and a high sense of statesmanship able to look beyond the
horizon to the coming decades of this emerging century.
Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy: Emerging Security
Challenges and Implications for Indo-US Cooperation: An Air
Force Perspective
It is difficult to hold a long session after lunch. So I would try and
stick to points that I have been asked to touch upon. I shall just touch
upon the changing contours of Indo-US relations, emerging security
challenges implication, and views of the Air Force of my time.
Well, as you probably know, I headed the Air Force in a very difficult
time. We were nearly at war; we had just a couple of days to really
cross the border, but we stood in that that state for about a year.
Subsequently, our own and international pressures persuaded us to
establish better relationship with the neighbourhood as well as
internationally. We are now going places! Around that time, I became
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The three Services
coordinated to establish service-to-service relationship with friendly
foreign countries and talk to their military. My experiences were
unique and I share some of these instead of giving a lecture.
The first part that strikes me now is the contour of the Indo-US
relation.  To start with, is a simple statement that we never had any
relation with USA and we now have built some relationship. To be
frank, so far there’s nothing exciting and nothing very strategic about
this relationship though there is a great expectancy from certain
quarters.  India, as a country is proud. When we take decisions, it is
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such a grinding machinery that we go through - between ministries
and departments and up and down the so-called Silos and within the
Services too. It takes so long and with speculations galore, it almost
threatens the relationship. Nevertheless, we went ahead and it was a
positive start.
From the perspective of the military, the ‘Strategic Relationship’ is
yet to be established with United States. I don’t quite follow the
arguments that one hears on this issue since they are quite diverse.
While we do have defence cooperation with many countries, we are
not yet familiar with a strategic military relationship. Currently, from
a political perspective, India and USA may feel that the relationship
would be of strategic value to both. Some examples of defence
cooperation that we have between the Air Forces are those with
Singapore, France, Israel, South Africa. The military to military
relationship with USA is nothing very significantly different from
that with these countries. We enjoyed exercising with the Singapore
Air Force, the French Air Force, the South African Air Force and
few others. As far as America is concerned, we also have some
exchange of postings. We have – one of our fighter pilots is posted
there – a post that is there for the last six years or so. Our pilot
participates in training American fighter pilots Every three years, he
is changed and a new guy goes. Similarly, we have one American
pilot with us. So in general we are quite familiar with Air Force to
Air Force relationships but this is very different from military strategic
relationship.
At times, the strategic relationship is wrongly perceived as obtaining
weapon systems from the USA. I do see a number of American
companies knocking at the doors of Air Headquarters and Ministry
of Defence, wanting to sell aeroplanes and ships and guns. There
may be a surprise coming! By the time our bureaucracy and Ministry
of Defence and Finance go through the processes and negotiate,
patience may run out that could melt down such strategic interests.
It is important that we perceive the military as an institution. In a
democracy, the power of such institutions is relatively small. There
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are other elements more important in building a strategic relationship
between two countries. Military element is plugged-in at the later
stage of building the relationship.
Now, as far as India is concerned, what kind of strategic relationship
does it wish with the United States? That will decide the kind of a
military-to-military relationship we ought to have. As yet, there is no
convergence - no real focus on what India is expected to do with the
United States. First and foremost is political convergence. That is,
whether the Parliament decides to establish a relationship with the
United States of a strategic significance, where the military also
joins, in the manner directed. That is yet to happen.
Indian military has never operated under anyone else’s flag other
than UN. I doubt very much that Indian military would work under
another nation’s flag – say in Iraq or anywhere else even if being a
strategic partner. US understands this well. The concept of being a
coalition partner but not under the UN flag is very new to India. And
the Americans know it and we know as well. Before embarking on
such a mission, the deliberations that would go on at political levels
will deep and very demanding. The arguments have to justify the
action.
The little bit of policing that we do during the so-called fight against
terrorism, and escorting ships or aeroplanes searching for survivors
or whatever it is, these are of a routine nature. Terrorism – it’s very
interesting that until 9/11 happened the United States never
acknowledged that we have problems across the border, and that
we face cross-border terrorism. When our relationship with Pakistan
went sour after a few incidents of cross-border terrorism, the
Americans did not acknowledge our actions to be right. We said that
we are facing this since 1989. But when the single incident of 9/11
occurred, the US woke up suddenly! We do see here that national
interests also dictate perceptions.
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We lose a soldier – statistically average one per day since 1989. In
fact, the total casualty is more than that. And certainly the Americans
know about it. They refuse to acknowledge that Pakistan as a State
supporting cross-border terrorism. Post 9/11 gave us an opportunity
to look for strategic partnership – that we shall fight terrorism together.
But I think the Americans are gradually turning around; and they are
seeing what we see and acknowledge. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen would
not have been blacklisted if it wasn’t for 9/11. If it was not for 9/11
we would still be fighting the same way as before then.
Both sides need to absorb the related issues. USA should no longer
hyphenate India and Pakistan. Though they say that they do not, on
ground this has not happened. India, however big we may be in the
region or however global we may go, Pakistan would always be an
important ally to USA. What solution are we going to evolve in
Kashmir? Is there a compromise? I cannot visualise a compromise.
The valley belongs to India. What does America think about it? They
say, you keep dialoguing, you’ll find a solution! But it is a very sensitive
issue.
It is very doubtful that even if ever join America as a coalition partner,
it is very doubtful if the US would ever join us in our fight against
terrorism in Kashmir, not that we are seeking their support.  We are
quite capable of handling it ourselves.  But, the indifference of US to
our sensitivities and principles are at times perplexing.
Hence, there are these so-called Lakshman rekhas (red-lines)
somewhere. That what are these strategic partnerships – where
should we be heading? First and foremost, is the congruence; the
political congruence. And from there, it could dictate where we go.
Now, coming back to the interesting part of the Air Force – we are,
after all, an institution under political control and guidance. If the
political directive permits us to exercise and train with the US military
or Singapore or France or South Africa, it is good for us – adds to
our training value. In fact, before the United States, we exercised
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with the French Air Force with their Mirage 2000 – (a more advanced
variant to the ones that we operate). I was fortunate to be on the
chair when all the international exercises fructified.
It was very, very interesting when we started off. Initially the USAF
was apprehensive over our minimal capability to support their
operation in India. They wished to know if our runway is strong
enough and if we have adequate drinking water. They wished to
know if our crash rescue system is good enough and also our medical
facilities. They wanted to test our runways and facilities which
we denied. It took quite a while – discussions and visits to plan the
training exercises in India. But they got started after over a year of
deliberations.
The Americans got used to it and when we started flying; they brought
the F-15s and we had the MIG-21s and our other conventional
aeroplanes. They were not ever interested to see our combat aircraft
since they were the old Soviet designs and way below the more
advanced machines that they had brought.  They were not too keen to
know about what tactics that we would follow while were very
secretive about their own. But then, when the exercise started they
realised that we were different to what they thought and what were
briefed about. The exchange ratio against American aeroplanes in
the first exercise we did in Gwalior was around 85:15. That means,
they lost 85% of their aeroplanes against 15% of ours. It was a serious
exercise – the rules of the games were made before the start – and
closely monitored using electronic systems. For us, it was certainly a
matter of great importance and pride.
What was interesting was that before they left, they came and saw
our cockpits. Our crew got along very well indeed. A certain level of
mutual understanding and respect was built. They were very straight
forward, honest and forthright. Subsequently, we exercised with the
F-16s of Singapore Air Force. They are trained by Americans and
employed similar tactics. They followed the American books and rules.
This was very interesting. We found that we could handle them pretty
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well. However, in certain areas such as avionics and sensors, the
American machines were superior to our own; but we learnt to
combat them effectively. It was like playing cricket or soccer.
The admirable part is that the US Military is very systematic. They
strictly follow rules and highly disciplined. While we may have the
desired skills, the US military is very powerful with resources that
are truly mind-boggling. Their war-fighting follows lessons learnt
over very many years. They flew 300,000 hours over Iraq before
they launched the offensive. They knew their adversary very well
before ever taking the first action.
We took our Jaguar strike aircraft to Alaska on an exercise with US
forces – all the way with the support of aerial re-fuelling tankers.
Our aircraft passed through Canada. There we had to change an
engine when a blizzard was blowing and the temperature was minus
three. Our men worked that whole night in that condition. Next
morning, the news paper in that town reported praising Indians’
capability and effort.
In the Alaskan exercise, our team completed all the missions despite
poor weather conditions. Some US forces did not fly in that weather
where as we did. Quality of our machines and management were
very superior despite the age of our machines. Next to our detachment
was parked the German Tornadoes. They had brought 180 tonnes of
support system while we managed with some 25-30 tonnes. Our men
did us proud and also enjoyed every minute of their stay and
work there.
After our detachments came back, a second round of exercises was
held with the Americans. It was a similar show as the one before.
This time, F-16s were brought and the location was Kalaikonda. We
are now expanding our facilities and capabilities to hold larger
exercises with foreign Air Forces. We feel very good about it.
However, how these move depends on the directions and decision of
our government.
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My last word is that we have to get involved as a nation. Today our
infrastructure is weak. Bangalore certainly deserves better roads.
Politics is consuming time but action on ground is not forthcoming.
My apprehension is that while we talk a great deal as becoming a
great power,  a regional power, we are not getting anywhere near it.
The United States is far too busy – they got caught up in the Middle
East, they’re going to stay there very long. They spend seven billion
dollars a day for their actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is now
bothering them. US is expected to have the ability to fight on two
fronts at the same time. But it seems very difficult and nearly
impossible. They need coalition partners in working towards world
peace and stability. Despite all the effort and expenditure, the US
today is very unpopular – a tragedy indeed!
I sense a vacuum in the far-east due to preoccupancy of US in the
middle-east.  It is difficult under these circumstances for the US to
provide the umbrella over Japan and beyond. When I visited Japan, I
could hear of the same apprehension being expressed at the higher
end of their military. However, the might of US forces should not be
under-estimated nor their will.
Where does this take us to? We are certainly emerging as a regional
player – mainly due to our performance in the economic field. To be
a regional player, we need other strengths too. Our political system
should see beyond the domestic policies. Our political system is far
too enmeshed in its survival having very little time to look at regional
responsibility.  We have to start believing, firstly, that we are a regional
power. Regional power requires the integration of all elements –
that is, the economy, military, sound polity, etc. – and then our
projection as the stabilizing influence. We must build ourselves to be
a stabilizing influence in the region. We should promote business,
well-being, peace and happiness. India should now gear up to that
position. To gear up, the first action required is to think in those
terms I strongly believe that we earn that position by being so located
geographically and the population that we support. We are entrusted
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with that responsibility and so we must pursue it. America, which is
on the other side of the globe, should not matter to our context.
Being Indian, to be proud of being an Indian is vital for any strategic
partnership to be meaningful. Our destiny is in acting with
responsibility and maturity as a regional power.
Discussant - Dr. Lawrence Prabhakar
Thank you, Admiral Jacob. We have had three presentations. One
was an academic presentation that gave a theoretical formulation of
what the United States policy and strategic direction was in the post
Cold War period and in the  post 9/11 period. The presentation was
focused in terms of the doctrinal evolution of how the US was
leveraging power on the rest of the world as it confronted a post
Cold War, post 9/11 situation. The second presentation was diagnostic.
General Banerjee elucidated the threat and challenges matrices of
the post-Cold War and post-9/11 period. He analysed the entire
spectrum of threat perceptions analysis, and then juxtaposed the reality
and the facts of India-US military collaboration. The third presentation
was an hands-on assessment presented from the perspective of a
practitioner of Air power. Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy gave us
an operational perspective couched with his personal and service
experience that candidly analysed the state of affairs.
The changing contours of the India-United States relations in the
area of defence cooperation has witnessed a transformation in terms
of convergence in the areas of defence technology collaboration and
military interoperability between the two powers. The nature of India-
United States defence relations has been a sensitive area in the
bilateral relations that extends to the 1960s when the United States
was a primary supplier of defence equipment and military hardware
to India. However the United States had used the hyphenating
influence of Pakistan in matters of arms sales to India.
Parameters of India-United States Military Cooperation
India-United States military cooperation could be successful with
the following parameters:
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a) The imperative for the United States to eliminate all
technological sanctions against India as that is anachronistic
to any meaningful partnership between India and the United
States
b) The need to evolve common standards for defence
collaboration, defence procurement for India;
c) India and United States could evolve joint ventures in defence
production with Indian participation like the Indian-Russian
Brahmos;
d) Enable Indian participation in phased manner in ongoing US
defence production programs and involvement in US led
multinational defence production programs
e) Develop capabilities in joint operations—interoperability.
f) Defence collaboration and participation of India in US
defence ventures would have the following advantages:
i) Indian capacities in technology assimilation;
ii) Indian participation in US led technology development;
iii) Indian technical human resources to be tasked for US
led technology and US R& D initiatives in India and the
United States;
g) India should initiate its own learning process of the US
strategic policy process and should be able to accrue lessons
from US strategic review process, like the US QDR 2006;
Joint Vision 2020; US Sea Power 21 that was a follow on to
the Operational Maneuver from the Sea; US Forward from
the Sea; US Defense transformation strategies and
technologies, evident in its Revolution in Military Affairs and
Revolution in Naval Affairs.
It would be appropriate to state that the scope of India-US strategic
cooperation should be premised on certain guiding principles in which
the viable interests of India are secured.
The first and foremost is what we could call the convergence of
strategic principles between India and the United States in which
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whatever is convergent between India and the United States is
basically what will be operable.
The second point is, basically, autonomy of action, both in foreign
and defence policy. Autonomy of action basically strengthens India’s
position in any transaction between India and the United States. Most
importantly, when it comes to a bilateral relationship, it has to be
based upon certain inter-operable joint capabilities between India
and the United States, where the learning curve experience should
benefit India. Well, these could be what I would call the guiding
principles of what can be called a bilateral relationship engagement.
Looking at the point of defence technology, India has much to gain
from the United States, not from what we could call the individual
platforms, but the extent by which the integration of technologies
have come into it – popularly known as Net-centric warfare
capabilities or the cutting edge of revolution in military affairs. So
that will basically come from what we will call as the inter-operability
with US Forces, where we learn much in terms of the adversarial
tactics.
It also comes in terms of the possible transfers – these are all in
what you could call hypothetical mention – possible transfers of
defence technology to India. It also comes from how much India
could technologically assimilate the US capabilities given to us, and
the ability to produce it within our own defence technological sphere.
Most importantly, one value addition which India would perhaps gain
from the United States is how the US strategic reviews could impact
upon India’s strategic culture. Now, what they had was a US
Quadrennial defence review (QDR) of 2001, which came before
9/11. The QDR’s 2005 & 2006 have completely different orientations.
What learning experiences India will have from the kind of institutional
learning processes of the United States in the form of the QDR
2005 & QDR 2006 is something that India has to accrue.
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India could gain from what the US has envisioned in its Joint Vision
2020. The JV 2020 envisages the doctrinal evolution of developing
joint warfare capabilities and the operational dimensions. This is one
area into which the Indian armed forces could gain. The other notable
aspect of the US doctrines has been the US Naval Sea Power 21.
This document envisions new capabilities in the twenty first century.
The US Sea Power 21 is the roadmap to naval transformation and it
predicates on the autonomous use of sea power. It envisages the
leveraging of US power from the sea to the littorals.
The Indian Ocean is an important maritime hub into which the United
States has its own area of interest, which almost coincides with India
– from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca and going
beyond east of Singapore to northern Australia.
The United States also looks into how they would like to overcome
ballistic missile threats in the periphery and also weapons of mass
destruction. They have envisioned various ways of what is known as
the anti-missile defence systems. These are learning points for India
when it comes to the aspect of it. Finally, what we look into is the
whole concept of transformation – defence transformation – military
transformation, which the United States has envisioned into it. These
would areas for focus and development for India.
As Dr. K. Subrahmanyam eloquently pointed out, India needs to
have a strategic culture wherein it needs to have a learning process
– from its competitors and from its partners. Strategic culture would
be the knowledge capital on which a robust Indian strategic policy
and decision making process is structured on long-term policy and
planning perspective and that would be the basis for a viable India-
US defence partnership for the future.
In conclusion the session on Changing Security Environment and
Implications for Indo-US Cooperation in Defence has inferred
the following issues:
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a) It inferred the role of United States in the global arena in terms
of its grand strategic visions, priorities and roles;
b) The discussions centered on the nature and scope of India-US
synergies in defence partnership and its derivatives;
c) The discussions were querying into the substantive issues of
defence cooperation and India’s strengths and requirements;
and
d) The discussions did probe the prospective role of India and the
United States in a transformed global order that would be
increasingly predicated on a balance of power system.
Now these are issues which probably the audience could perhaps
raise, and we could have a meaningful discussion. Thank you very
much.
Chair: Thank you, Dr. Prabhakar. I think the discussant has done
the job of summing up very well and the floor is open for questions to
anybody.
Questions: Two questions – in the context of fighting terrorism and
so on, it appears to me it’s important that we have the capability to
do what I call ‘surgical strikes’ to the extent that your military
operation may be confined to as narrow a place as a specific building.
Is there a Indian military thinking to develop such capabilities, and
are you doing anything in that direction at all? Because I don’t think
large-scale conventional warfare will take place. Even between ’71
and Kargil, for example, there seem to be a paradigm shift in terms
of how you fight and so on. Are we able to make surgical strikes at
narrow what you call undesirable enemy targets and so on – are you
developing such capabilities? That’s one.
The second is, from the talk of Gen. Banerjee, I got the impression
that for now, we have developed the Brahmos missile with Russia.
That seems to be a success and so on. As far as the Americans are
concerned, we have a lot of ideas on paper, but nothing has come. Is
that correct? Is there any attempt to get anything?
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Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy: With regard to surgical
strikes, we have the capability – we have the necessary wherewithal,
and we have the skills, we have the machines, we have the weapons,
whatever. But what is very important for us to know is that use of
air power – politically and in the country as we are – we are very
nervous about it. Now, use of air power is seen as escalatory. I’ve
had some very tense moments – and then we were there, ready to
go at very, very short notice. There’s no point in bringing up which
date and time – that’s irrelevant. On the other hand, I must also tell
you – because it came in the newspapers subsequently – we did
precision strike in this period of tension at a particular time. We’ve
done that – for a particular reason. You know, they had come in and
they had occupied something near the Kargil heights, and we did
surgical strikes.
But what is important for us to know – and this is where a lot of
difference is between us and the United States or other western
forces who are more at ease with the use of air power, also of
course, the Israelis and so on – is that we see it as escalatory, and
then we doubt ho jayega kya – will it happen? What if it doesn’t
happen?
There is always a risk-taking and the ‘will’ to use it. The ‘will’ is
certainly lacking. Third is, it is lacking not because of lack of courage,
but the lack of information and knowledge and familiarity with the
forces and the weapon system.
If you talk about coalition, for example the many coalition operations
the Americans and the West had done, they always had a political
representative, with a Force Commander, to take decisions on
targeting. There were conditions like when a strike aircraft was flying,
the President of France had intervened and said no. Halfway through,
the aircraft was called off. This is during the Bosnia deployment.
Therefore, targeting is also acknowledged – or supervised, or accepted
or whatever it is – at the political level and the government level.
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In our case, it is absent despite the fact that there is a necessity
today, especially if you’re going to become regional and so on and so
forth, that the decision makers of the government and the political
level – we, as a democracy – it is time they have to be trained as
well.
The last part is about Brahmos or whatever it is, I would say – the
others would say about the respective weapon systems, the ground
and the Navy – we are not dying for the American system. We have
pretty good systems. Of course, the Americans have some super-
duper systems – certainly more than what we have – but we’re not
actually craving for it. We’ll do it in our own way. Our problem is,
the weapon system must marry with the aeroplanes and other operating
systems. And that’s very difficult. We are very happy with our
inventory. But if we have to go for the next generation of machines,
then of course, it has to be seen in a comprehensive manner.
Major General D. Banerjee: The question of use of air power for
anti-terrorist strikes will doctrinally – using force internally, within
the country, whether counter-insurgency operations or even counter-
terrorism operations – the doctrine of minimum force applies. Air
power has never been a part of the military force in terms of the
minimum force’s doctrine. We have never utilized air power. Well,
there have been one or two very minor examples – I did not want to
go into details of it. There have been some very, very minor examples
as an exception, which have been used, which is more an aberration,
I would say, than a normal course of employment. Across the border,
yes, that restriction will not apply; but other conditions would, perhaps,
apply. In the case of Sierra Leone, we had a little bit of skirmish
under the UN peace-keeping operations. A certain amount of Air
power was used in that context.
On the possible technology deal regarding equipments with the US,
we have not yet – because of the fact, as the Air Chief Marshal
mentioned – have not yet had any major developments on that. But
enormous discussion, etc. are going on is one indication. Of course,
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the American companies are extremely keen in order to be able to
develop such a relationship with India. Of course they are looking
for this market. The Indian arms market continues to be an extremely
large and sophisticated market. This time, for example last week, in
the defence exhibition in Delhi, all the leading American companies
were there in large numbers – a significant presence, at the highest
executive levels – and so they are exploring their possibilities. And
wherever it meets with our requirements and within our budgetary
thing and technology, etc., deals will be struck – I have no doubt.
When and how, that is of course a different question.
Chair: May I say a few words about the entire thing of the Indo-US
cooperation that has been kicked off with this defence relationship.
While I would say that we’re not falling over our feet to get into it,
but at the same time, there are a lot of aspects which are of great
benefit to India. I think if you look at the way the United States’
Armed Forces is structured, the kind of strategic thinking that that
country has, the amount of effort and the amount of money that they
are putting into their R & D, I think they are very, very far ahead of
most of the countries in the world as far as technology is concerned.
And I think one has just got to look at some of theirs – when you say
precision strikes, I can say, okay, local precision strikes, yes, certainly
we have the capability. But when you can sit at sea, a thousand
miles away, and do a precision strike on a target deep inshore, I think
we need to really take a look at all this.
While I would say that I think we should go into this whole thing with
an open mind, with the United States, while we should not allow our
national interests to be compromised in any way, but wherever we
can gain and benefit from the experience and expertise that they are
prepared to share with you, I think there is nothing wrong in taking it.
By and large, I think our Forces have so far been configured for a
war which was fought in the past. I think they really need to look
into the future and see the kind of battlefield that will evolve in the
year 2020 or 2030. Are we working towards configuring our armed
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forces for that kind of a war? Are we networking our armed forces,
which has to be really a top-down approach, it cannot be that each
individual surface keeps making its own systems. I think we need to
have a lot of economy which we exercise when we look at systems
which are to be used by all three services. Look at surveillance.
Look at any of these areas. I think we have a long way to go and the
first step towards becoming a major power in the region is to
understand where your weaknesses are, so that you can build on
these and overcome these weaknesses.
So I am not so negative about what is happening as far as Indo-US
relations are concerned. Certainly, the US is doing it for its own
interests – no doubt about it. And we are not going into it from a
position of weakness. We are going into it from a position of strength.
Our economy is growing, our technology is increasing. But there are
certain cutting edge areas where we would certainly benefit from
US involvement. I let it rest at that. Any other questions?
Comment: I would like to mention that in terms of cooperation in
the defence field with the USA, the US approach based upon their
past experiences with NATO and other countries is that there is a
three-tier way in which they approach it. From the Indian side, for
the LCA, we started looking for some components for the LCA to
begin with – apart from other things like computers. Then the US
side in fact turned around and said, you are coming and asking me
for these things. If we get to know what exactly you need, we can
put together what is called a machine area approach, where it’s
aeronautics or LCA. That’s how the machine area cooperation
between India and the US, a governmental agreement, was signed
in 1987.
Hence, one is co-development, and the next one in the pyramid is
co-production, where you have identified something of a product.
There is a US company prepared to come and invest and you also are
prepared to make matching investments, and it will be like what you
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call licensed production with respect to systems of Soviet origin or
Russian origin.
The third – and this is important to know – the nature of the beast.
They insisted on Service-to-Service cooperation. When we went to
talk about technology development and maybe importing a few sub-
systems, they said can we also include Service-to-Service
co-operation. And so Service-to-Service co-operation was introduced,
and thereafter there have been some exchanges between the armed
forces of India and those of the USA.
I think there is one area in which – I mean if you are talking of
something contemporary and therefore cutting edge, and therefore of
relevance to us in the future – some amount of cooperation has already
begun in missile defence. There have been exchanges, visits, at the
expert levels. How exactly it blossoms out, matures out, we have to
wait and see, but certainly in terms of one of the advanced stages of
concern – to them of course… Plus, we possibly could do software
development of a certain class, in our real time – fast. So missile
defence is an area in which some interest is emerging.
There’s concern – you know, it’s like Blanco’s ghost, always hovering
in the background – the US will, at any time, turn the tap off. You
know, that is retrospective application. You have a contract now;
they’ll say, according to the 1987 Act, sorry, we can’t go further, and
they can adduce any number of arguments, including how you voted
in the UN. But this concern about turning off of the tap by the USA
is not just of concern to India alone. We are not unique. The NATO
countries are equally worried about it and therefore, two years ago,
there has been something of an agreement between NATO countries,
where there is co-production going on, and the USA, and this is
called the ‘Statement of Principles’ (SoP).
You see, the US has cast-iron clauses in the Arms Export Control
Act. They can’t go and change that – it’s like changing the Indian
Constitution. However, the subterfuge that they have now brought
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in with respect to Europe is something called the Statement of
Principles. What it really says is – if you’re going to turn the tap off,
please tell me 6-12 months ahead – give me 6-12 months’ notice so
that I can find alternate suppliers – you know, for spare parts and
assemblies and materials.
I think the SoP that has been worked out between NATO and the
USA is of relevance to India, because our fear about the turning off
of the tap is genuine. It is also true that the NATO countries also
have a genuine fear, to the extent that NATO has solved the problem
in one particular way, whereby they get 6-12 months’ breathing time
before the tap is completely turned off. If you’re able to introduce
that SoP – kind of – we can change it – you know, we are great
drafters, the second-oldest profession – and therefore it is possible
to assuage some of the feelings, some of the fears, some of the
apprehensions, but not all – but that is the direction to go.  That is all
I have to say. Thank you.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Participant: Can I say a point?
Chair: Okay, the last.
Comment: Thank you. I just have a few comments to make, and
particularly with respect to the presentation by Prof. Raj. His entire
analysis is based on the premise that the US will continue to be the
superpower or the hyper-power and the world is a unipolar system.
I would say the argument is little debatable, because going by what
Mr. K. Subrahmanyam brought out, is that this has been a transitory
phase where the US has been able to exert a certain element of
unilateralism. But I think the world has now entered the beginnings
of a balance of power phase, and that’s going to mature. In that
context, it becomes very credible that the US needs, from a long-
term perspective, India as a strategic partner. The US needs – for
its own national interests – India as a strategic partner.
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So now we need to gain from our point of view how we capitalize
and what are our shortfalls in this. If you are emerging as a great
power, then the three elements – the military power, economic power
and technological power – have to be credible. For that to be credible,
you need to have control over critical technologies and innovative
processes. That is where we lack considerably in that area. Therefore,
our strategic approach and our strategic relationship with the US
must take a long-term view on how we get access to these critical
technologies and innovative processes. That’s the way I think our
entire strategy must be laid on a foundation and that’s the way we
need to progress.
Military power, if it is dependent on imported technologies, is not
credible in the larger context of the global player. And Therefore,
this is an important thing. Similarly, technological power – today’s
technology, for the first time in human history – you have a technology
that can be used simultaneously for the military and the civil uses.
And therefore it assumes tremendous economic and technological
relevance. This is where we need to access that through an appropriate
strategy and that strategy has to be a long-term strategy.
Chair: Thank you. A quick answer because I think we’re running
out of time.
Prof. S. Raj: You said the United States will not be a superpower. It
is only in movement and as the process moves in, it will have to
confront a leading power. Then I said the definition of superpower
suits the United States – the components and everything. But the
point I would like to raise is that while we presume that it will come
to a leading post, at the same time, the superpower also does things
to retain its pre-eminence. Today they declare 439 billion dollars as
defence expenditure.
I also said that the basic concept in which it retains super power is
hyper-securitization. They have already identified the threat, and that
threat is always related to the building up of its own defence. The
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balancing factor is that the superpower fears countries like India –
mainly – Russia and China coming together as a balancing factor. If
you see the various crises that came, every time the budget wentup.
Your benefit also, you know, NSC-68 how to solve the issue of
increasing budget, they were the first people to say – NSC-68 said
let’s introduce deficit financing of the budget.
How do you meet this situation of hyper-securitization? It will always
keep it up to retain its pre-eminence.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Ambassador Ghose: Admiral Jacob, may I ask one question? It’s
a very brief one. I was wondering, that when we talk about
convergences and divergences that enhance or animate Indo-US
defence relations – and whether we call it cooperative, whether we
call it other names – but just the relationship. What would you say
about our joint efforts on PSI, for example? We’ve sort of agreed
along and said we’re doing the CSI, but not the PSI; then we cited
other reasons and so on. What kind of things are we willing to do? I
think Air Marshal raised the question – will the Americans come and
fight in Kashmir along with us? But Kashmir is an internal problem.
Maybe we don’t want them to come with us. But what are the
things that we are jointly willing to do.
Summary of the session
Two major landmarks in the Indo-US Cooperation in the area of
defence were the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations between
the United States and India” signed in January 1995 and the “New
Framework for the US-India Relationship” signed in June 2005.
These agreements provide evidence of the common interests of the
two countries in:
• Maintaining Security and stability
• Defeating Terrorism and violent religious extremism
• Preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
their related technologies
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• Protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea
There was clear agreement that even though the US was a super
power with a global presence it definitely needed suitable partners
across the globe especially in the Asian region. The nature of the
threats facing the United States was such that superior military power
alone was not adequate to deal with each and every situation
confronting it. In a world of “more equal powers” major military
wars between the bigger powers was unlikely. India was well placed
to be partner to the US. In the past, the US preference for Pakistan as
a partner has had a negative impact on Indian views of the US. One
can argue that the development of closer relations with China by the
US has also clouded Indian perceptions. However these perceptions
are changing in the post 9/11 and the post Iraq world.
There was consensus that both countries needed each other in the
increasingly complex world of today. However, some participants
did raise the issue of what the relationship meant in terms of Indian
military involvement. In the minds of important decision-makers in
the US, the bilateral relationship should not be construed to mean
that India could be used as:
• An eastern seaboard for the US
• An ally against China
• A surrogate or subordinate state to do the US bidding in Iraq
or elsewhere
The relationship should rather be a partnership of equals based on
shared strategic interests with neither side threatening the core
interests of the other. A tolerance for each other’s geo-political
compulsions could be the basis for a long-term relationship. Only
such an approach from both sides could help in the creation of a
more stable, secure and prosperous Asia.
The participants also felt that though the current thaw in Indo-US
relations could have been influenced by economic considerations,
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military to military cooperation has been an important contributor to
the improved relationship. In spite of the nuclear tests of 1998 the
relationship has survived and even become stronger. They also felt
that high technology cooperation between the two countries in the
area of defence could result in a win-win situation and further
strengthen the relationship.
Participants differed on the relative importance of the Army, Navy
and the Air Force to the US. The Navy was clearly very important to
the US in the context of the current strategic scenario. While inter-
operability between the defence forces of both sides would be
important, the larger direction of the relationship would depend upon
cooperative endeavors in other areas – weapons procurement, joint
developments and joint ventures and the development of a more
interdependent defence industry. In the past, strategic differences
between the US and India had moved the Indian defence industry
away from the US. India did not see the US as a reliable supplier of
advanced military equipment. This should change. There was
agreement that the potential for cooperation in the defence area was
big and could be of mutual benefit.
While economic considerations may have played some role in the
altered perceptions that the US may have had about India, military
to military cooperation has also had a significant impact on the nature
and strength of the relationship especially in the recent past. This
should not be overlooked when negotiating with the US on the other
dimensions of the relationship.
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Challenges and Prospects for
Indo – US Relations
Speaker : Dr. K. Subrahmanyam, Chairman, Task Force
on Global Strategic Developments, GOI
Chair : Dr. G. Madhavan Nair, Chairman, ISRO
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to this
public lecture which is a part of the national workshop on the Changing
Contours of Indo-US relations – a national workshop that has been
conceived by Dr. Rangan and the NIAS team. This evening we
have Shri K. Subrahmanyam, the strategic guru, who very kindly
consented to share with us some of his perspectives on strategic
issues. We also have with us, Mr. Madhavan Nair, Chairman ISRO,
to chair this session. ISRO has generously funded this workshop.
I invite Mr. Madhavan Nair to say a few words about Shri
K. Subrahmanyam.
Dr. Madhavan Nair: A very good evening to all of you, Shri
K. Subrahmanyam, Dr. Kasturirangan, distinguished participants,
invitees, ladies and gentlemen.
I consider it a privilege to chair this evening’s lecture session. Of
course, the topic, ‘Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations’ is very,
very appropriate. I must congratulate Dr. Rangan and his team for
taking up the topic in a timely manner and bringing together such a
galaxy of people to address various issues to formulate something
like an outline as to what we should be doing in the current context.
My congratulations to the entire NIAS team for this effort, and of
course ISRO is ultimately going to benefit out of some of these things.
That is why, in our selfish interests, we have supported this
programme.
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ISRO has been fortunate to have created some relationship with US
agencies, especially in the beginning phase, with NASA. We had
cooperation in rocket launches and studying atmospheric phenomena
and so on. Later, we graduated to utilization of the satellite
communication and remote sensing applications. We had very strong
relations in the early phase of our programmes. We were gaining
strength in building our satellites and the launch vehicles. Certain
negative factors got into the relations between the institutions in these
two countries. As time progressed, our technical strength in various
areas, and also our persuasive powers with some other agencies who
are working on this, especially the NASA, NOVA and academic
institutions, and some of the industries in this field saw an upward
trend. Now, we are seeing a positive recognition of our own – there
are areas where even the US can benefit out of cooperation with us.
Similarly, we are also trying to explore the avenues where we can
rope in the strength of the US industries and academic institutions.
One of the fine examples is what we are carrying out in the
Chandrayaan mission. We have made significant progress there, and
we are going to have two payloads from the US, flying in our own
Chandrayaan mission. This will be a landmark event as far as the
scientific exploration of outer space is concerned. I consider these as
positive indicators. I don’t want to take much of your time on these
topics, but I am sure these will unfold in the subsequent presentation
and discussions.
I have the privilege of introducing Shri K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen
of strategic planning in the country. This audience does not need a
formal introduction to this great personality. He can be called a
strategic analyst, journalist, or a very proud civil servant who has
served the country in many capacities. You know of his powerful
analytical capability and how he has looked at various issues in an
independent and unbiased manner, and brought out specific
recommendations.
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Immediately after the Kargil war, he chaired the Kargil committee.
The report of the committee is outstanding. It has benefited many
agencies that are working in this field. Right now, under the present
government, he is heading the team for global strategic developments
– the Task Force, and its report is expected soon.
With the globalized economy and the type of cooperation which we
have with various nations across the globe, this Task Force report is
quite eagerly awaited. I’m sure it will throw light onto how we want
to progress on this. Earlier he has served in various capacities. The
most important thing which strikes all of us is his observation
capability with respect to what is happening in the country as well as
abroad, at his analysis and sharp focus on the issues, and how they
have been brought to the policy makers and the government level to
see that they are implemented.
As you know, he received his M.Sc. degree in Chemistry from Madras
University in 1950, and immediately, he joined the Indian
Administrative Service. He has worked in various capacities and has
been a Rockefeller Fellow in Strategic Studies at the London School
of Economics. Later, he took the leadership as a director of the Institute
for Defence Studies and Analysis, IDSA, in 1975. There again, he
has made a significant contribution in carrying out the activities of
this agency.
K. Subrahmanyam has authored a number of books –I could count
fourteen of them – and quite a few of them came out at a time of
critical events like the Bangladesh war. This book is one of the few
documents available on this history. He has also authored works on
nuclear myths and realities, superpower rivalry and the Indian Ocean
– these are the other topics on which remarkable books have been
brought out. You must be anxiously waiting to listen to him.
Let me invite Shri K. Subrahmanyam to deliver this evening’s talk
on this occasion. Thank you.
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Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: Thank you, Dr. Madhavan Nair,
Dr. Kasturirangan, my colleagues as well as distinguished participants.
You’ll have to forgive me for talking sitting, due to health reasons, I
am not able to stand for a long time.
Today, there is a lot of debate in this country about the Indo-American
relations and a particular characteristic of the debate is that there is
an enormous over-burden of distrust of the United States in this
country, as there is distrust of India in the United States. Even though
both these countries are democracies, they are ‘estranged
democracies’. Why is it that these two democracies were estranged
for so long and why is it now that there is a change in the direction in
their relationship?
The estrangement between the two countries was not a natural one.
President Roosevelt was strong supporter of Indian independence,
but the Americans were misled by the British. The British told the
Americans that even though there were 2.7 million Indians fighting
in the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of them were
Muslims. This misinformation was deliberately fed to the Americans.
The British argued that since Gandhi and the Congress Party started
the Quit India Movement at the height of the Second World War,
they could not be trusted to side with the Allies in the confrontation
with the Soviet Union. At the same time, India’s situation was militarily
very important. The British thought that since whole of India will not
be with them, the best thing is to have at least a part of India with
them. That is how the British created Pakistan.
From that time onwards, the British had been telling the Americans
that Pakistan was absolutely important to guard the oilfields of West
Asia and to prevent the Soviets from advancing into this area. As a
Muslim country, Pakistan would be fervently anti-Communist, while
you could not trust India to be that.
At the same time, in India, Jawaharlal Nehru had to formulate a
foreign policy taking into account the fact that he could not afford to
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alienate the Soviet Union or China. The reason for that was that the
Communist Party of India at that time was in insurgency. There was
insurgency in Telengana, Kerala, and Bengal, and therefore, he did
not want the external powers to support the Communist Party in
their insurgency. So he decided that he should cultivate the Soviet
Union. This, in fact, paid off. In 1951, Stalin advised the Indian
communists to call off the insurgency.
India had to balance between the Soviet Union and the western
democracies. Among the western democracies, the erstwhile masters
of India – the British – were not always helpful to us. So the policy
of non-alignment was adopted. This was made use of by the British
as well as the Pakistanis to say to the Americans that since India was
not with the US, it was against the US.
Secondly, at that time the Indian position did not command admiration
in the United States. We were heavily importing food for years
altogether. In the 60’s, there was a book called Famine 1975 which
was circulated all over the world. In that book, it was predicted that
there would be a big famine in the world and you can’t save everybody,
and therefore India didn’t deserve to be saved.
To add to this, in 1962, China defeated India. In 1965, the Americans
knew war was coming, but they played their war games – they are
available in publication – and they came to the conclusion that
Pakistan would beat us in that war. For all these reasons, the
Americans didn’t have a very high opinion of us in the 60’s. Till, of
course, the Bangladesh war when we were able to beat Pakistan and
allowed an independent Bangladesh to emerge.
In the 80’s the Americans decided to wage war against the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, of course, assured the
Americans that they would help them in waging that war. In retrospect,
India decided very wisely not to get involved in that war. If we had
got involved in that war, today there would have been an al Qaeda in
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this country. It is because we kept out of it that we don’t have al
Qaeda in this country.
That is the history from 1945 till about 1990, when the Cold war
ended. The Cold War ended in victory for the Americans. Their
containment policy won, and the Soviet Union broke up. Originally,
in 1947, when George Kennan proposed the strategy of containment
it proposed to contain the Soviet Union militarily, politically, and
economically. It was expected that finally, there would be forces
released within the Soviet Union, which would break it up. That is
what happened.
The Cold War was a unique event in history. It was the first instance
in history in which two major powers, armed to the teeth and
possessing the capability of destroying the entire human civilization
several times over, confronted each other for forty years and finally
ended the war without exchanging a single shot. Of course, one can
argue that it was the result of nuclear deterrence. But once it happened,
the popular impression was that America became the sole superpower.
But that was not the truth. What really happened was that there were
two poles mainly because the various other nations of the world, like
Western Europe, Japan and China felt threatened by the Soviet Union.
So they joined with United States and you had just the two poles.
Once the Soviet Union broke up and the threat was removed, these
nations started asserting their own independence and the world became
a balance of power, a poly-centric world. Unfortunately, even today,
most people don’t recognize it. That is a part of the problem. In
1991-92, you could say that a balance of power of five nations –
major nations – emerged in the international system. That is, the
United States, the European Union, Russia, China and Japan.
Dr. Kissinger wrote a book in 1994 called Diplomacy, in which he
said that the future international structure would be a balance of
power. He added that there probably could be a sixth nation joining
it, and that would be India. A person like Kissinger was able to foresee
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that as early as 1992. In the early 1990s, the US started taking an
interest in India. It was a surprising thing to the US that this enormous
number of people (900 million then) could be kept together under a
democratic administration. Something that was unparalleled in the
world. Of all the ex-colonies, only two were able to sustain their
democratic constitution left behind by the colonialists – India and
Sri Lanka. That in itself was something which impressed people.
Secondly, in 1991, we started our liberalization program and our
growth rate went up to 6%, our exports rose and our foreign exchange
balance started rising. Then finally, in 1998, we carried out our nuclear
tests. To the Americans these were indications of India becoming the
sixth balancer of power. Up to the Second World War, the major
superpower or the sole superpower of the world was the British
Empire. The Second World War destroyed the British Empire,
weakened Britain, and America emerged as the sole superpower of
the world. In 1948-49, the Americans planned their containment
strategy which would defeat the Soviet Union without fighting a war.
In 1970, the Americans again found a new strategy when Kissinger
went to China. Up to that point of time, China was an ally of the
Soviet Union. He weaned China away from the Soviet Union,
promised to help them, and in the process, he persuaded China to
give up Communism. China was the main Communist country, but
today it is as capitalist as any other capitalist country in the world.
Kissinger used China in order to step up the containment of the Soviet
Union that finally resulted in the break up of the Soviet Union.
In the present situation, the Chinese economy has grown so fast that
the Americans anticipate that China will overtake them in terms of
GDP in the next twenty years. Even if each every Chinese gets one-
fourth the income of an American, the Chinese total income would be
higher than that of the United States because they are four times the
American population. The Chinese are producing so many engineers
and scientists that the Americans are worried about their losing their
pre-eminence as the global scientific and technological leader. They
are not worried about the military aspect because the American
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military expenditure is equal to that of the next fourty five nations in
the world. In the next five years or so, it is expected that the American
military expenditure will be half of the global military expenditure.
The Americans have equipped themselves with a capability which is
unbeatable.
The Americans will have a military capability which will make them
unbeatable by anybody else, but that would not mean that the
Americans can go anywhere and do anything in the world. The reason
for that is the Americans have abolished the draft. Today, it is very
difficult to re-introduce draft in the United States. The American
Army is now limited to 14 divisions. With 14 divisions, you can do
certain things; you cannot do it all. In today’s world, you can go and
defeat another army, you can punish and destroy another country’s
valuable targets, but you cannot go and occupy a country and subject
the population of a country perpetually to military occupation, which
Hitler could do. Therefore, there is a limit to the exercise of military
power.
Secondly, the major nations of the world, except Japan, are all nuclear
weapon nations. There cannot be a war among them because they
will destroy each other. War is meant to be for political reasons, at
the end of which you are supposed to come out as a political gainer.
A nuclear war will not leave a political gainer or loser. There will be
losers on both sides. Therefore in the future, the Americans can assert
their supremacy only in terms of their being economically,
technologically and scientifically the supreme power in the world.
The US is aware that the Europeans are no longer very loyal and
humble allies of the United States. The Europeans built the Airbus
aircraft and compete with the US Boeing aircraft. The Europeans
built their own Galileo satellite system. The Chinese will become the
second largest market of the world and therefore, they are competing
with the Americans. China is also the only major nation which is not
a democracy. The US has doubts about China abiding by the rule of
law. Therefore this time the Americans are looking for not allies, but
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partners. If the US discounts the EU and China, that leaves Russia,
Japan and India. In a few years times India will become the most
populous nation in the world. Because of China’s one-child policy,
their population will age much faster than the Indian population.
Populations of Japan, Russia and Europe are already ageing much
faster. Therefore, the India will have a younger age profile and a
talented population, and will be the third biggest market in the world,
next to the United States and China. If English-speaking, democratic,
multi-cultural India can be won over as a partner, it will be to the
advantage of the US. This is the reason why they came out with the
declaration that it is the intention of the United States to help India
become a world-class power in the 21st century.
Now you may ask a question – what is all this? The Americans showed
up as very charitable people – we haven’t seen them to be like that.
Are they doing it for our good, because they like us and suddenly
they have grown fond of India? No, the Americans are doing it for
their own purpose, in their own interest. The Americans have already
a history of doing this kind of thing. World War II ended. Their former
enemies Germany and Japan were in shambles. The Americans rebuilt
those countries, those economies. Not because of any sense of guilt,
but because they felt that unless they rebuilt Western Europe and
Japan, if they were left poor and destitute, they would become victims
of communism. Therefore, if communism were to be contained, they
should build those countries and make them their allies. It worked.
Then as I mentioned, in 1971, Kissinger went to China. China was in
the throes of the Cultural Revolution and at the height of communist
excesses. They won China over to the side of the Western alliance.
Following this China grew so fast that today it is overtaking other
countries in the world, and the trade between the United States and
China is 200 billion dollars, with about 80-100 billion dollars in
China’s favour.
Now the US had decided to help build India. Condoleezza Rice has
said if the United States is to solve its problems successfully –
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problems like its social security, Medicare – a partnership with India
is necessary. It is for these reasons they are doing it and we must
understand that. If we understand that they have a stake in this
relationship, and they are doing it for their own purpose, then you
have a little more of leverage in trying to deal with them. This is the
reason for the sudden change in the American attitude. But there are
problems. When originally the policy of containment was proposed
by George Kennan, it was not very popular. Most of the Americans
in those days were thinking of confronting the Soviet Union militarily.
The sophistication of the policy of containment was not easily
understood. Over a period of time, of course, it came to be accepted.
When Kissinger went to China, he didn’t even mention it to William
Rogers, the United States’ Secretary of State. Kissinger kept only the
President informed. It took years for them to bring it out into the
open, and after 1971, it took nine years before they could send an
Ambassador to China.
Similarly, now, they are trying to befriend India and make it a partner.
Again, this is a policy proposed by a few people. Foremost among
them is the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Mind you, all these
ideas come from intellectuals there – not from politicians. George
Kennan, of course, subsequently became a professor in Princeton
University and Kissinger originally taught History in Harvard.
Condoleezza Rice was the provost of Stanford University, and she is
also a professor of International Relations. Her idea of reshaping the
international structure is shared between three or four people in her
department.
There are objections to this policy from the arms control and the
non-proliferation lobbies. There is also opposition from the politicians.
The Bush administration had to get over this opposition in its
endeavour to partner with India. Similarly, in this country too, there
are few people who appreciate this. The world is globalized. There
will be no major wars between major powers. You may say Manmohan
Singh understands it. Manmohan Singh said from the Red Fort that
today all the world’s financial flows are available to India’s
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development. In fact, the world is friendly to India’s development.
You didn’t hear such statements from any previous Prime Minister.
But, again, he is in a minority. Most of our politicians or political
parties, our media, academia, are still to adjust themselves to this
new reality. That is where the problem today is.
There is certain inevitability about it this changed reality. There are
people who ask me why do you think we should go with the United
States? There are others who have come out with a very fanciful idea
that China, Russia and India should form a triangular group in order
to stand up to the American domination. The answer is very simple.
We have to ask most of them, where is your son, or daughter, your
nephew or niece? Are they in Beijing and Shanghai and Guangzhou
or Moscow? No. they are all in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco.
There is already a large Indian Diaspora in the US of nearly two
million people. In another ten to twenty years, it will increase to five
million. When the Indian population crosses a particular level in the
United States, you will have a critical mass with which you would be
able to influence political decisions of the United States, just as the
Jews do in the United States. Some beginnings in this have already
been made. How many people would know that the person who is
helping the Under-Secretary Nicholas Burns negotiate the nuclear
deal is a Bombay-born Indian, Ashley Tellis? So the process is on
and you have to ask yourselves the question as to what will happen
in due course about this.
Now we come to the soft power of the United States. The most
effective weapon that the United States has is the English language.
India is one of the countries that have English as an official language.
Then, of course, come all the other things – music, McDonalds and
everything else that goes with soft power. There is also the element
of India’s soft power; for example, when I want to hear the best
Thyagaraja Uthsavam on DVD, I get it from Cleveland. Are we
176
going to have a similar relationship with China or Russia? It’s not
going to happen however hard you might try.
The Americans need brain power. That’s why, George Bush has said
in his latest speech, asking Congress to increase the number of H1-B
visas. With ageing populations, countries in Europe will have to import
more population from outside; they will have to increase immigration.
This immigration will most probably take place from the south of the
Mediterranean to the north of the Mediterranean, with all its
complications.
The Americans also are increasing their population through
immigration, mostly of Hispanics. However, the Hispanics come in
by crossing the frontier illegally, and are absorbed in low-paid jobs.
You are not getting computer engineers, software engineers and other
kinds of skilled people from Latin America into the United States.
In a speech delivered at the Asia Society, Nicholas Burns has said
that India is going to have the largest young skilled population.
Therefore, we’ve got to cultivate it. This is the reason why things
are changing. Of course, one could ask whether the US is going to
treat us as equals. Perhaps not for quite some time to come. It won’t
come by stipulating it. You’ll have to earn it. You’ll have to assert it.
Similarly, they have been arrogant, and they will continue to be
arrogant till such time that they realize that it doesn’t pay to be
arrogant vis-à-vis India. So all those things are what we have got to
establish. The question is whether it is in the hands of this nation. We
should be able to do that.
This is what I have been trying to say. If you find flaws in it and if
you can fault the logic, then we can discuss these issues and I am
prepared to correct myself.
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Discussion
Question: What makes you think that the Americans would be so
dependent so on Indian intellectual power? Already the software people
are saying that India is not going to be a destination for a long period
of time. The business can move to other more attractive places. They
talk of competition from Eastern Europe, China, and from other Asian
countries. What gives you this ground for optimism that there is no
competition for India in this Indo-US relation?
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: The answer is not in terms of industry and
investment, I agree. That is partly because of the fact that we are still
to make the climate in this country more congenial to that kind of
investment. If somebody had come and visited India last week and
looked at our airports, of course nobody will be coming to invest in
this country. Therefore, those are the kind of problems which we
have to get over.
But if you look at what the major American companies are doing in
terms of R&D, then – lots of people have made comparisons between
what happens, the setting up of centres of R&D in India and China –
have always said that India has won over China and is very much in
advance of China. While they are thinking about Eastern Europe in
terms of outsourcing, but in terms of R&D, there is no question about
India’s lead over all the other nations.
Question: The Republicans and the Democrats are quite divided in
their own attitudes to either of one of them but there emerges a common
approach to India. Well, there are some differences, but generally
they look at it reasonably together. Whereas in India, I find it’s quite
chaotic. We are now looking at this coalition politics to continue for
quite some time to come. For us to sustain a quality relationship – or
very futuristically we are talking about India being a great power–
but we need political strength. It’s not good enough to have money
and brains and all these things that we’ve talked about. Political
stability is vital. When we look at way India is moving, what is the
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future? On one side, we are very clear in terms of education and
research and business and so on – it’s going on beautifully. But what
about our political system? Does it matter? Does it mean anything?
If so, how is it going to correct itself? And where is the trigger?
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: It’s a very good question. But then, let’s
look at our own history. John Galbraith said there is only one
functioning chaos in the world, and that is India. We were relatively
more orderly in our political system till the 90s. At that time, our
growth rate was what used to be called the Hindu growth rate of
three-and-a-half per cent. Our growth rate started increasing to six
per cent and later on to seven percent, eight per cent only when, to
some extent, our politics has become a little more chaotic.
Now, the point in hand is that this chaos and instability in within a
system of rule of law, which is a part of this chaotic coalition politics
and it permits this seven-to-eight per cent growth rate. If only that
can be solved, your growth rate will go up to ten per cent. The second
point is the fact that in this country, the Armed Forces are disciplined
and totally under civilian control. That’s a plus factor.
When this happens, let me also tell you, economics will also start
influencing politics. Thereafter, the politicians will start being
influenced by the business houses; politics will become interest-based
politics. Though it is inevitable, you will have to wait for it. American
politics of the 19th century was a highly chaotic and handled by what
they used to call the Robber Barons. It became disciplined politics –
moral politics – only after Roosevelt.
Therefore, it is a question of expectations. You may say well, it may
not work out that way, and your coalition politics may degenerate.
Yes. Everybody makes his calculations on that. So long as you are
able to hold free and fair elections and enforce it, then many of these
things have got a self-correcting mechanism.
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Question: In the morning lecture you lamented the lack of a strategic
culture in India.. With your long experience, what would you
recommend be done to develop a strategic culture within India?
Secondly, in the evolving relationship between India and the US,
how should China be handled?
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: The first one is, yes, I still say that India is
yet to develop a strategic culture. But at the same time, as it happens,
I have memories of what happened in 1962, when we found out,
suddenly, that the Americans and the West would not give arms to us
to fight the Chinese. We had to look to the Soviet Union. In those
days our political awareness was so low – I remember as an official
in the Ministry of Defence, I had to go to go and talk to officials in
the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs as well as all the
uniformed people.
At that time people didn’t know that there was a conflict between
Soviet Union and China. People thought that they were both
Communist countries and would go together. The issue was how can
you trust one Communist against another? People asked that how
can we buy MIG aircraft from Soviet Union and be sure that the
Russians won’t let us down. It took quite a long time to persuade
people that there was a conflict between Soviet Union and China and
that we could trust the Russians. Now everybody is so used to the
Russian supply of defence equipment to us. I can tell you – the Navy
opposed our getting submarines from the Soviet Union. The Air Force
appointed a committee which said scrap the MIG project.
Therefore, in one sense if you say that at that time also the leadership
of the government had to formulate its policy and had to pursue that
irrespective of the fact that it didn’t have much popular support. But
once you pursued it, later popular support gathered and now the
situation is that today people are worried about giving up Russia as
a supplier of armaments. So these things have happened before and
for me it is nothing new.
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In those days, when we signed the Indo-Soviet treaty, and
Mr. Venkateswaran, who has signed that letter of eleven Ambassadors
was the Joint Secretary who went along with D. P. Dhar to negotiate
that treaty. There were accusations that there are secret parleys in
process and that people were kept in ignorance. There were also fears
that India would become a poodle of the Soviet Union. I had said at
that time that you can make Hungary a poodle, Czechoslovakia a
little pet, but you can’t make India, an elephant, a pet. And I am
saying the same thing today. In those days, of course, I was denounced
as a Soviet agent. My point is, at that time, that was a good policy
for India, and now this is a good policy for India. The problem is that
in India we do not have a broad enough structure to create a culture
for policy-making. It has still to be done by the leadership at the top.
This will develop over a period of time because I still believe in the
force of logic and the circumstances.
On the second question, till now people thought in a non-aligned
world with bipolarity, you have got to be with either side or stay out
of the power politics. You had only three options. In a balance of
power world, there are five others. You have got five options. It’s a
new flexible world. It is not in a bipolar world where if you deal one
country you alienate the others. The balance of power world was
there with the Europeans from 1815, the Congress of Vienna, till
1914, the outbreak of the First World War. But people in the India
are not familiar with that.
Question: Sir, I have been following all your writings and all these
years I have always considered you as my guru. It is very difficult to
disagree with you and your sense of logic.
You also told us, in the course of your discourse that the Americans
need us as much as we need them. Americans need us to help them
solve their problems. You also referred briefly to the kind of leverages
that we might have. I wonder whether we have really exercised those
leverages. I get a feeling often that the Americans want to make us a
dependent power.
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I would also like to know from you what space you assign to questions
of national honour, prestige and public sentiments. I am keeping in
mind the kind of a statement which the American Ambassador made
here and our Foreign Office came up with a lacklustre, below-average
reaction to that. We could have been a little more forthright; we could
have been a little more categorical. Knowing full well that the
Americans need us, we can be more assertive. I think we blink too
often and perhaps that is not necessary. Perhaps if you were there in
the Foreign Office, you would have handled it differently. I don’t
know. How do you react to it?
There is a growing perception we are not really dealing with all the
major powers in the same fashion in which we deal with the Americans.
With the Americans, we are more subdued. Would you like to react
to this?
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: We are so subdued with the Iranians and
you are talking about the Americans! There are people who say that
if you vote against Iran, the Iranians who have been carrying on
proliferation for sixteen years, who are being assisted in proliferation
by Dr. A. Q. Khan of Pakistan, will be angered. And they expect
you to be afraid of Iran. Yemen being a Shia country has voted
against Iran. Indonesia, Libya, Algeria have abstained from the Iranian
vote. In India people are apprehensive that the Muslims will get
angry if we vote against Iran. Therefore, that is a matter of dealing
with different countries differently. When I said Indians do not have
a strategic culture that is exactly what I meant. If you understand
your own leverage, you will behave properly; if you don’t understand
your leverages, then you won’t. That is the problem.
Question: For a hundred years, the world economy was Euro-centric
or American centric. Twenty years from now, it would have shifted
to Asia, and that probably is the writing on the wall that the Americans
are seeing. Therefore, they are looking at us as a long-term strategic
partner. Their security strategy states that they will prevent the rise
of a military and technological competitor. As you mentioned, they
182
see the European Union as the biggest and closest rivals, and you
can see their strategies preventing the European Union from
consolidating and becoming a political entity.
While they take steps to leverage India as a strategic partner in the
longer term, do we see, finally, the change of the United Nations’
P-5 system on a more rational basis?
Dr. K. Subrahmanyam: Yes. That will happen over a period of
time. As I mentioned, the six balancers of power – the Americans
have already accepted Japan as a country which deserves to be a
member of the Security Council. Over a period of time India too will
be included but not Germany, not South Africa, not Brazil. However,
you have got to wait for it and you should not, in the meantime, go
about alienating other people.
Chair: I think we have had a very interesting discussion so far and I
think with what Mr K. Subrahmanyam has deliberated in such a
crisp, logical manner. But I am sure the questions will remain in the
minds of some of us whether we are going from a bipolar regime
towards a balance of power regime or a unipolar regime. The questions
perhaps may still be lingering in the minds of people.
There is no doubt that in times to come, one of the oldest democracies
and the largest democracy have to work together for the benefit of
mankind. In that process, I think India can gain much by developing
our strengths and demonstrating it in various fields – to start with,
the intellectual strength, the economic strength and, above all, the
political strength. I hope that a time will come when we will be able
to have this process continue in a manner where we are equal partners
in this process. Thank you.
 Prof. Vijayalakshmi: After all these thoughts for the future, I think
we’ll have to put up a case to Mr. K. Subrahmanyam that there is a
nascent strategic cultural thinking in India and that’s the reason this
workshop was conceived. There is a growing impetus and impulse
Public Lecture
Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations
183
within India that is seeking to define for itself its place in the world
and the way it would like to conduct itself world affairs.
We take the words of Shri K. Subrahmanyam very seriously and
want to thank him for a splendid lecture. I also want to thank Shri
Madhavan Nair for very graciously conducting it. I think his
introduction and his summing up was also equally masterly.
I want to thank all of you – you have been a great audience, you’ve
asked some wonderful questions and we hope to see more of you.
This workshop is the beginning of a great dialogue on strategic cultural
thinking in India. This is an internal conversation, which all of you
are welcome to join and tell us what you think. Thank you very
much.
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Session IV
Prospects for Indo-US Cooperation in
High Technology
Left to Right: Dr. S. Banerjee,  Dr. V. Siddhartha,
Prof. Roddam Narasimha, Prof. P. Rama Rao and
Dr. K. Kasturirangan
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Session IV
Prospects for Indo-US Cooperation in
High Technology
Chair: Prof. P. Rama Rao, Member, Task Force on Global
Strategic Developments
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Let me welcome all of you once again to this
session on high technology and the complex issues related to it. To
lead us into the discussion, I invite Prof. Rao to chair this session.
Prof. P. Rama Rao: Dr. Kasturirangan, Prof. Narasimha,
Dr. Banerjee, Dr. V. Siddhartha, Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Dr. Aatre,
our colleagues from the Task Force, Air Marshal Patney, Shri
Tarundas, Prof. Ananth and distinguished colleagues.
Until yesterday afternoon, till Dr. Kakodkar left, I was to be a
discussant in this session. Thereafter Dr. Kasturirangan kindly asked
me to chair this morning’s session. I feel very privileged to do this
job because we have a very distinguished panel. Each one of our four
speakers has devoted almost all his professional life to this subject.
We are indeed fortunate to have their views.
The topic of this session is ‘Prospects for Indo-US Cooperation in
High Technology’. I wish to follow the pattern set yesterday and take
this opportunity to make a few preliminary remarks.
What are the prospects for this cooperation like? The simple answer
is - excellent! However, I must add that there has been so far no
demonstration of any major accomplishment in the area of high
technology coming through Indo-US cooperation. Individual informal
collaboration between scientists in India and scientists in the United
States is clearly very large in scale maybe larger than between India
and any other country in the world. Perhaps these are the largest
between any two countries in the world.
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There are also, on a much smaller scale, collaborations between
institutions here and institutions in the US, university groups here
and university groups there, some R&D labs here and some R&D
labs there. A more recent important development is that several
multinationals are coming into India and setting up their R&D labs.
Dr. Sridharan made a reference to this yesterday.
There are also instances of Indian companies and Indian specialist
groups performing hi-tech work on a contract basis for some of the
entities in the US. We understand that WIPRO for instance is
developing software for a US military aircraft system. I expect Prof.
Narasimha would give more examples of this kind.
There have been several initiatives between the Government of India
and the Government of the United States. I can give you a picture of
the historical development of the various mechanisms. However since
that will take a long time I shall desist from doing so. Right now,
there is the Indo-US Science & Technology Forum, the High
Technology Core Group as well as the programs under the Next Steps
in Strategic Partnership. Yesterday, Prof. Vijayalakshmi said that this
is going very well. I am not sure. We will probably hear from Dr.
Siddhartha on how well these are proceeding.
There was another good question that was asked yesterday. Do we
have a structured strategic group in this country? Thinking and
analyzing how the Indo-US relations are expected to pan out in the
next two or three decades and linking these to international strategic
developments is clearly important. The answer given by the learned
Chairman of the Task Force to the above question was that there is
no such strategic thinking or group. He went on to add that maybe
the creation of a Task Force marks a small beginning towards the
creation of such a group.
If you asked me the same question on whether there is a strategic
group looking at the potential of Indo-US cooperation in Science &
Technology - for that matter in high technology - my answer again
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would be no. Whatever has been going on has been taking place on
an ad hoc basis and there’s a lot of work to be done. What are the key
elements, then, of building a self-sustaining, meaningful and mutually
profitable partnership between India and the US? Clearly, the
foundation upon which such an edifice of S&T cooperation or hi-
tech cooperation can be built is mutual dependency and not just mutual
appreciation. I want to emphasize this – not just mutual appreciation,
not merely mutual respect - but more importantly, mutual dependence.
India, no doubt, will benefit from US capacities and capabilities.
India also has resources and the inherent strength to enhance
dependency of the US and to provide benefits to the US through such
a partnership. How are we to achieve such a meaningful partnership?
In fact, I have replaced the word collaboration / cooperation. It says
cooperation, but I have replaced this word ‘cooperation’ with
‘partnership’ following yesterday’s thesis.
Apart from building human resources - I will come back to this in a
minute - I think we have to, first of all, identify areas for initiating
projects. Before I do that, I wish to point out that in the area of
Science & Technology there are not many people in this country who
are anywhere like Mr. K. Subrahmanyam – well versed in their own
discipline and having an appreciation of what’s happening in the world
at large. I am happy that Dr. Siddhartha has devoted quite a lot of
energy to this issue. He is now spending 50% of his time with DRDO
and the other 50% with MEA. I would like to humbly submit that
there must be more such people in a larger number of strategic as
well as non-strategic departments and agencies. We would then be
able to identify suitable areas and projects.
I want to just take a minute to give you an illustration of what can be
clearly of interest to both countries. One of them is counter-terrorism.
The US is worried about that. We are concerned about that. There
are a whole lot of technologies to detect WMDs (Chemical, Biological
and Radioactive Devices) and to deactivate them. Then there are
environment-friendly technologies. These are in fact, of interest to
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the whole world. The President of the United States has come up
with the idea of a zero-emission coal-based power plant. Can we
have a joint project?
Thinking along the same lines bio-fuels, bio-products, and integrated
bio-refineries are other areas of promise. I have seen one good initiative
of a solid oxide fuel cell based power generation and distribution
system for our rural areas. These two areas offer the possibility of a
third rural revolution in the country after the agricultural and dairy
revolutions.
The third area I would like to mention is mathematics. Recently,
under the chairmanship of Dr. Kasturirangan, a small group of us
have tried to identify mathematics as a potential field deserving
substantially greater support. There is a great deal of potential for
cooperation in this very basic field.
The last area I would like to mention, because it has got something to
do with what I am going to say towards the end, is manufacturing. In
the area of manufacturing, the marketplace of the future is expected
to demand greater product variety along with shorter product life
because of rapid obsolescence. These requirements would need more
and more rapid innovation. A direct implication of this is that the
quantum of engineering, design and retooling involved in the
reconfiguration of manufacturing systems as well as the cost
associated with them as a fraction of the total manufacturing cost,
will continue to grow. Obviously, this places a demand on a very
large number of highly skilled engineers and cost-effective sources
from where such engineers can be drawn.
India should seize this opportunity. If we can learn to put our act
together the revenues from such activities, per capita, and also per
product, will be significantly greater. China has chosen mass
production of low-cost low-tech items, and this can be a different
kind of parallel. This will also enhance India’s competitiveness.
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I do not want to mention nuclear or space because we have two
eminent and very erudite speakers. But I do want to touch upon
defence. Yesterday, General Banerjee said something about joint
projects for futuristic systems. I think that’s the direction to go. I just
want to illustrate this with the example of the Brahmos missile. It’s a
project – in fact, it’s a program – between India and Russia.  I’m not
getting into the details of the product, or what has come by way of
design, etc. But I do want to refer to the structure of the project.
The structure of that organization is a joint venture. Both the
governments have put their money in it. The venture they have created
has a great deal of freedom with which it can operate to induct
manpower or expedite procurement etc.  If you need to go abroad to
sell this is a good study to look at. I know for certain that we have
learnt a great deal not only in terms of basic design or technology,
but also in terms of the manufacturing systems that the other country
puts in place.
Can we do something similar? For instance, if WIPRO or Satyam
get a huge project from General Motors, they are immediately able
to open a centre and recruit a thousand people. We must also be able
to do that in joint ventures in the area of defence, in areas such as
aero-engines, futuristic military aircraft and so on and so forth – the
examples given yesterday. I feel that we have to think completely
anew. Otherwise we are worried about departmental personnel and
all kinds of things. I do not want to go into details, but we should
think innovatively.
Finally, if you are going to achieve all of this, there is one urgent
necessity and that is to revamp our higher education system. From
where do we get the engineers? That was the question asked yesterday.
We have to revamp our education system again in a very innovative
fashion. I do not believe this can be achieved by depending solely on
publicly supported institutions. This is one area where a public-private
partnership has to be encouraged. As of today, we do not have an
imaginative legal and regulatory framework to promote this. I think
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nothing is more urgent than this. Institutions that are in a position to
generate human resources of the required calibre in large numbers,
will be the keys to unlocking future possibilities in Indo-US
cooperation in high technology.
I now have great pleasure in inviting Dr. S. Banerjee to talk about
the future possibilities of cooperation in the nuclear area. Dr.
Banerjee.
Dr. S. Banerjee - Prospects for Indo-US Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation
I would first like to thank Prof. Kasturirangan for giving me this
opportunity of sharing some of our ideas on the future possibilities
of international collaboration in the nuclear program. I will perhaps
talk more about international collaboration because in the nuclear
area it is very difficult to single out a single country and have a
collaboration program with that country because many of these
technologies have international connotations.
What I want to cover first is about the evolution of the Indian nuclear
program. It is very important to know how we grew from very meagre
resources to the present situation. Without this story of the evolution
it is not possible for us to assess what are the possibilities of future
growth through international collaborations.
You see we started with some guiding principles. The guiding principle
is that, first, we wanted to have an indigenous development of
technology. Rarely do we handle the total technology. When I say
total technology I mean you have to start from the resources i.e. you
mine the resource to make the fuel, develop the technology to do the
reprocessing, take care of waste management and manage the entire
fuel cycle. Such histories of total technology development in our
country are very few and the nuclear area is one of them. This was
one issue that was decided right at the beginning. We wanted to be
self-sufficient in our indigenous resources.
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The second important thing was adopting a closed fuel cycle. Till
about a year back, this is perhaps one area where we have been
opposing almost the entire world, particularly the United States. Only
in the recent past (I think in the recent IAEA meeting) have the United
States representatives openly said that they now have the option of
going towards the closed fuel cycle. There are two reasons for us to
do this. One is, that we can make the best use of fissile and fertile
materials. The other is that this will reduce the waste burden.
Otherwise, the nuclear waste will live very long – several tens of
thousands of years – and this can be reduced to a few hundred years
if we can burn or incinerate them. This is nuclear burning in a reactor
or an accelerator-driven system.
Finally, there is the three-stage program, which also starts from the
very basic point that we have a very meagre uranium resource, but a
very large thorium reserve. We have about one-third of the total
thorium of the world in our country.
I just want to show you this picture to tell you that when you build a
nuclear reactor (we have two more reactors coming up in Kaiga) it
doesn’t really disturb the environment. If you drive down to Kaiga
from Goa, you will find that you are going through deep forest, and
suddenly you come to this station. It doesn’t have a large railway
yard to keep the fuel; it doesn’t have an ash pond to keep the ash; so
this really does not disturb the environment in any way. Of course,
we have no quantitative way of establishing that but I think this picture
tells us more than quantitative numbers.
We started working on the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor
(PHWR) that depends on natural uranium as fuel and I will very
quickly run through some of the points. This has some weaknesses
like low burn-up, because it contains only 0.7 per cent of Uranium
235. That is the fissile material, so the burn-up is low. But it has a
very efficient use of U 235. If you take it per ton of uranium mined
this is perhaps the best use of Uranium 235.
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We have heavy water, both as the moderator and coolant. That
requires the development of heavy water technology – an extremely
difficult technology. Setting up and running a heavy water plant is a
very difficult task. We have done it. Coming to the on-load fuelling
you have to develop a fuelling machine. Though it is attractive in one
sense you have to carry out entry into the reactor core daily.
Compared to other types of reactor systems like Pressurized Water
Reactors here you have to enter the core every day.
Neutron economy is one point that is very important. In nuclear
technology we have resources – the fissile element is one resource,
the fertile element is another resource and the third resource, which
we normally forget, is neutrons. From where will these neutrons come?
Neutrons can come from a fission process. Today, of course, we
know that neutrons can come from other processes. But that is still
far off. Maybe for the next twenty years, these other neutron sources
are not going to play a major role in the nuclear energy program.
So the neutron economy of this reactor is perfect and this is excellent
physics design. But it has very complex engineering and it needs a
very careful choice of in-core materials. The neutrons are best utilized
if we do not allow them to get lost by capture. They should be entirely
used by either the fission or conversion processes. In a PWHR a
large pressure vessel is not required.
When we embarked upon this program in the late 60s, we were not in
a position to build large pressure vessels. Even today, I think I will
not say that we can build a 1000-Megawatt Reactor Pressure Vessel
(RPV) in the country. So this is one advantage in going for PHWR
where by distributing the pressure across different pressure tubes - a
technology that we could manage - we are reducing the size of the
pressure vessel.
So there are many challenges. Again I just list out the challenges in
this slide and also say that we have fulfilled all these and successfully
met all of them. From a very low-grade resource, we have finished
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fuel; and the performance of the fuel is very good. We have also
perfected making the in-core structural components and mastered
heavy water technology. In fact we had two alternative technologies
and both of them are running. We have also economized on the
energy requirements for heavy water production. Finally, the heavy
water production capacity today is fully consistent with the power
program and there is no difficulty for us to expand this program.
Very sophisticated equipment has been developed. These have also
been transferred to industry and Indian industry is geared up for
meeting our requirements. We have also developed computerized
reactor control systems and our capabilities in repair, refurbishment
and life extension are very good. Today we can definitely call ourselves
world leaders in PHWR technology. Countries like Canada and others
as well are interested in taking our technology, provided the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group allows that to happen.
As for operating experience, we have a record capacity utilization in
PHWR. We have also reduced the construction time, which was in
the region of ten to twelve years, to four-and-a-half years. This is
again some kind of a world record. Look at the capacity utilization
shown in this slide. So this is the Indian PHWR. The Indian PHWR,
which was operating earlier at a gross capacity factor as low as about
70% has exceeded the world maximum and we have reached 91%.
The present situation is seen in this slide. We have the reactors and
what is marked in red, are the reactors that are in operation, and the
ones in blue are under construction and they are in these sites. If you
draw a circle here, you can find the centre of the circle, which is
somewhere here. The radius is typically over 800 kilometres because
this is the coal pit of the country and in nuclear power stations today
economics work at distances that are a little over 800 kilometres
from the coal pit.
Now, lets get back to the back-end of the fuel cycle. This is one area
that we wanted to emphasise right from the beginning. Through
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reprocessing plants in Kalpakam and Trombay we have been using
this spent fuel reprocessing to get plutonium out of it. Because we
thought of a closed fuel cycle, reprocessing is a must for us. Supply
of fuel to the fast breeder reactor, which is the second stage of the
Indian nuclear programme, comes from this reprocessing. We have
also been operating a vitrification plant for high-level waste on a
regular basis. Here is the picture that shows the vitrified or rather the
liquid material that is coming out of the pot to get vitrified. This is
the plant that we have in Trombay.
So the thrust area of development today is the multi-component
reprocessing of thoria based fuel (uranium, plutonium and thorium
based streams). These are some of the areas that we are working on.
I just want to remind you of what I mentioned earlier about the
minimization of the waste burden. In this plot, you have the ingestive
radio-toxicity index on the Y-axis and the time after the shutdown in
years on the X-axis. If you talk of a once-through fuel cycle, you can
see that the toxicity level is quite high. Coal also has a toxicity level
and that is indicated here.
So the once-through fuel cycle will have a very extended period of
toxicity - it is a thousand years. In a closed fuel cycle, where plutonium
is burnt in the fast reactor, it comes down very drastically and it
comes very close to the toxicity level of coal. If you have further
incineration with an accelerator-driven sub-critical system, you can
reduce it down even below the radio-toxicity level of coal.
Since open and closed fuel cycles have become a topic for
newspapers, it is useful to understand the physics of it a little more.
What we have from the mining of uranuim is the processed fuel that
goes into the nuclear reactor. In some countries, the philosophy was
that the spent fuel would be put into a waste disposal site in a deep
geological repository. Essentially, you are taking out uranium and
you are you are creating a plutonium mine.  The plutonium in the
repository has a half-life of over ten thousand years.
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We thought this was not proper for the environment and we wanted
this spent fuel to cycle back into the next-generation reactor, or even
into the same reactors. We can then burn the fuel – incinerate the
fuel – and get even more energy. This has a tremendous advantage
because, as I mentioned, uranium contains only 0.7 per cent of U235
and 99.3 per cent of 238. When we do this recycling this U238 part
gets utilized and we can get the maximum energy out of the whole
system.
These slide shows you the three-stage plan that is often talked about
but rarely elaborated so nicely. This is our first-generation reactor,
which I just now mentioned – the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor.
Natural uranium is the input. It delivers as output the depleted
uranium, and plutonium. And, of course, it gives electricity. But with
our limited resources of uranium, we cannot build up our whole system
based on this. So power generation will be there in the PHWR, and
we are building an inventory of plutonium out of the spent fuel from
these PHWRs.
With this inventory, we will be having Fast Breeder Reactors in which
the more and more plutonium that we burn, we generate higher
amounts of plutonium, and with that breeding, it is possible to increase
the total inventory and expand the power program. We can go right
up to about ten thousand megawatts of capacity with the PWHR but
with Fast Breeder Reactors we can produce about 50 times more
power and the power program can expand.
Then comes the third generation reactor which is Uranium 233 fuelled.
Uranium 233 is not a naturally occurring nuclide. It can be produced
only by irradiation of thorium. Then we get uranium 233. Once we
get thorium into the form of uranium 233, we can get electricity. In
our sustainable power program, whatever be the level that we have
achieved through the second generation, we can sustain it for centuries
more by using thorium. But there are many technological obstacles.
I wouldn’t say that these are very trivial, but this is where the path
lies. This is what we have decided upon, right from the beginning.
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Here is our present situation – 13 operating reactors, five reactors
under construction with several in the planning stage. In fact, today,
these five reactors (two of which are being constructed with Russian
collaboration), I think we are the country with the largest number of
new reactors under construction. In fast-breeder reactors we already
have twenty years’ experience of the 40-megawatt thermal fast-breeder
test reactor; we are going towards the prototype fast-breeder reactor,
which is 500 megawatts and is under construction. In this slide you
see 530 Gigawatts is the power potential compared to the 10 Gigawatt
power potential for the first generation reactors.
Then it is possible for us to go for the thorium-based reactor and here
the power potential is very large, and the availability of an accelerator-
driven system can raise the power potential even beyond this.
Just to recapitulate the major highlights. Our reactors are among the
best performing in the world. We have the largest number of reactors
under construction.  With all this why do we need help from outside?
As you see our per capita energy consumption today is there in this
plot. The USA is here, the OECD countries are here and India is
here. So India, in 2050, by our calculations, would typically need
about 6000 KWH units per capita. This is a reasonable value. It is
not to the US standards but even if we take this lower value, we
need to have a tenfold growth in electricity. Tenfold growth in
electricity is not a small job. For this to happen, it is clear that at least
20-25% share of that electricity has to come from a nuclear resource.
So this is really a very big challenge.
This is the present scenario. In the present scenario 3360 Megawatts
is the installed nuclear capacity. We have five more reactors coming
up, and that will take the installed capacity to 4780 Megawatts. Two
more light water reactors being constructed at Koodangulam  (these
are Pressurized Water Reactors or PWRs) will take the installed
capacity up to 6780 Megawatts. I am absolutely sure this is going to
happen in a couple of years’ time. Then we have the Fast Breeder
Reactors under construction, so this adds up to 7280 Megawatts.
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Then we come the projects planned till 2020. Out of those, we have
eight PHWRs of 700 megawatts and four fast breeder reactors of
500 megawatts each. But these too depend on the further mining of
uranium. The PHWRs of 700 megawatts will come up only when
our mines are open and more and more of uranium is mined in the
country. But this is sustainable with our own uranium. The fast breeder
reactors come from our own resources of plutonium. The AHWR
comes with our own resources. But these light water reactors – six of
them with a capacity of 1000 megawatts each – which are being
planned are supposed to be imported. This depends on the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group allowing this import to occur into our country.
Finally in 2020 we can get to 21180 Megawatts. But this is too small
a figure and that is the issue. Can we increase it through international
collaborations? In the Fast Breeder Reactor, we have 20 years
experience on the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) that we are
successfully operating with mixed uranium carbide and plutonium
carbide fuels. We have reached 150,000 megawatt day per tonne,
again a kind of a world record, without a single fuel-pin failure.
We have also reached maturity in the molten sodium technology. The
FBTR fuel discharged at 100,000 MWday per tonne has been
successfully reprocessed. This is the  first time that a plutonium rich
carbide fuel has been reprocesses anywhere in the world. There is
adequate plutonium inventory in spent fuel to begin the construction
of a commercial 500 Megawatts Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) that
started in 2004.
What are the prospects for the growth of nuclear power through
fast reactors. The initial growth is supported by plutonium from the
PHWR. During this time, metallic fuel has to be developed. The
present oxide fuel does not have a very good breeding ratio. The
doubling time is large. That doubling time has to be reduced by
introducing metallic fuel, and this development process is now going
on. With improved breeding ratio using metallic fuel, the doubling
time will be reduced, and we can then have a faster capacity growth.
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But all this is time consuming and that is the big problem. So we
have been talking about international collaboration and the Indo-US
dialogue on nuclear energy has started. A few significant events have
happened in the last couple of years. It first started with meetings
between the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and the US
Nuclear Regulatory Council (USNRC). Several of these meetings
have happened and Richard Meserve the Chairman of USNRC visited
us. You can see that he has mentioned that they had an interesting
briefing on the extensive upgrades that have been undertaken or
planned. He also says “It is clear that your action in improving safety
is parallel to activities in the United States.” So here is recognition
by USNRC that our safety system is as good as theirs.
So we are in this process. Then there are many scientific
collaborations. There is one example I can give on the R&D
collaboration in accelerator physics and high energy physics. As you
can see there are many items that are identified by a Memorandum of
Understanding. The Institutes that are going to participate in this
collaboration are also listed.
So as I explained to you, these magenta bars show our planned growth
today. Demand is very high. From 20,000 megawatts, by 2020, can
we go to 30,000 or 40,000? Or even 40,000 in the next ten years? So
this is just a plot of that type, which is a kind of wish list for us. Is it
possible for us to get there? With our own resources, it is not possible
for us to take any of these paths. With international collaboration,
there is a possibility.
Let me now just give an example just to see who gets the benefit in
international collaboration or cooperation in nuclear technology? I
have two slides. This is the advantage to India. What is our advantage?
We will have a faster build up of our power generation capacity in
the next two to three decades. I am not talking of capacity after
forty years. After forty years using our indigenous resources, will
get the same result. We can also induct large sized power plants
(1500 Megawatts plus) into our system. Today our power plants are
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540 megawatts; we can raise it to 700. With international collaboration,
we may be able to jump to 1500 Megawatts today.
In this context, I just mentioned to you that the United States has not
built a nuclear reactor in the last 25 to 28 years. So the United States
does not have anything to offer immediately. But there are countries
like France and Russia. France has a 1500 or 1650 Megawatt plant
ready that they are selling; Russia has a 1000 Megawatt and there
are announcements that they have even a 1500 Megawatt Pressurised
Water Reactors (PWR) available today. So if one wants to induct
this kind of large sized plants, the two countries that can really give
it are Russia and France. But everything depends on the clearance
from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
This will lead us to PWR technologies that are extremely important
for us. We have only PHWR technology. In parallel, if we have PWR,
then our whole technology as well as industry growth will go in a
little different direction. Import in the initial period, followed by
indigenisation, and vendor development can fuel industry
development. Reactor pressure vessel development is also possible
within the country.
Uranium enrichment, which is now being done on a somewhat pilot
plant scale, can be done on a commercial scale. We can import fuel
(yellowcake) that can be supplied to Indian PHWRs. This is yet
another point which is rarely mentioned. We do not want to go entirely
into PWR technology but want to have a parallel growth of PHWR
and PWR and this PHWR can be fuelled by importing yellowcake
and not processed fuel.  We want to take something like yellow cake
(magnesium diuranite or ammonium diuranite) and from there we
can process fuel. With the growth of the PHWR program with
imported uranium, we can have a capacity growth of as much as
1000-2000 megawatts per year that can be supported by Indian
industry. So here we are not talking of importing any finished product.
We are only talking of importing the fuel material. From there, we
can have our own growth.
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What is the advantage to the world? I think Indian expertise in PHWR
technology can be made available to others. This is very important.
We can make small sized plants of 200-500 Megawatts that will be
suitable for countries initiating their nuclear power programs. There
are a large number of countries who are interested in that and we can
export. Today, again, we can’t export because of NSG.
Many countries like Canada would like us to share our experience in
operations and component replacement. We can provide them that.
Export of fuel, structural materials and heavy water are all
possibilities. India plays a leading role in Fast Breeder Reactor
technology development. We have taken the lead. We are now the
only country running a commercial fast breeder reactor and after a
few years we may be the leaders in the world to deliver this technology.
It is also possible for us one day to become the leaders in Thorium
fuel reactors, in which the other countries have not shown interest. It
is possible for us to develop, and disseminate knowledge on these to
other countries. One point that is extremely important for us to
remember is that the price of fossil fuels in the international market
will be essentially determined by the Indian energy demand. Because
when 1.5 billion people having something like the per capita demand
I have just indicated, very large electricity consumption is required.
Our economic growth is bound to happen and we will pay any price
for fuel. If we pay any price for that, the world fossil fuel prices will
be essentially determined by us.
So if we can keep our fuel and energy costs low, it is an advantage to
the world. It would save a significant amount of the Carbon dioxide
burden. Finally, we can also make an important contribution through
radiation technology in healthcare, agriculture and food preservation.
I will jump a few things. We have many concepts of innovative
reactors. One of them is the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor
(AHWR). I will not go into the details. If there are further questions,
I can come back.
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Then we are talking of nuclear energy in the hydrogen economy.
This is something that is extremely important. Many countries are
interested in this and here again we are interested to participate with
others to develop a substitute for petroleum. And that is possible
only when you can get hydrogen. Often we make the mistake that
hydrogen is a source of energy. Hydrogen is not a source of energy.
Hydrogen is only a carrier of energy, just like electricity.
So we have to make hydrogen from something and that something
should not be hydrocarbons. We want to make hydrogen from water.
Only then is it possible to have a sustainable energy supply for fuelling
internal combustion engines. That is why it is important for us to get
into hydrogen. We have just started the work and here again
international collaboration is going to be extremely profitable.
There is one more thing that I want to mention. The simultaneous
presence of two reactor systems - the PHWR and the PWR - will
make Indian PHWRs cost-competitive when compared with imported
PWRs. In fact, we can say that we can be cost competitive even by
today’s standard. But if you take imported fuel, our PHWR will be
cheaper when compared to the best PWR anywhere else in the
world. So this kind of a cost competitiveness will drive both the
systems to work more and more efficiently.
There are also options for the fuel cycle. The spent fuel of a PWR,
can be fed as the fuel for a PHWR. There are different schemes. One
scheme is to use enriched uranium in PHWR for increased burn-up.
An early introduction of thorium for in-situ conversion and burning
are also possibilities in the fuel cycle. This will really open up the
possibilities of  very big changes in the scenario. Finally the growth
in plutonium inventory will result in a faster growth of fast reactors.
There are many challenges ahead and exploration is the biggest
challenge for us today. What I am showing here in this slide is what
is called Reasonably Assured Resource (RAR). This is the estimated
additional resource. There are good possibilities of finding additional
large deposits within the country. Unless we have our own resources
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we cannot dictate terms. That is possible if we can get our exploration
activity going and for that geophysical tools are needed. We are
developing electromagnetic aerial survey tools. We cannot buy these
from abroad because of restrictions.
Development of the fast reactor fuel cycle and development of thorium
fuel cycle are other challenges. The development of the thorium fuel
cycle is particularly challenging because of an extremely difficult
step of reducing the uranium 232 content (which is present in U-233)
to a level of 10 ppm from a 1000 ppm level. These materials are
extremely gamma radioactive and so are their daughter products. So
unless this separation is possible the thorium fuel cycle cannot be
developed.
So there are many big challenges on the path. These, I would say, are
technological challenges. We are sure that we along with our next
generation will meet them.
The other major challenge is to use molten heavy metal and salt as
coolants. We are now working at higher and higher temperatures.
Reactors will not work on steam or steam temperatures like 300°C.
They will work at 1000 or 1000+ degrees temperature. Heavy metals
like lead, bismuth or molten salt could be used as coolant. This is
again  new technology. The United States worked on the molten salt
reactor development (a very nice concept) years back, in the 60s. It
had been abandoned. Today again there is a revival of interest in this
kind of concept. Online removal of fission products and in-situ
breeding are some possibilities.
This is R. K. Laxman’s cartoon in 1957, when Nehru formally
inaugurated the DAE establishment and this is today’s situation, when
we have complete mastery over the fuel cycle. PHWR operating
efficiencies exceeding 90%, fast reactor development, embarking
on commercial fast breeder reactor development and widespread
use of radiation and isotope technology are realities today.
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We call it ‘winds of change’. I finish with my quotation fro Mahatma
Gandhi “I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my
windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown
about my house as freely as possible, but I refuse to be blown off my
feet by any.”
Thank you very much.
Dr. Kasturirangan - Prospects for Indo-US Civilian Space
Cooperation
Thank you, Chairman. I will be rather brief. Even though 15 minutes
is rather short I will try to make it in 15 minutes. What I propose to
do is to give you a little overview of the way the space program has
evolved. These have ramifications on the discussions that we have
on the collaboration with the United States. After the evolutionary
part of it, we will also look at the current state of relations that we
have developed in space with the United States in the recent past.
Based on that as well taking into account the present level of
discussions and their outcomes and the willingness of both the parties
(to the extent that we are able to make some judgments on it), we
would make certain projections about the future.
These projections are necessarily going to be not too speculative.
Nor are they going to be too ambitious. They would be in conformity
with the spirit of discussions that is currently taking place between
the agencies. From the US the agencies involved would of course be
the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA), the
National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
some other agencies including the State Department. From the Indian
side, the agency would be the Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO). In the later part of our discussions if there are any further
questions some of my colleagues from ISRO are here and will try to
clarify these.
Space, as you may know, completes 50 years since the launching of
Sputnik on October 4th next year. The International Astronomical
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Union and the United Nations are looking into organizing some special
events to celebrate. As most of you know, Sputnik was followed by
Yuri Gagarin’s manned flight and Alan Shepard’s flight as well.
As you can see space has evolved from these early beginnings. When
we try to understand what space has done in the last fifty years one
area of great impact have been scientific missions. Scientific missions
have made major breakthrough in looking at the high-energy
component of astronomy and in enhancing our ability to look at the
earth and its environment. Forays into planetary exploration have
also greatly added to our knowledge.
On the other side, you have telecommunications, which can be point-
to-point, point to multi-point or multi-point to multi-point
communications and broadcasting satellites. Navigation satellites are
also finding new applications in areas like air traffic control. India
has contributions in science through scientific missions like the
AstroSat and Chandrayaan Projects. The INSAT series represents a
major contribution in telecommunications. The IRS series of remote
sensing satellites and the Kalpana series of weather satellites use the
synoptic perspective from space and make a major contribution
towards managing natural resources and the weather. Expendable
launchers like the PSLV and GSLV represent Indian contributions to
Space Transportation Systems that complement the re-usable vehicles
like the American space shuttle and the Russian Buran. Though the
Buran has been shelved the American Space Shuttle is still operational.
This gives you a broad kind of a scenario on how space has evolved
over the last fifty years. Of course there is this question of man and
space – man landing on the moon as well as the work currently going
on in space habitats - which would provide a permanent presence
for humankind, both in the near earth orbits and ultimately in other
planetary systems. Of course, China has been the most recent entrant
into the area of manned space flight.
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Now, if you look at how the space has evolved in India you can see
several phases. The first phase (between 1963 and 1970) was what
we can term as the capacity-building phase. Capacity building was
primarily to develop human resources, to create a certain level of
infrastructure and to conduct some meaningful experiments. These
activities logically transitioned into phase two of the programme,
going into what can be termed as proof of concept projects. The
proof of concept projects did not stop with capacity-building or
scientific exploration but went into an application domain to actually
demonstrate the efficacy of a space system. Projects in this phase
tried to address key questions with regard to the role of space systems
in meeting supplementing or complementing services provided by
conventional systems.
The third phase has been the experimental era, where we try to do an
end-to-end kind of an effort, like the Bhaskara remote sensing satellite
and the Apple communications satellite. Satellites became an
important component of the experimental era. In phase two, satellites
were never built but they were a part of the plan. The definition of
what the satellite system should be came out of the experience of
Phase two, which then fed into the experimental systems in Phase 3.
Experimental systems are characterized by low investments, short
time frames, an ability to demonstrate a certain capability and to
develop hands on experience on an end-to-end basis by working closely
with the users. These are the four characteristics of the experimental
era. This phase proved that certain capabilities are extremely useful
for the county in the context of its developmental status and in turn
took us logically into the next phase - the operational era.
The operational era is what we are witnessing today. The Indian
Remote Sensing Satellites, the Indian National Satellite Systems and
other systems like that provide routine services to the country in a
variety of domains such as communications, broadcasting, remote
sensing, meteorology and so on. The most recent entrant into this
operational domain is the plan for getting into navigational systems.
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The current operational phase also includes Phase five, globalization.
This involves extending the space capability to working with several
communities across the world that are engaged in space efforts. It
also involves using the capacity and the capability that we have built
up over the years into what we call a commercial domain to the extent
that they could be commercialized.
This represents the five phases of evolution of the Indian Space
Programme. What I am showing you here is of course, the first
sounding rocket launched by India. This was the first effort to launch
a rocket, and this particular rocket was a US supplied Nike-Apache
rocket. The experiments carried out were for sounding the upper
atmosphere, to look at the magnetic fields and things of that kind.
We now go into the specific role that the US has played in these five
phases through which India’s space program has evolved. If you look
at Phase one - the US role in the capacity-building phase – you look
at the establishment of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching
Station. The US helped with the supply of sounding rockets and of
certain instruments that were flown like magnetometers. These were
given as a part of the initial capacity-building phase in which the US
played an important role.
To establish capabilities in remote sensing through flying instruments
on aircraft they provided film systems and gave other help for taking
aerial photographs. ISRO engineers were trained at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and the Lincoln Laboratories. This was
primarily aimed at system and configurations studies on the required
capabilities of a communication satellite for meeting India’s
development needs.
ISRO engineers and scientists also got trained at the Willow Run
Laboratories at Michigan in techniques related to remote sensing.
The United States also gave us on a permanent loan (they call it
permanent loan because they cannot give it to us for free) a ground
station that was used at the Physical Research Laboratory for
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receiving satellite signals for an ionospheric survey experiment. You
can call it a topside sounding of the ionosphere. These were all a part
of the US contribution to early capacity building. Their contribution
was quite significant.
In Phase two, which I said, was the phase that provided proof of
concept, the US role was critical in both communications and remote
sensing. The first major initiative in which US help was critical was
the carrying out of the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
(SITE). The US moved their Advanced Technology Satellite (ATS 6)
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean to conduct one of the largest
sociological experiments ever carried out in the area of developmental
communications.
The satellite based developmental education programmes were meant
to help agriculture, environment and many such things. 2400 villages
participated in it and there were something like 200,000 rural people
who benefited from it. This really paved the way for the early definition
of what an INSAT satellite should be. So here we used the Advanced
Technology Satellite to try and reach developmental education to
rural India.
The uniqueness of this satellite, especially the power levels at which
this particular satellite was beaming signals, was such that with a
chicken-mesh antenna of hardly ten feet diameter one could establish
a ground system. This was at that time the most apt system on the
ground to work in the rural areas. The US built ATS 6 was also
probably the most powerful satellite ever built at that particular point
in time. So they moved it – NASA moved it – and we worked with
this particular satellite for one year.
The second component of the cooperation in phase 2 shown in the
next picture is remote sensing. In this area too the US provided
substantial help to establish what a remote sensing satellite can do
for the country. The US pioneered remote sensing from space by
establishing an operational system called the LANDSAT system. The
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US gave us the entire coverage of the country in terms of LANDSAT
imageries, which was then put to use by several users in the country
in areas such as hydrology, oceanography, agriculture, forestry and
geology. In many of these areas, these kinds of images were used for
the first time. The US also supplied the necessary technology for
establishing a ground station at Hyderabad for receiving the signals
from the LANDSAT satellites. This is the Hyderabad ground station
that was established with support from the United States in
Phase two.
In Phase three we were building satellites like the Aryabhatta, the
Bhaskara and the Apple satellites. In parallel the development of the
SLV 3 rocket was also taking place. This phase was dominated by
procurement of components and materials that were used in the design
and development of our experimental satellites and rockets. One of
the important features of the early phase of the Indian space program
has been the cooperation in the procurement of various materials and
components.
Indian engineers were more oriented to the western line of technology
development, both because of the fact that you have familiarity with
such systems and because of the availability and cost competitiveness
of such systems. US components and materials therefore implicitly
served as an impetus to orient the Indian Space Program into a western
mode of working. The US also helped in conducting configuration
studies of INSAT. This came out of the SITE experience and studies
were carried out at both MIT and the Fairchild Company.
In the next picture, we see that in the operational phase, we bought
four INSAT satellites. We found that the time frame for India to
build its own INSAT satellite system was inconsistent with the needs
of the country for establishing a satellite-based communication and
broadcasting system. The first four satellites in the first-generation
INSATs were therefore all procured under a commercial contract
with Ford Aerospace - a US based company. These first-generation
INSAT satellites really ushered in the operational communications
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era in India. Forty engineers were a part of this procurement team.
Indian engineers got hands on experience with the company in the
design, development and testing of these satellites.
Three of these satellites – the INSAT 1-A, 1-B and 1-D were also
launched with US launch vehicles. The Delta rocket and the shuttle
were both used for these launches. The US continued to supply
components and materials.
The next picture shows the final phase – the phase of globalization
and commercialization starting from 1990 to today. As a first step in
the commercialization of our capabilities in remote sensing we signed
a major agreement with an American firm, the Earth Observation
Satellite Company (EOSAT). They agreed use their extensive
experience in marketing remote sensing data across the world to help
India market imagery from the IRS series of satellites. So Indian IRS
satellites became available as data sources across the world. Ground
stations were established and the contract was extended through a
second company Space Imaging when EOSAT merged with other
companies. By 1995, we had a ten-year agreement. Today this has
resulted in something like eighteen to nineteen ground stations across
the world, which receive data from the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite
series including the most recently launched Resource-Sat. These are
all a part of an agreement with an American company that has been
going on well as a commercial arrangement.
Another major milestone in Indo-US cooperation in space has been
an agreement that was signed in 1997 that deals with earth and
atmospheric sciences. The importance of this particular agreement, I
should say, was that until then, there was a serious problem in working
together with the United States in several areas of space other than
the ones that we mentioned. In fact, we wanted to expand it, but
there were difficulties.
One of the irritants in this area was the real time supply of weather
data from the INSAT satellites. Prof. Rama Rao who is here with us
212
today, was then the DST Secretary. He worked very closely with us
in trying to see how we could make available the INSAT data.
Ultimately we succeeded in convincing various Indian agencies on
the need for this agreement. This agreement also enabled us to get
data from the US Defence Meteorological Satellite as well as data
from the advanced instruments flown on the NOAA satellites. This
data has been critical for getting a global view of the weather and for
building regional models of the weather that is very important for us.
More recently the supply of components and materials became limited
because sanctions were imposed on ISRO after Pokhran. Both sides
started taking a re-look at this in 2001. The US President and the
Indian PM initiated some discussions on civilian cooperation in high
technology areas. For the first time the US started loosening up a
little in terms of components and materials. Finally, after five years
of the lapse of the DST-DOS-NASA-NOAA agreement, we renewed
this agreement for the second time. The US was glad to renew the
agreement, which is now working well.
The next slide shows some observations, on how the program is
working. We have the high technology cooperation, which has been
initiated. The second thing is with respect to the next step in the
strategic partnership, and I don’t have to elaborate upon this. There
was a very major conference that we had to discuss the various issues
of the cooperation between India and the US in the coming years.
This was a very major meet in Bangalore. We had something like
150 visiting scientists, government officials, company people, NGOs
and so on from the United States who participated in this conference.
The purpose was to identify specific areas in their respective domains
where India and the US could strengthen their relationship in space.
This first meeting on Indo-US joint cooperation in space took place
in 2005 - last year.
Currently, the Jet-Propulsion Laboratory, John Hopkins University
and the Brown University from the United States are interested in
flying their radars and other kinds of instrument payloads on India’s
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first planetary mission Chandrayaan. There are also ongoing
discussions on critical aspects of technology safeguard agreements.
Many of you may be aware that safeguards have been a major irritant
in Indo-US technology assistance agreements. This has also affected
our relations. Discussions on these have been going on for some time.
How we move forward on these technology assistance agreements
and their related safeguards may well hinge upon some of the
suggestions that would emerge from you at the end of this talk. If we
can negotiate this well it will also lead to the United States loosening
up its controls with respect to satellites that could be launched with
Indian launch vehicles.
I would like to make some overall observations on Indo-US
cooperation. I have already pointed out that the US did play a key
role in all phases. In the initial phases it was the US who supported
and had an upper hand with India being on the receiving side. Most
of the time, we were getting support from them; we were able to get
training from them. We were able to get these and even the know-
how as well through the supply of components. In the current
operational phase the relationship has been transformed into a
mutually beneficial one. In the future commercial cooperation can
even go beyond this.
In the next slide we see that we have been looking at missions which
could be in the area of science, like Chandrayaan or it could be on
applications as we will see a couple of slides later. Joint ventures are
another area that could emerge. Sourcing components and materials
is also a major area of cooperation. Finally, India and the US could
also cooperate in policy making at the international level. In fact,
there are many areas in the policy domain (international treaties,
international conventions) in which there could be tremendous synergy
between the US outlook and the Indian outlook, because of our own
stature and maturity as a space power. This could serve to bring us
together.
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Other areas where we could share common interests could be
management of space traffic disaster management, the exploitation
of lunar and planetary sources and the protecting of space objects
against interference.
Irritants have always been there between the two countries and these
have had a major impact on relations. Notwithstanding these irritants,
we did achieve quite a lot by working with them. You had a Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that came in and started
applying brakes on components and materials. There were other
stricter efforts to control the flow of materials and technologies to
India. But I should say that this by itself never stopped the US from
supplying materials. US companies were allowed and still do export
materials and components to India. Some of them are critical, but
they did allow this.
In 1992, the US imposed sanctions on ISRO and Glavkosmos,
primarily because we went ahead with an agreement with Glavkosmos
of Russia (then the USSR) for getting cryo-stages and the technology
for building cryo stages for powering the upper stage of the Indian
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The United States
objected to this deal because it was in violation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime. There were a lot of arguments and
counter-arguments about the logic of this whole thing because nobody
uses cryogenic systems for missiles. But the fact remains that they
did interpret the MTCR in a way that was convenient for them and
put a brake on the supply of the technology from Russia.
Subsequently, in 1998, when BARC and the Atomic Energy
establishment went ahead with their nuclear explosion, ISRO was
the one that was targeted. When we said that when Atomic Energy
does something, why we should be punished for it, we were told that
the US will impose sanctions on those entities that will make India
notice that there has been a sanction. They said that ISRO is the
right organization on which we can apply the sanctions because it
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will have an impact that will be noticed. They said this from the
State Department. So you can look at the way they work.
So we don’t have to assume that what Atomic Energy will do tomorrow
will not affect space and we can be insulated from their actions. We
are certainly affected and there are some connections. That happened
at the State Department level, not here.
I would like to make some observations on the sanctions imposed on
the space program. They had no major impact. I don’t want to go
into the details of why there was no major impact.  But I should say
that what Mr. K. Subrahmanyam has been mentioning all the time,
the question of strategic planning and strategic thinking is very
important. Strategic planning and strategic thinking are important
components of the space program that has been developed to a very
high level of sophistication. We think ten years ahead on what could
go wrong. We also think about the implications if cooperation breaks
down then and look at our options and our alternatives. This has
become an integral part of our work just like the worries that you
may have about space system failures and the kinds of work around
plans that would be needed to retrieve the mission. A space system
has a failure analysis board. This failure analysis of a space system
has been reasonably well transferred into a well-grounded system
mode of thinking. The system thinking culture including the ideas of
reliability, failure modes and contingency plans have influenced us in
working cooperatively with the United States. I think this kind of
thinking is very important in many other areas too.
The European policy of space autonomy has also helped India. India
has also made significant progress in establishing indigenous
capabilities in critical areas. These will become important in the future
in terms of how we may affected by sanctions.  If you have to apply
sanctions, it has to hurt us. If you have to hurt us, then we should be
denied something. What are the kinds of things that are available
today that can have such an impact. Not too many things are available.
Therefore it makes more sense to cooperate rather than put all kinds
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of brakes. I think that particular era – the sanctions and controls era
- has passed. That is what I want to convey as a message through
these comments.
We now come to the future prospects. The core program of ISRO,
which is on the social side (communications, education, healthcare,
remote sensing, navigation), I think India is going to have a certain
amount of autonomy. What I mean by autonomy is that we will go
alone on most of these systems. The launch vehicle has already reached
a level where we do not have to depend on technologies from outside.
These will have a very high level of autonomy when it comes to
going alone.
So there is a core program of ISRO that will be driven by national
interests and we will go alone in this part. But what is important is
that on some of the technologies that go into these core programs, we
will continue to work with the United States like in the past. Probably
we would want to look at how we could strengthen this part of it for
reasons of quality, sophistication and cost-effectiveness.
Programs involving cooperation with the United States (the expansion
component of the programme) will be related to planetary exploration,
environmental missions and future space transportation systems. This
would be almost exactly along the lines that Anil Kakodkar mentioned
yesterday about the ITER project where the international community
has come together. There could be similar examples in space. For
example areas like hypersonic flights, reusable space transportation
systems and air breathing concepts for propulsion systems are likely
to become important 25-30 years or even fifty years into the future.
There are good possibilities that we would be able to work together
in such areas.
The last area is related to the use of the space station itself. India
has not been a partner in the space station, but there is now the
possibility of getting some time in the space station for conducting
experiments. We could even work with them in trying to create a
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module that could be fitted onto the space station in future, before
going on our own autonomous way for building a manned habitat in
space.
Finally, commercial cooperation is another area of promise. Ventures
like the IRS initiative in global marketing for building cost-effective
systems that address global needs can be thought of. We have been
discussing such ideas with companies like Boeing for marketing launch
vehicles like PSLV. This would allow US launcher companies to have
our rockets in their manifesto. Joint ventures where we bring in our
expertise in building satellites like EduSat for the benefit of the
developing world is another possibility. There are a billion to two
billion people who are untouched by the benefit of space. Here we
have proposed to the United States that we could work together in
trying to bring the benefit of space to these untouched two billion
people. There could also be a market in it, and as C.K.Prahlad has
said, there is enough room at the bottom of the pyramid. Corporate
interests could influence the formulation of international policy. I did
mention something about this. These are other areas -commercial
cooperation and joint ventures - that we could be working on together.
Finally I would like to say what the erstwhile NASA administrator
said in 1995, when we met together in Washington at the Indian
Ambassador’s residence. He made this very interesting observation
to the Ambassador and me that the US, India and Japan could be
natural partners in the 21st century space endeavour. I see no reason
why this cannot be so. So far all the indications are that this could
certainly happen.
At what level could this happen? Of course one part of it is our own
strategic thinking and strategic maturity. To work with them, we have
to first safeguard our interests. But I have found that we can certainly
safeguard our interests while working with them. The US is a
fountainhead of technology and let us not overlook this aspect.
Certainly, working with them has many advantages. The MTCR and
related arguments often come in when discussing cooperation with
the US. We have given our own reasons why the MTCR should not
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be a problem. We have shown the same moralistic posture as them
with regard to our adherence to the MTCR principles. We have also
told them, in our own negotiations, that if we had not applied MTCR
to ourselves, we could have made billions by providing the technology
we have developed to other countries. This essentially means that we
would have never come to you for high technology support or any
cooperation. We could have, rather, bought it from you, because I
know that there is a price. When you ban something, there is an extra
price that you have to pay for it. We could have easily managed it.
This kind of arguments have been very well articulated with the United
States State Department, and we have done our share of it as far as
space is concerned. Ultimately, I think that we should also mount a
certain level of think tank work between India and the United States.
It is not sufficient that we, in a closed room, debate amongst ourselves
and then try to come out with various possibilities. I think it is time
that the think tanks there and the think tanks here work together
to look at solutions that could be mutually beneficial. We can certainly
safeguard our interests and also ensure that it is part of our
own plan.
All I have to say before I conclude is that we have been a little
proactive in trying to move forward in planetary and other explorations
simply because all these countries look for dates and they put artificial
cut-off dates. If you are not there where you should be by that artificial
cut-off date, I think you are out of that system. Then, in the view of
the international community you have to fight your way in. This can
be a very difficult and painful process. If we can stop that from
happening by working with the same devils who have been working
against us all this time, I think that is the best way that we can
squarely meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Thank you.
Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Rangan. I now have pleasure in
requesting Prof. Narasimha.
Session IV
Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations
219
Prof. Roddam Narasimha: Mr. Chairman Dr Rama Rao,
Dr Kasturirangan. Thank you for inviting me here to speak at this
meeting. I'll try and see if I can stick to fifteen minutes.
Now, this meeting is about the changing contours of Indo-US relations.
Having heard presentations on nuclear technology and space, I see
that I have been asked to speak about high technology, but that's a
very wide sector, and I certainly won't be able to do justioce to it,
both because of shortage of time and lack of competence.
But there are two areas where I do want to say something. One is
aeronautics and the other is computing. As time is short, may be I
will just say two sentences about computing at the end.  Two years
ago, we held a meeting between NIAS and a US team led by the
National Academy of Sciences, to look at counter-terrorism in
particular. The volume that we prepared on that occasion, will I hope
come out fairly soon, perhaps later this year, so I will not talk any
more about it.
With regard to aeronautics let me spend a few minutes on how it has
evolved over time. Now talking about Indo-US relations in
aeronautics is relatively easy, because for a long time there was
very little happening. If we go back to the 1940s, when the industry
was set up, Hindustan Aeronautics (originally called Hindustan
Aircraft) was a private company. There was a fairly large American
presence at that time. In fact, it might come as a bit of a surprise to
people here who don't know the early history of the aeronautical
enterprise in India that the first leaders of Indian R&D were people
who went to the United States for education based on scholarships
given by an American engineer who was here at HAL during the
Second World War.
In the 1950s Indo-US relations had already become somewhat
volatile, and the contours of the relationship were well described by
Mr Subrahmanyam yesterday on the two occasions when he spoke.
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It looked as if by the 1950s and 60s there was little of any significance
in aeronautics between India and US. The aeronautical equipment
that India got - aircraft and the rest of it - largely came from Europe
and Russia.
Europe was quickly seen as an unreliable supplier. We all remember
- certainly people of my generation remember - the difficulties that
India experienced in obtaining spares for the Ajeet and other aircraft
during times of conflict. A few years later, as relations with the Soviet
Union developed, the Soviets were seen as more reliable suppliers
and the relations between India and the US as far as aeronautics
was concerned had become really weak.
There is, however, a major difference between aeronautics and
nuclear and space technologies in terms of the way that India has
developed. This is that the licensed production of aeronautical
equipment designed elsewhere in the world was possible in India.
Such production was not always frontline equipment, but many aircraft
have been manufactured that way in India. Though there was very
little technology transfer, you can say that to some extent industry
learnt some production technology from these projects. These projects
were once again not from the United State but by and large from
Western Europe and Russia.
The other big difference is that commerce has been a major factor
in aeronautics. This has its good and bad points. The fact that certain
products of technology have been commercially available in
aeronautics has led to a different course of evolution in that field.
Today, there is another big difference, and that is that there is, in the
United States, a very large community of Indian origin that is very
closely involved with various US aeronautical enterprises.
The turning point in these relations came after Mr. Rajiv Gandhi
became the Prime Minister. Somehow, the chemistry seemed to go
right all of a sudden. He represented a new generation with fewer
political hang-ups. He was an aeronautical person and a technology
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buff himself. He looked forward to the 21st century and it looked as
if, for a short while, relations between India and the United States
were going to improve substantially. There was a Reagan-Gandhi
initiative that led not only to a variety of science and technology
schemes but also to procuring a Cray super-computer for weather
prediction. I am going to come back to that if I have the time to
touch on computers at all.
But most importantly, from our point of view here, some agreements
linked directly to the future of the LCA project were concluded in
the 1980s. One of these was that the United States agreed to supply
to India a small number of F-404 engines to power the Light Combat
Aircraft.  Other systems were also discussed, and by about 1998
there was some work going on in the United States on the flight
control system of the LCA. In fact, the system was actually flying
on one of the platforms in the United States at the time of the Pokhran
II explosions. Pokharan II brought to a grinding halt all cooperation
on the LCA. As we all know, on the same day on which the explosions
took place, the team of Indian engineers who were working with this
US company were told to go home.
So there was an abrupt end to what seemed like a developing
relationship between the United States and India in aeronautics. This
was a setback to the LCA project. It was also a setback to the
Advanced Light Helicopter project, the Dhruv, because once again
there was a problem about a power plant. Despite the setbacks, the
programmes did not grind to a halt. Things were delayed somewhat,
and we took a few years to recover from it, but of course, after that,
the project development has gone on.
Now, let me come back to the major theme of this session and ask,
What are the prospects? In my own view - in fact, I would echo
what Prof. Rama Rao said - the prospects are excellent. But one
has to add an 'if' to it. They are excellent only if - if and only if - both
countries handle the thing well. This goes back to what
Mr. Subrahmanyam and others have been saying - that we have to
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have a strategy. We have to agree on what the ground rules of that
strategy are. We have to be clear on what our objectives are. If we
are clear on these, though there will be problems and hitches in
between, I think the prospects are excellent.
Since 1998, the world has changed. Right now, without any further
assistance from the United States, LCA prototypes are flying. From
all the reports that we have, it's flown well, and supersonically. Several
hundred test flights have been carried out. Wherever the envelope
has been tested, it has met what has been projected for it. So in
many ways, I think the LCA project has gone well. It doesn't mean
that it's going to go well in the future, and in fact this can be  a matter
of major concern,  but I will not touch on that right now.
Similarly, the Advanced Light Helicopter had also been set back by
a couple of years because the power plant for it was not available
after 1998. The project has since recovered from this setback and
several variants of it have been certified for Army, Navy, Air Force
and civilian use. It is flying, and under production
The other major development that has taken place since 1998 is that
civil aviation in India has taken off spectacularly. Growth rates that
we used to associate five years ago only with China are now
characteristic of India as well. I won't touch on that a great deal
because it is a matter of common everyday experience. The number
of airlines, aircraft and flights in India has multiplied enormously and
the fares have fallen. As for growth rates now, figures of 20-30 per
cent are being freely talked about.
India has become one of the major purchasers of civil aviation
equipment in the world today. The centre of gravity of civil aviation
has been shifting eastwards for several years now, and I think that in
the coming years this trend will become even stronger.
The other development that has taken place is that many companies
in the United States have set up business in India now, to do research,
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development and design. GE, of course, is a major force in Bangalore.
Honeywell has a growing presence, and many others, like Rolls Royce,
are trying to set up shop here.
So what is happening now seems ironic to me. For a long time, we
have agonized in India that our R&D, our research, design and
development in particular, have been weak. We have an enormous
amount of self-inflicted criticism on the way that we have done this
work ourselves. However, the same research and development
scientists and engineers - the same ones we worked with in our labs
- now start working for other companies at great financial benefit to
themselves. It is clear to me, therefore, that the commercial value of
the work that is being done in India has been vastly underrated, first
of all by ourselves.
Looking at the way that developments have gone people usually
take one of two extreme views. On one hand there are those who
say that the policies that we have adopted in previous years have
left us in technological isolation and that if we do not work with other
countries this technological isolation will increase. On the other hand
there are those who are afraid that working on projects with countries
like the United States may lead us into becoming technology service
providers or technological clients rather than people who are a major
force by themselves in the world.
I very strongly believe that technological collaboration is possible
without loss of strategic autonomy, provided an appropriate strategy
is adopted. Let me just give two examples. Let's take the LCA. The
future of the LCA depends on a mixture of proper management and
appreciation of the economics involved and of course on technology.
There are certain ideas about how this may be done. But what is
relevant to this meeting  is best highlighted by looking at the engine.
We go back once again to the engine because it seems  that, by and
large, the LCA air frame development has gone very well, although
it's taken time. There were maybe one or two problems with other
systems but there is a somewhat larger problem with the engine.
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The SA to RM, giving the Brahm Prakash Memorial lecture here in
August 2005, said that a major cause for concern  (I am quoting
him) "has been the lack of success in the indigenous development of
propulsion systems". He said that, in spite of the fact that we have
large manufacturing infrastructure for license produced systems -
and these include many engines made right here in Bangalore and in
Nasik- we have had this problem. The problem includes aero-engines
for both fighter aircraft and unmanned air vehicles, IC engines for
tanks, naval propulsion systems and so on. He said one grey area in
the LCA program is the Kaveri engine.
I think therefore that it is worthwhile trying to formulate a strategy
that can be seen as beneficial to both the United States and India.
One sign of what might happen is a recent statement made by the
CEO of Pratt & Whitney who offered to join DRDO in a partnership
for making the Kaveri a world-class engine.
The point here is about partnership. The point here is also about a
world-class engine. Now, you may ask how that is possible. It is
possible because there are industries in the world that are right now
finding out that they do not have an engine of this class in their
repertoire. India has spent a fair bit of money developing that engine
and is, let's say, not far from getting there. But if you wanted this
engine and we went about developing it entirely by ourselves, I think
it will be done but it will take time. By that time technology may have
changed.
If, therefore, Indo-US high technology relations are improving, one
test I would say is whether we can work on the Kaveri engine as a
joint venture, where a US company will also be interested in it as a
product to add to its repertoire and we will be interested in ensuring
that the joint development and certification of the engine can be
completed within a time-bound schedule.
I take the LCA as only one example. In fact, there are other examples,
but I don't have the time to go into them. So let me just state the
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principles that we might adopt if we are looking at joint projects. I
agree with Prof. Rama Rao that eventually, whether this is a success
or not will be determined by exactly what happens on well formulated
joint projects.
I believe that in aeronautics, the future lies in:
public-private partnerships within the country - and that's a
point I've argued elsewhere and so  won't spend too much
time on it,
international partnerships like the ones that might take place
between India and the United States.
It is  essential to change the paradigm on which the aircraft industry
has been moving in India. There are several reasons for it. One is
wealth creation. If we do not turn these industries towards wealth
creation, they will be unable to attract young talent.  We are already
losing them, and  that loss will become more and more severe as
time goes on. I also believe that we have to maintain our strategic
autonomy in critical technologies. Otherwise we will degenerate into
bit players in the world.
Thirdly we have to reduce development time cycles. The long, slow,
steady policy that India has adopted in technology development will
no longer work. We have to build on our domestic strengths; and
these strengths are in fact substantial. The country now suffers from
underestimating the strengths it has. Basically our human resources
- our research and development base - are actually now considerable,
and could be built up in an appropriate policy regime.
We have therefore to learn to exploit the opportunities that are offered
by globalization, and those opportunities are vast. And I think we can
do that without sacrificing our strategic autonomy.
How do we do this? We do this, first of all, by selecting  areas where
we want to go ahead for joint ventures and joint developments.
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Without giving up a  commitment to strategic autonomy, we have to
loosen controls on joint research, design, development and marketing.
We have to push civil aviation in a big way, extracting what you may
call spin-backs from civil aviation into military aviation. We have to
push offset arrangements, because we are now becoming major
customers for civil aviation in the world.
Civil aviation in the world now is characterized by competition
between Airbus and Boeing. Although there is much concern in the
US about outsourcing, the outsourcing that takes place to India now
is extremely small.
I personally believe that in the coming decades - if we do it correctly
it can happen certainly in the next ten years, but may be even in the
next five years -  Indian aerospace in general and aeronautics in
particular can be India's next big buzz like IT and BT and so on,
because the resources are there. The experience is already there.
We can make competitive arrangements with other major players in
the world.
My fifteen minutes are up. I'll just say two things about computers.
First of all, computers have now ceased being the major worries that
they were ten years ago. If that is so, it is because of the major
parallel computing efforts that were undertaken in this country. Now,
none of these efforts has been commercially successful. So sometimes
people criticize the parallel computing efforts in this country. However
they have done one important thing - they have removed the country's
vulnerabilities in terms of computing. This has been done at very
little expense. Just the other day, we celebrated twenty years of the
parallel computing effort in India at the National Aerospace
Laboratories. I estimated that we had spent less than ten crores on
the whole program but we have made ourselves invulnerable. It's
well worth it.  But on the other hand, if we join up with somebody
now, we might be able to do things that we were not able to do till
recently.
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So let me conclude by saying that the prospects are excellent. We
don't have to sacrifice our strategic autonomy - we can, in fact,
actually gain. But we have to sit down and work out a careful strategy
for doing it.
Thank you.
Dr. V. Siddhartha - Export Control and Technology Denial
Regimes and their Implications for Indo-US Relations
We cannot get a full understanding of the fit of the technology
component in the emerging dynamic of the US-India relationship
unless we understand the geo-strategic context. That context has
been provided by Shri K. Subrahmanyam yesterday both in his
presentation during our conclave here and also what he said at
yesterday’s evening lecture. Further, in support what Professor
Narasimha has just said, I will try to identify the necessary, but not
necessarily the sufficient conditions to be able to fashion the kind of
technology relationship that both India and the US could benefit from
– a true partnership of co-equality, without India being drawn into
becoming a bit player and a dependent on the United States.
My starting point is that a repositioning of India in regional and world
affairs is now a geo-strategic imperative: It is not just a ruling
establishment yearning. I think it necessary to re-iterate this point –
and here I endorse what Shri K. Subrahmanyam said and has been
saying for some time – because some political formations in this
country have been voicing their apprehension that the emerging
dynamic of the Indo-US relationship is being driven largely by the
two hundred million middle class in this country which has a certain
dual sentiment vis-à-vis the US, captured in the pithy title of a
presentation that Jairam Ramesh – now a minister in the Union Cabinet
– made several years ago to a US audience: “Yankee go home, but
take me with you”!
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Such strategic (re)positioning of India in world affairs requires an
active strategy. It will not happen automatically. That strategy has to
jettison India’s historical posture of the mere reactive preservation of
“maximum available autonomy at the lowest possible cost”; to quote
from Professor Narasimha, who also noted in a different context:
“The world will not leave us alone, even if we wish to be left alone”.
This point is poorly appreciated. Without an active strategy of re-
positioning, our new generation will inevitably be saddled with
stultifying, anxiety-ridden status quo paralysis and global diminution
in the face of the inexorable rise of a China, that is disdainful – if not
contemptuous – of India, to the Number One world power in another
thirty years or so, possibly sooner, particularly when it will have
established a full-spectrum military and human presence in Space. (I
will come to that again a little later.) The geo-strategic significance
of this inevitability is still not widely appreciated in a significant
segment of our elite.
The foundational elements of a repositioning strategy in geopolitical
terms are: First, you have to grow rapidly to become a geo-economic
pole in the globalised world economy. We moved about a decade
ago from being G-77 non-aligned cheer-leader to G-15 co-player.
Since then we have moved along to G-8 plus 3 – recall India was
invited to the G-8 meeting in Scotland along with Brazil and China.
Then later into the future, perhaps contemporaneous with a
restructuring of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)–
although on that development there is still a question mark – we
should be counted in a G-5+. Exactly how and when this will happen
is still a matter of conjecture.
Second, India will remain a Nuclear Weapon State until nuclear
weapons are altogether eliminated. (The opening preambular
paragraph of our WMD Act, 2005 says that we are a Nuclear
Weapon State).
Correlated with that is the third – again little appreciated –
requirement: The acquisition of geo-military reach by becoming,
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among other things, a military co-occupant of Space – until the
militarisation of Space is ended. If you do not become such you will
not get the military reach that you require to be a even a regional
power, never mind a global one.
When the above three foundational elements are well on their way
to irreversible achievement, the world will, perforce, invite India to
be a permanent member of the board of “Global Governance
Incorporated” – the permanent membership of the UNSC. The
admission of India into permanent membership of the UNSC will
also depend on whether we are able and willing to bear the economic
and military costs of setting the ‘rules of engagement’ in the emerging
global order – the real world of real power, that includes technological
power – which latter I shall come back to in relation to what Dr.
Banerjee said in his presentation. There are no free lunches.
Now, is the above understood in our political establishment? At one
level it is. The following quote from the Prime Minister’s address on
November 11, 2005 at the fortieth anniversary of the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses is important to attend to because,
while the imperative of repositioning of India in the world system
was identified by his immediate predecessor, the Prime Minister
recognized the technological dimensions of that imperative in his
address thus: “I have said in the past that our security policy in the
emerging global order must be based on three pillars. The first must
be to strengthen India economically and technologically.” Note
how technology is identified as an independent driving factor. It is
not a derivative of economic policy – a point often not understood by
lesser economists. “Second, to develop adequate defence capability
making optimal use of modern science and technology so that we
can effectively meet all contemporary challenges to our security.”
This is the second reference to science and technology and its role
in a country whose most pressing “contemporary challenge” to its
security is terrorism. “And finally we must develop partnerships in
strategic, economic and technological spheres, to enlarge our policy
choices and developmental options.” Technology is again referenced
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as an independent vehicle for the development of [international]
partnerships.
It is of seminal significance in my judgment that technology is explicitly
identified as an integral component of all three pillars of security
policy as thus enunciated by the Prime Minister as an elaboration of
what his predecessor had said with regard to the necessity for India
to be repositioned in the international system.
I come now to the way in which the bilateral relationship with the US
in controlled technologies has evolved over the past two decades. In
summary, it went like this:
Post the Indira Gandhi-Ronald Reagan meeting at Cancun there was
signed in November 1984 an Indo-US Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) for a sub-class of items and technologies whose export from
the US is controlled under US Law. The ‘Cray’ computer was
purchased for the India Meteorological Department under the terms
of this MoU.
The US-led Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into
force in 1987, Then in March 1988, the MoU implementation
procedures were laid out in detail. Nevertheless the MoU was
effectively dead after our Agni test in 1989 (and also because of
Gulf War I). MTCR was further tightened after – among other
happenings – the ISRO-DRDO link was revealed by (now President
of India) Abdul Kalam in a Brahm Prakash Memorial lecture that he
delivered in August, 1990.
New sets of “sanctions” were slapped after our 1998 nuclear tests.
During 1999 – 2000 you had the Singh-Talbott dialogue that went
into thirteen rounds. In November 2001 the PM and the US President
met in Washington DC to agree on the partnership statement to
“qualitatively transform US- India relations.” One of the means of
qualitative transformation was the agreement to “discuss ways to
stimulate bilateral high-technology commerce.” In 2002 India and
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the US announced the establishment of the High Technology
Cooperation Group (HTCG), the first such group set up by the US
with any country. In February 2003, the US and India signed a
“Statement of Principles on US – India High Technology Cooperation”
and in July 2003 at the first meeting of the HTCG that took place in
Washington an Action Plan was agreed upon that covered inter alia
“Policy Review for Dual Use Exports”.
In August 2003 the US added “missile defence” to the earlier “Trinity
Issues” of co-operation in Civil Nuclear, Civil Space and High
Technology trade. The expression “strategic partnership” came into
bilateral use by end-2003. It was in January 2004 that the Next Steps
in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) were announced by the Prime
Minister of India and the US President, to cover now the quartet of
Civil Space, Civil Nuclear, “High-Technology” and Missile Defence.
On September 17, 2004 the End-Use Visit Arrangement document
was signed. On September 22 the US notified a new licensing policy.
Periodically updated Indian export control regulations have been in
existence for over a dozen years. They are called the SCOMET
(Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and
Technologies) regulations. On 15 of July 2005, our Department of
Commerce notified the NSG – MTCR concordant revised SCOMET
regulations as one of the reciprocal steps that we had agreed to take
under NSSP to bring our export controls in line with “international
norms” without necessarily becoming full members of international
export control regimes such as the MTCR.
On July 18, 2005, the landmark Indo-US joint statement announced
“completion of NSSP”. By then the reciprocal steps that had been
intended to be taken under NSSP had been taken by both sides,
although there was one then-pending matter with regard to control
over export to India of “NP2” items i.e. items controlled by the United
States for non-proliferation (“NP”) reasons unilaterally,  - i.e., outside
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and lists. The
232
elimination of this control was effected in August, 2005 after NSSP
was declared ‘completed’, when the US notified in its Federal Register
(equivalent to our Gazette notification) removal of the licence
requirement for export of such items to India. This regulatory detail
is very illuminating of the effect on US policy of the potential size of
the Indian market for US-origin controlled technologies, because one
of the NP2 items is oscilloscopes – high-end oscilloscopes - widely-
used in our telecom sector mostly made by the well-known US firm
Tektronix. More than ten million US dollars worth of such
oscilloscopes were imported into this country, even when a US export
licence for these was required, over a period of about two-and-a-half
years since the setting-up of the HTCG.
I now come to the mismatch between US intentions vis-à-vis Indo-
US trade in controlled technologies and our understanding of those
intentions.
The three strategic departments of Atomic Energy, Space and
Defence R&D – commonly referred amongst the cognoscenti as
“Trimurti” – were given to the impression that, subject to India taking
firm legal and effective administrative measures to prevent un-
authorised export out of India (known as “nuclear proliferation”), of
controlled technologies imported into India from the US, or those
that India had itself developed on its own. It is in US interests to
enable a significant enhancement of India’s strategic autonomy, via
technology-supply to Trimurti because such enhancement will serve
US regional interests without threatening US global interests. Our
belief and understanding was that high technology cooperation –
with which the NSSP began – was about the US at least not impeding
– even if it could not actively assist – India’s self-movement on the
road to significantly enhanced strategic autonomy; albeit within the
maximum allowable discretionary stretch of US law as made
applicable, for example, to non-NPT, non-NATO US ally, Israel.
However, for that discretionary stretch to be exercised by the US,
existing Indian export control law and regulation needed to be brought
into concordance with MTCR and NSG norms, as far as the items
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controlled by those two regimes are concerned. This exercise was
completed by mid-2005 and notified by our Department of Commerce
three days before the July 18 joint statement.
The end-use verification “arrangement” document was signed
between the US and Indian sides on September 17, 2004. The
arrangement is applicable to any US origin item exported from US
or re-exported from third countries. The arrangement includes
verification of compliance with licence conditions and US
Government officials have the right to inspect the exported item at
the location in India where such exported item is actually being used.
Entities under contract to GOI are subject to this arrangement. There
are other post-shipment verification arrangements even at non-
Trimurti locations. Clearly, these arrangements are vehicles for the
extra-territorial application of US law and regulations to industrial
activities pursued even wholly within India.
It is now apparent that our expectations from the NSSP were quite
different from US objectives. 1 Trimurti’s experience of the end-use
verification arrangement reveals quite clearly that for the US, high-
technology cooperation means the following. “Let’s work our Export
Control regulations so we can enable US companies to sell more
dual-use high-technology to the Big Emerging Market in India, but
now be extra careful: Apply US law extra-territorially so that these
transfers do not contribute to enhancing India’s strategic autonomy”.
In particular, make sure that these technologies cannot, by second-
order diffusion – explicit or otherwise – get into Trimurti.
I thus now come to the last - or nearly the last – item of my
presentation: What is the future trajectory of Indo-US trade in
controlled technologies?
1I was told yesterday by Dr. Kakodkar that they (i.e. DAE) never had any such
expectations.
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The Indo-US joint statement of July 18, 2005 recognises that India
has a military nuclear programme (implicitly accepting it as
“legitimate”) and brings India onto an international platform of nuclear
discourse as a “part of the solution” rather than as a “part of the
problem”, thus enabling procurement of fuel for reactors without
full-scope IAEA safeguards (but subject to what you heard yesterday
from Dr. Kakodkar about civil-military separation etc.).
Notwithstanding the Indo-US joint statement and any implementing
arrangements, we should be under no illusion that Trimurti access to
US origin “dual use” technologies controlled for nuclear and missile
non-proliferation reasons will ease significantly even in the medium
term. However, on the conventional military side, indications in
bilateral discussions with the US are that mutually beneficial programs
of equality-respecting R&D cooperation can be mounted, particularly
in institutions and facilities operated by the US Department of
Defence.
So, what is the prospect in the medium term for Indo-US relations in
controlled technologies? Trimurti experience with NSSP and the End-
Use verification arrangement engenders the ‘minimum credible
suspicion’ that facilitating bi-lateral trade with the US in controlled
technologies by, for example, civil-military separation and technology
fire-walling is tantamount to facilitating technological “divide and
rule”. However, we can promote greater two-way flow and trust in
Indo-US trade in controlled technologies if we now take all the steps
of legislation and executive action – of the kind that major NATO
allies of the US, such as Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and a
few others have taken – to ensure that there is no extraterritorial
application of technology controls to in-country access of our strategic
sectors to required supplies and technologies ‘contaminated’ by, or
with, US origin plant, equipment and technology.
Can such countervailing legislative and regulatory steps be taken?
Indeed they can, but taking them will call for devoting time and
attention to tedious detail in such arcane regulatory topics as industrial
licensing and foreign investment guidelines. If we take such steps,
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will the supply of US-origin controlled “high-technologies” to
commercial industrial sectors slow or halt? No, it will not. Why?
Because the US itself has on its statute books such kinds of measures;
and because of what Shri K. Subrahmanyam said yesterday about
India’s place in balance of power relations in the global order, in
which trade in controlled technologies plays a central role: This
geo-strategic factor cannot be over-emphasized. However, if we do
not institute the necessary measures; if we allow ourselves to be
frightened by free-trade ogres of our own making, or – worse still –
are just lazy and do not ourselves take the necessary legislative and
administrative countervailing steps, the US will have no reasons not
to apply its export control regulations in the most restrictive ways,
including extra-territorially. So, the real “next steps in strategic
partnership” with the US are the ones we have to take in domestic
law and regulation, so as to maximize the advantages that can
undoubtedly accrue to both countries, through full-spectrum
Indo-US co-operation and trade in technologies now controlled not
only by the US but also increasingly by an India that should (will
she?) seek quid pro quos for sharing them with its strategic partners.
And what of the longer term? Normally I do not quote foreigners but
this is so apt, I thought I would put it down. “However, the larger
geo-strategic impact (of the July 18 deal) is more uncertain as the
consequences of this and the subsequent agreements on the alignment
of forces in the new international system now emerging will take
many years to become evident.” It is actually taken from an opening
statement made by Henry Hyde, Chairman of the United States
House International Relations Committee in Hearings (on the Deal)
on 8 September 2005. Such an apposite public statement from
someone at the heart the US system is uncommon. It is a very realistic
assessment indeed.
Thank you very much.
Chair: Thank you very much. So we will have some questions.
Because we stared at nine forty-five and we have ended up at eleven
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thirty we have taken exactly an hour and 45 minutes. So I expect
some spillovers. Fifteen minutes. A few questions.
Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy: My request to
Dr. Kasturirangan is, if he could tell us about the ISRO contribution
in the planning and development of military needs of Space and
whether there is some thinking of cooperation now that there is so
much willingness to cooperate in this sector between US and India
and whether this cooperation will spill over to meeting the military
and security requirements as well.
Question: Sir, if I can add on to the Air Chief Marshal’s, particularly
because of the importance of the Space military sector. What we
heard is that the denial regime will be in force particularly in the
Indo-US cooperation on Space that the west says they are going to
be applying to any technology that meets military requirements. Will
this not be a concern?
Dr. K. Kasturirangan: They understand that once you start getting
into the civilian Space domain it is going to have certain military
implications simply because of the fact they are dual use items
ultimately. The question of optimal resources sharing for the total
resource we are creating for the country is something that has been
in debate in the US itself. A major change that has occurred in US
policy in recent times has been to see how civilian systems could be
used for military applications. This has been a major change in their
policy and because procurements are dictated by other considerations
(cost considerations are not so important) there is no question of a
separate major budget for a satellite that can do something more. A
defence satellite today costs five times more than the same satellite
in the civilian domain. Private companies also try to build satellites
that they get launched. These are all considerations that dictate what
they do. I see no reason why a separate logic will be applicable to
this country and certainly there are investments that are happening
in this country. These investments obviously would be for capabilities
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like Space systems and the Space systems will be optimal largely for
meeting the civilian requirements of the state. If it is applicable in the
context of sharing the resources with the military, then it is up to a
policy decision at the political level to see if this is so. I don’t see a
problem because that is the only way to optimize the total resources.
But there will be only a civilian satellite. That much I can tell you.
Question: This is with respect to the fuel cycle.  U232 you said is a
problem at thousand parts per million. You have reduced this to ten.
I didn’t get the impression that you have solved that problem. Is that
correct or have you solved the problem?
S. Bannerjee: No, we haven’t solved the problem. We are just
working on it. Yes, but there are two aspects. One of the things is
that Thorium can be introduced in a system much earlier, if you can
do that burning in situ. This problem doesn’t exist if you can take
thorium in an enriching system and then thorium can be burnt in situ
and then there is no problem. This is short term. But to have a very
sustainable thorium- based U233 based reactor one has to separate
U 233 from U232. We are tackling the problem. It is not an
insurmountable problem. The problem is that the whole operation
has to be done in hot cells. That’s what we have been planning now.
Question: In terms of getting fuels for our rockets and so on do you
see much progress in collaboration with the Americans.  I have a
second question which also I want to ask you. This is in terms of
both India and US as societies. There is a lot of information that is
available in the public domain which probability is not desirable. You
can see, for example, my house. That is not so bad. You can also see
the uranium facilities and the various sites and so on. Is there some
attempt to understand this complex problem?  It is not just Space it is
legal, political and a lot of things are involved here in terms of what
is a desirable communication, what is not a desirable communication?
Can we work together on this?
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K. Kasturirangan: You know, so far as propellants are concerned,
I don’t think we have to depend on any country.  Obviously, that is
one of the critical areas where we have developed our own autonomy.
Expendable vehicles systems of today as well as for the future
including the Mark III of the GSLV would not need any kind of
propellant from anywhere outside. The second is with respect to the
futuristic systems.  I said that in future space transportation systems
that are recoverable and reusable would be needed. Their development
hinges on the optimization of their trajectories in the atmosphere
through using air-breathing technology engines and so on. There is
an element of development happening on this both in ISRO and
DRDO. I am sure that there could be scope simply because it is a
long range programme and there could be several interesting
technologies in areas like computational fluid dynamics, high
temperature materials, combined propulsions and so on. In this area
certainly there are possibilities but that hinges on the overall time
and many other aspects of the discussion currently in progress
between the ISRO and the agencies concerned in the USA.
Regarding the other part of your question - the Google thing - I think
we are going to have to accept a certain amount of relativity in this
world now? Ability to look at things from Space is not going to be
any more the preserve of one or two countries. Many countries are
developing this capability. You have to assume that that you are being
watched all the time. So, whatever precaution you take including
what you want to do in your bedroom is something that is your concern.
Chair: We will close this session now. And luckily we have a tea
break. And all the four speakers are available to you for further
questioning. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the speakers for
the very illuminating presentations.
Summary of the session
The Workshop debated at length the various issues related to
Indo-US Cooperation in the field of high technology. A large part of
the discussions were devoted to cooperation in the nuclear, space and
strategic technology domains.
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The US is a big user of nuclear energy. However, historically it made
a choice that it would not invest in fast breeder technology. Recently
it has changed its mind and it now believes that recycling and burning
of high level wastes in a secondary cycle would be in its interest.
This is partly a response to the growth in energy demand in Asia and
the resulting greater competition for scarcer fossil fuels. Burning of
high-level radioactive waste in a second reactor would also confer
major economic and environmental benefits. This has renewed the
US interest in fast breeder technology. India, of course, has significant
expertise and technology in this area. Placing such reactors under
safeguards could jeopardize Indian economic interests through leakage
of technology. India needs to position herself properly in this emerging
international order. The current Indian three-phase approach to its
nuclear development – thermal reactors, fast breeder reactors and
eventually thorium reactors - is a consequence of a well thought plan
based upon Indian resources and Indian perceptions of how the
international order will function. There is no doubt that international
cooperation will enable India to increase its power generation
capabilities. A stronger and more robust Indian nuclear industry could
develop with critical foreign technology in the civilian power sector.
The enhanced supply of uranium through the easing of restrictions
could also help us build more power plants based on indigenous
technology. The world may also in turn benefit from Indian technology
in some critical areas. There are many emerging areas of nuclear
technology where collaboration would be useful. The Indo-US nuclear
deal could become a win-win situation for both countries. But one
must remember that it is “national interest” that should determine
India’s international posture. India must preserve strategic autonomy
on all matters related to her technology options and not trade it away
lightly. There was agreement that the outcome of the Indo-US nuclear
deal would be a crucial test of the intentions of both sides to make
the necessary investments for moving Indo-US relationship to a higher
plane.
The US has played an important role in all phases of the Indian
Space Programme as it evolved from the early experimental phase
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to the current operational and globalisation phase. Current cooperative
endeavours in Space Sciences, Communications and Remote Sensing
are substantive and significant for both sides. Major irritants in the
relationship have been the MTCR and the periodic imposition of
sanctions on various space establishments. In spite of these problems
Indo-US relationship in Space has increased and moved forward. If
the relationship further improves with the removal of many current
constraints such as the MTCR and export control laws, India and the
US can gain significantly through cooperative ventures in the
commercial, technology and science domains.
The Workshop also addressed other areas of technology that had
both strategic and commercial dimensions. Aeronautics and
Computing were chosen as examples to illustrate the prospects and
problems posed by collaborative ventures in such areas. There was
growing recognition in the US about the potential of Indian
engineering and technology talent. Most major multinational
companies have set up big R&D centers in India. Would this
commercial recognition translate into specific projects in high
technology areas? If this were so, what would it mean in terms of
technology development in areas like civil aviation? Can India and
the US collaborate, for example, in the development of a joint aircraft
engine that caters to the needs of a growing civil aviation market in
India? Can similar initiatives take place in other emerging areas like
supercomputing and encryption? In many of these areas the prospects
for cooperation are good because of significant Indian capabilities
built up over the years. Can these mutual interdependencies be
converted into tangible products and services of benefit to both sides?
Counter-terrorism, environment friendly fuels, manufacturing, defence
technologies and mathematics were identified as other areas having
high potential for cooperation.
Some participants felt that technology would be one of the key
elements of a re-positioning strategy for India in the post 9/11 world
order. To be able to deal with this increasingly important force, India
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needs a proactive Science & Technology Strategy. “Economic
Power”, “Nuclear Weapon Power” and “Space Power” should be
the critical factors addressed by such a strategy. Many members of
the strategic community believe that the passage of the recent export
control law by India promotes India’s strategic autonomy in the key
areas of nuclear, space and defence technologies to the maximum
extent possible under current US laws. This belief may be misplaced.
While this may enhance export of dual use items to the big emerging
market like India, the US through its “India – US End Use Visit
Arrangement” is trying to prevent the transfer of such technologies
into areas that may be critical for India’s strategic autonomy. Thus
the Indo-US Agreement may not ease US restrictions on technology
transfer to “Proliferation Sensitive Entities” within the country. India
must be prepared to confront and deal with these issues. High
technology cooperation on the conventional military side may not be
subject to these same restrictions and may benefit through the easing
of restrictions.
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Session V
US and Indian Legal Systems and Its
Implications for Indo-US Relations
Right to Left:  Prof. K.P. Vijayalakshmi, Mr. Tarun Das,
Prof. Rupa Chanda, Prof. M.J. Vinod
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Session V
US and Indian Legal Systems and Its
Implications for Indo-US Relations
Chair: Prof. Jayagovind, Director, NLSIU, Bangalore
Prof. Jayagovind: In the last session I was trying very hard to
understand what the speakers stated about a high degree of economic
co-operation between India and the US. But when it comes to legal
matters, it is rather easy to understand if you say India and US are
the two greatest democracies, one is the oldest democracy and the
other is youngest democracy. It is how some of the public understands
the context of Indo US relations. The question however is whether
both being democracies include a common system that has facilitated
the relationship between the two countries. Anyhow we are apparently
going to focus on the trade relations, intellectual property systems so
on and so forth. These are the issues, which are very much relevant
in fostering the economic and technological cooperation between these
countries. I have been told that we must conclude by one fifteen and
therefore whatever I wish to say I will reserve it to the end. All the
speakers are given exactly ten minutes. There are three speakers –
Mr. Tarun Das, Professor Rupa Chanda and Professor Ramakrishna
I intimate them in advance that they must complete their presentation
within ten minutes that I have been strictly expected to be so. Let me
now call upon Shri Tarun Das, Chief Mentor of Confederation of
Indian Industries. He will be speaking on United States Systems versus
Indian Systems, World Trade Organizations, and TRIPS.
Tarun Das – US Systems vis-à-vis Indian System: WTO/ TRIPS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I walked fast here so that it won’t be
deducted from my ten minutes. Dr. Kasturirangan, it is nice to be
here at the NIAS. I hope you will have me back again soon for more
than ten minutes.
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On Trade: Listening to Dr. Bannerjee from BARC was very
revealing and what I learnt from him was that India can emerge as
a global leader in nuclear power development if we get out of our
isolation and participate in the global network for nuclear power and
technology development. That seems to be the kind of feeling I get
in other areas also. This session is essentially on trade and I have a
similar message there that in the trade area while we have had a
very limited basket of our exports in the past like textiles, gems and
jewelry, leather, that whole scenario is changing and you have seen
pharmaceuticals, automotive components and other products where
there is much more of science, technology and engineering involved
in the product. So it is not as basic as it has been and we have seen
that in America also we can occupy leadership position in trade in
this kind of engineered products. We don’t have to be just small
players.
Second aspect, of course, is the services sector. You all know about
the IT sector. So I don’t need to expand on the success that has been
achieved and I agree with the previous speakers that we have really
only touched the very small corner of the potential of the IT business.
But when I look forward, today we are at roughly 25 billion dollars
of bilateral trade between India and the US in products and maybe
another 15 billion dollars in services say, so a total of about forty
billion dollars. I would say that we will go to about 100 billion dollars
in a few years and then much beyond that. And the balance of trade
will be in India’s favour, which it is today. So it is not an issue where
the balance of trade is going to be in their favour and they will be
exporting more and we will be exporting less into the US. We need to
keep that in our mind because it is not an one-way traffic. It is a two-
way traffic.
On Investment: There is a new development in that we are now
investing in the US. And we are acquiring US companies. Tatas have
acquired a telecom company. The Federal Agencies have given security
and other approval to Tatas. For that, Ranbaxy has acquired
pharmaceutical companies; Bharat Forge has acquired automotive
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companies. So this is the new trend you are seeing where India is
putting its footprint in the US economy and in the US market which
was never there before and this will multiply as we go forward.
Going beyond IT: In the knowledge industries we are going to go
beyond just IT and I will spend a moment on health care. In a recent
study for example, a brief study which we have done and which we
discussed last week in Washington with their Department of Health,
Department of State and the National security Council some
interesting facts emerged. The US spent 1.5 trillion dollars on health
care last year. Their own estimates of their own National Intelligence
Council and the Health Department are that they will spend 3.5 trillion
dollars on health care by 2015. Now 10% saving on that is 350 billion
dollars. They will have a shortage of nurses in USA of one million by
that time. Now, the health care cooperation between US and India is
going to make the IT look like small-scale industry. Just think of it
because there is no other country in the world with which the US
can partner in health care as much as they can with India. The
increasing of US dependence on India in a whole range of industries,
manufacturing and services is accompanied by a corresponding
increasing US vulnerability because of their high cost and loss of
competitiveness. Hence the partnership with India is enabling them
to retain or regain their competitiveness over the next ten to fifteen
years. So there is a lot of mutuality there.
On WTO and multilateral Agreements: India can start negotiating
a Free Trade Agreement with the US. It will come in phases. It can
come over a ten-year period. But we are ready because we have
more to gain by accepting their markets because we have the human
resources, talent and we have the technology to access their market
than they have vis-à-vis us.
Regarding the specific issues of WTO and TRIPS which are largely
a technical subject some significant observations can be made. The
TRIPS issue has been discussed between US and India since the
nineties. Now they want a strict patent regime. We resisted that in the
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past. Now the shoe is on the other foot. We have become exporters.
So we need patent protection. Ranbaxy needs patent protection.
Wockhardt needs patent protection. So we do not have very big
differences with the US law because our interests are converging as
exporters of products and services where IPR is important. So, that
past history is not applicable. But still we have differences. One is on
TRIPS on public health where in public health there is a paragraph
six - amendment issue - which allows poor countries to use compulsory
licensing route to import patented drugs from the cheapest suppliers
to contain an epidemic. The debate with the US is that what are the
diseases to be covered, what is the import eligibility, what is the
supply eligibility and what are the safeguards. So far we don’t have
a solution on this. The US is worried about the misuse of this provision
for selling patented drugs. Countries like India and Brazil have argued
that putting stringent conditions would make the provision completely
useless to us. I believe we can negotiate with them. We should not
be afraid to negotiate and we can try to come to some kind of a
bilateral understanding, which will work in our interest. We have to
shed our concern that we cannot negotiate on an equal footing with
them. We can.
The second issue is TRIPS and the conventional biodiversity. This is
a disclosure of the source of biological materials and related traditional
knowledge in patent applications. The two countries USA and India
have differences on whether such a patent-based system is necessary
to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources.
Again, I think, we would need to get into a dialogue with them
intensively and put a time line and come to a compromise solution
which works mutually for both of us. We have submitted to WTO
that we refute the US views that disclosure requirements would
increase uncertainties and lead to additional burdens and obligations
on patent applicants and offices. So, these are the two issues and I
just want to conclude by saying that in our own national interest, not
in their national interest, we need to prove the efficiency of our legal
system. We don’t need to be worried about opening legal services to
the Americans because I don’t think that is an issue. I think our
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lawyers are on a par with them and we have enough non-tariff
barriers in our legal system to prevent the Americans from penetrating
too much – They will never be able to figure out how our courts
work and how our systems work. So I don’t think we need to worry
about the American taking us over. We will take them over, in fact.
So, I see that as an opportunity, not as a threat.
Finally, as we come out of our, you know, from 1947 to 1991 we
were in a closed regime, economic regime, a closed trade regime, a
closed investment regime. And so when we started opening up with a
gun at our back in 1991, because the country was facing bankruptcy,
we were scared, we were scared of competition, private sector was
scared, they were flabby, they were inefficient, and they were
uncompetitive. In the last fourteen years that has changed now. By
the very fact that we are going out into the world, we are acquiring
companies, we are exporting now. The situation has changed. By the
very fact that we are going out into the world, we are acquiring
companies, we are exporting now. The situation has changed. We are
no longer defenders. We are more in the mould of aggressors. And
this applies to a whole set of civilian industries, and I think beyond
civilian to other sectors where we are technology leaders. We don’t
have to be running scared whether it is Space, whether it is nuclear,
whether it is defence and all that. So, on the trade side I see a great
potential for us. I see a partnership and I see increasing dependency
of the US on India. Thank you.
Chair: Thank you, Mr. Tarun Das. Now, let me call upon Professor
Rupa Chanda to make her presentation.
Prof. Rupa Chanda - Institutional and Legal Barriers to
Indo-US Trade
Thank you, everyone. I will try to be brief. I am not a legal expert. I
am going to be mainly focusing on the institutional aspects and in
this I have taken a rather comprehensive view of what I regard as
barriers in Indo-US trade both merchandise as well as services trade
vis-à-vis the non-tariff barrier issues and the regulatory issues. This
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is broadly what I would like to cover, if time permits. And then get to
some of the divergence or convergence of positions between India
and the US in the WTO negotiations. Indo-US trade is about twenty
billion dollars. It has been growing quite rapidly. And there is an
overall surplus in favour of India. Also one should recognize that
there is a bit of an asymmetry in the sense that the US is an important
market for us but still we don’t find India figuring very important as
a source of inputs, but that also suggests that there are probably
some barriers that can be done away with and there is tremendous
potential for growth. In the services area, of course, the IT and IT-
enabled services may serve as a major focus, and in addition, as Mr.
Tarun Das has mentioned, there is tremendous scope in a variety of
other areas, such as health care services, other professional services,
accounting  legal and so on. I will also talk a little about some of the
barriers in services in particular.
As an FDI source US is important but again if you look at how
important India is in terms of the share of total US outputs it is not so
large. But again that might reflect on a variety of investment related
regulations and with liberalization you can expect India to become
an increasingly important market, especially with the opening of
telecom, retailing and so on. Also you see increasingly outward
investment by Indian companies but still there is tremendous scope
to grow. There are projections that have been projected in the dialogue
which point to the US merchandise 40 million dollars and inclusive
of services something like 60 million dollars by 2008, provided as
someone puts it, the NTBs (non-tariff barriers) are done away with.
This is the projected trend in terms of Indo-US trade. Again you can
see the asymmetry here in terms if India’s exports to the US versus
the other way and of course, the surplus that we have. The US is a
very important market for us. Eleven per cent of our world share of
trade is with the US. It figures as one of the top ten in goods sources
as well as the top ten as export destination.
This is in terms of FDI. Of course, we do see extensively and
cumulatively FDI has been increasing. But of course there is a
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divergence between what is approved and what actually flows in,
again reflective of institutional issues and absorptive capacity issues.
What I would say is that if there are lots of barriers within the Indian
economy, which would have to be removed, if you want to really
exploit the full potential of Indo-US merchandise as well as services
trade. This is, as you can see, the divergence. About one fourth of
what is approved is actually realized. Some of the actually there is
quite a diversification also. You have lot of the services sector, which
are important. And then you have also in food-processing etc. which,
I think, increasingly will see US are coming in. This is another
important point to appreciate and says that India is a major exporter
and one of the top five and in fact in some areas the topmost exporter
of professional manpower to the US. Seventeen per cent of all skilled
immigration from Asia go to the US . And if you compare with China,
we are way ahead in terms of the usage of the immigration visa for
the skilled category. I think, the story is quite clear if you look at
specific areas like IT, medical and health. This is the comparison
with China, for instance, 1989 to 1999 in terms of usage of H1 visa.
This is going to be one major area of discussion and it already is in
the context of the WTO negotiations – the whole issue of regulatory
hurdles to movement of professional service providers from India to
the US – the whole range not just of immigration regulations but as
well recognition- related issues, economic needs test and other sub –
federal type of regulations which prevent people from going and
practicing.
India’s trade is much lower with the US. What does that signify?
Basically it represents a variety of barriers, which still exist between
India and the US. Look at the exports vis-à-vis the other countries.
Of course, China is way out there. There are reasons related to labour
laws and so on. Investment also, as I mentioned, we are very small in
terms of the overall share of outward investment. So, what are the
main factors that are affecting Indo-US trade and investment flows?
One is, of course, that India still has relatively higher tariffs compared
to other countries in the regional emerging markets. In fact, there is
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a recent study that out of 135 emerging markets India is among the
top in terms of agricultural tariffs in particular. Administrative and
procedural issues on both sides seem to be very important and non-
tariff barriers, a whole slew of them technical barriers to trade, sanitary
and phytosanitary standards, testing, labeling, certification issues,
labour and environmental clauses which are attached to trade.
Increasingly these are becoming important. As Indian manufacturers
go up the value chain these are going to be more and more important.
If you look at the advantages of companies like ITC, for instance,
which want to export food products, there are tremendous amount
of barriers in the United States, the European Union with regard to
testing, labeling, certification, equivalence, in a variety of national
standards, where often countries apply even more stringent standards
than that. They detain consignments. They don’t explain the reason
for detention. These are some of the discriminatory kind of barriers
that India is trying to address. This will have to be done bilaterally
but also at the multilateral level trying to discipline the use of this
kind of non-tariff barriers.
Antidumping is another major issue, several sectors having time and
again been subject to this, for instance, shrimp, steel, safeguard
measures, for instance, in the textile industry with the MFN quotas
having gone away there is this possibility that safeguard measures
will be used in case of flare-up of imports from India into the US
market, which is exactly what is happening with China in the US and
China in the EU.
Investment-related regulations are more on our side in key sectors
where US is pressing us to open up in areas like retail distribution, to
relax further in the telecom sector, in banking removing some of the
conditions with regard to the type of establishment, in IPR issues
which, I am sure, the next speaker will speak about more.
 Then labour market regulations, one of the main issues in the service
sector trade between the two countries, even issues of subsidization
for even issues like subsidization, for instance, in agriculture,
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Agriculture subsidies in the US, which undermine market access in
areas such as cotton and sugar. Government procurement and
distribution issues in the Indian case i.e. lack of transparency. This
has been brought up in the WTO negotiations where the US has been
very resistant on having transparency in government procurement as
one of the things under the Singapore issues.
What are the main US concerns if you look at merchandise trade?
First and foremost, it is tariffs- that our tariff rates are still higher
and in the WTO context they are pressing us to bring down the higher
level tariffs faster with what they call non-linear tariff reduction.
Then, of course, there are the additional, the multiplicity of taxes
within India. So once it enters the country the interstate commerce
and levies and so on. Issues of information and transparency, but
there isn’t proper publication of information.
There are other issues of nomenclature; there are issues of
classification, import-licensing issues in some sectors still continue
for instance, in the automotive sector. Customs procedures – that
there are discriminatory valuation criteria, there are problems of
consistency in classification; there are extensive documentation
requirements. Again these are procedural regulatory kind of barriers.
I am not saying that this is only specific to India. We also face various
kinds of regulatory hurdles in those markets. But these are things
that, over time, with administrative streamlining would definitely help
in terms of expanding trade.
Some focus needs to be given to the following issues that impinge on
the legal terrain of the two countries.
Fertilizer subsidy regime: This is another issue raised by the US
regarding the preferential subsidy if you procure domestically as
opposed to getting through imports.
Standards and certification issues: Again there is discrimination
in terms of standards that are applied on foreign products.
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Sanitary and  phytosanitary standards or SPS issues: There is
the issue between India and the US regarding almonds exports, for
instance, from US to India because the application of sanitary and
phytosanitary standards and some of these are found to be not
consistent with what are existing international standards. India’s
concerns are again mainly non-tariff measures. There are some
estimates done recently which say that about 44% of our exports to
the US market are subject to non-tariff barriers. The US is a major
applicant of non-tariff barriers. If you look across developed countries
their tariffs especially on manufactured products are quite low while
in certain sectors like textiles and leather. But, on the other hand as
tariff protection has gone down, non-tariff barriers have definitely
gone up. Some of the main factors – especially in, agricultural and
agro products that are subject to non-tariff barriers and certain types
of manufactured products apply to South Asia as a whole. It is not
unique to India. It is an issue that has been raised by developing
countries. It is something that deters value addition, as well.
Repeatedly, these are going to become more and more important
over time as traditional forms of protection go down. For instance,
the contaminations issue in marine products regarding pesticide
residues which are subject to international testing are not specific to
the US but they apply in general to India’s exports to a variety of
developed markets.
Textiles: Standards on quality, use of ado dyes, for instance, Import
procedures, pharmaceutical registration requirements. These are of
course, major regulatory issues, which affect trade. Some examples,
specific to the US elucidate it further. Steel exports affected by
antidumping duties, shrimp exports affected by sanitary and
phytosanitary standards, antidumping duties, even environmental
clauses such as whether the excluded devices were used or not.
Textiles exports which have grown last year about 30% or so from
the Indian to the US market. But increasingly there are detentions
and there are delays because of security checks. There are all kinds
of labour-related, work place norms, environmental and safety norms,
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which have been applied. So these conditionalities lead to delay and
are hurdles in the expansion of trade relations. Mango exports have
the issue of fruit fly, for instance. Leather exports, again on sanitary
and phytosanitary norms. Another example regarding food products.
Again certification by Indian labs will have to be considered equivalent
to a lab there. Often India has to adopt the same kind of technology
like EU has in particular. So labeling and certification become major
problems unless you have institutional mechanisms to cover for those
costs, it is very difficult for small-scale manufacturers to try and
export.
Licensing, packages, public health security and bio-terrorism are other
major issues in the US post-September Eleven. For example, US
requires detailed tests of production areas for fruits and vegetables,
estimations of certified residue and  stipulates the exact method and
the technology that has to be applied. It has paved the way for a lot
of arbitrariness in the entire procedure, and a lack of transparency.
Often, if you look at the causes of detention, a large number of cases
just not explained why they are detained. These are the variety of
reasons why. Now the problem in some of these kinds of barriers to
trade is that countries do have autonomy to impose their standards.
But then do they impose it in a manner, which is non-discriminatory
and did not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade. These are going
to be the difficult issues to negotiate bilaterally as well as
multilaterally.
From the US side, in services, the main issue is customs barriers. If
you look at the bilateral nature of trade, US wants to access our
markets through movement of capital through commercial presence,
we want to access the market mainly through movement of people
and now increasingly through offshore.
In some of the sectors, the US wants us to move much faster, for
instance, in insurance, banking. If you look at the banking there they
feel there are too many restrictive conditions on the nature of
commercial presence they want banking presence to be there in
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multiple modes at the same time not through only ATMs and wholly
owned subsidies and so-called branches. In accountancy, there has
been a major issue regarding the setting up of foreign account firms
in the country. They want other conditions also addressed. Foreign
mail usage, you know, whether we can do auditing, financial auditing.
Foreign accountants to be equity partners: In the legal services
area they want foreign law firms to be established here. This is very
much resisted by the Bar Council of India. In telecom they want
even faster liberalization, higher equity leading to 100%, actually it is
very reflective if you look at the service sector negotiations and you
see what the US has been requesting from India. They have been
tracking our liberalisation trends very carefully and they are interested
in asking us to pre-commit to further and further levels of FDI
utilization. In most of the cases they are asking for seventy-five
percent or 100% opening up which is what we are gradually
autonomously opening up towards, in some of the key sectors. It
maybe noted that they are already required in the WTO context. In
fact, what they are asking for- that if you open up in terms of FDI
we open up- we may perhaps give you more access in terms of
movement of people. So there is a quid pro quo kind of negotiating
tactic going on. In retailing again. There has been a series of
discussions in this area. Recently we have announced 51% opening
up and even perhaps liberalizing further. This is another major area,
which they have been pressuring in terms of movement of capital.
If one were to summarize what are the issues between he US and
India, it is really about stringent, non-transparent regulations and
procedures. They want a secure and legal framework. They find the
processes in our courts too slow. That affects the repeat investment
from their country. Anti-competitive practices, slow bureaucracy,
government, institutional, judicial issues become very important. For
us it is really the movement of people and recently in response to the
backlash to outsourcing some of the issues regarding the ban on
government outsourcing and its possible spillover in the private
domain. So the issues really are immigrations-related barriers. This
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discretion that the US keeps on applying in terms of raising and
lowering H1B quotas from 65 to 150 and 195 and then bringing it
down - NASSCOM, in particular, has been particularly lobbying for
more certainty in terms of the immigration regime. In fact, we have
been arguing in the WTO negotiations that H1B is not the way to
give market access for temporary movement of service providers
because H1B is something that can eventually be used for permanent
residence and nationality change. So we should have a completely
different kind of visa which allows companies to send people over
fast, independent professionals to move fast, contractual service
suppliers and we have a particular proposal for that a movement of
people but the main target market is the United States. The US
unfortunately, because of security concerns, is not heeding that
proposal for the time being. But, for demographic reasons, in future
perhaps there will be some shift in that direction. The other issues
are really again reach parity issues requiring people of similar case
to be paid exactly at par. Normally the displacement conditions in
certain sectors. Mutual recognition and so on.  So the procedural and
again the discriminatory aspects, the non-transparent aspects of visa
denials, the clearance procedure and so on, which is what India has
raised.
Economic Needs Test: The fact that in certain sectors you can’t
go unless you meet certain economic means criteria. That is not
very clear. What criteria are applied? How do they translate into
numbers that are going to be allowed for entry? Again regulatory
issues.
Recognition: We don’t have mutual recognition agreement in
professions like health, accountancy, and legal with the United States.
Again, there is a national level issue, and then there are sub-federal
level issues. So in different states you may have different conditions.
You many need to a resident in that state. You may need to set up a
firm in order to be able to practice. It is very difficult because these
kinds of jurisdictional issues have to be discussed bilaterally. How
well one can get around this problem of recertification of our
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professionals to be able to practice there. India has been pushing
very hard for discipline on qualification and licensing procedures
under the WTO negotiations so that there is more transparency, more
consistency across countries.
The issue of outsourcing in particular which raised a lot of concern
with the government’s outsourcing ban and India was afraid that this
might spill over into private outsourcing, though for the time being
there doesn’t seem to be any such issue. Government procurement
is another area that has been raised by the United States that they
are preferential; towards domestic producers they favour Indian public
sector enterprises. The judicial system and enforcement issues
because of – especially ITI-related violations.
Antidumping: This is something that on both sides they are both
major users of antidumping. China, of course, is one of the biggest
recipients of antidumping action, but this is something one has to be
discipline much more in future. India wants informal curbs on the
use of antidumping measures. Within the WTO we have divergences,
definitely. In agriculture, because the US wants us to bring down
agricultural tariff, we want them to bring down the export subsidies.
In industrial products, again, divergent positions. We have been raising
the issue of the small scale sector sensitivities and employment
displacement. The US is asking India as a big developing country
to bring down the industrial tariffs faster- with some sensitivities
for special sectors. In IPRs we can see some convergence because
of our larger pharmaceutical companies but there are largely divergent
positions especially in the TRIPS, public health and the bio-diversity
area.
Services sector: There are divergence and convergence because
we both have an aggressive agenda in services. So, as far as the
modalities of negotiation are concerned, the two countries are coming
towards the same kind of approach. Both of us want very fast
negotiations in services through unilateral discussions in services so
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that a critical mass of countries can move through negotiations faster.
As far as other issues are concerned especially on movement of
people India has asked for the service provider visa which
unfortunately is not going anywhere right now but it has a very bold
set of proposals regarding service provider professionals. The US
has not made any change in its offer at so far in the negotiations.
The EU, interestingly, has. There is tremendous scope for expanded
trade. But there remain a lot of regulatory and other institutional
barriers. As far as India is concerned there are the more conventional
kind of barriers, I would say, investment restrictions, high tariffs and
transparency issues. But on the US side they are really non-tariff
barriers and movement of people related barriers. Finally I would
add that if India really has to exploit the full potential to go for a FTA,
a lot of the usual domestic constraints that we talk about in India
regarding infrastructure, labour laws and so on would also have to
be addressed. There is no way you can realize the potential without
that. Thank you.
Prof. T. Ramakrishna – Comparative Analysis of Indo-US Legal
Frameworks with Special Emphasis on IPR
 Honourable Chairperson, distinguished delegates, I will be just going
through the synergies and the divergences between the IPR legislations
in US as well as India. I will perhaps just skip the first few slides.
The US has the constitutional mandate for protecting Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR). Article 1, clause 8, section 8 has clearly
indicated that the objective here is “to promote the progress of science
and useful arts and for that purpose secure for limited times to authors
and inventors exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”
The role of IPRs in the global economy is well understood by all of
us and therefore I will just quickly run through these slides. The US
has realized that the economic product of US is conceptual. A similar
trend will be seen in India as well as China. IPRs capture these
intellectual assets and have been creating powerful incentives for
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innovation. They permit the recouping of R&D investments through
exclusive rights being granted for a limited time. Revenue generation
comes through technology licensing. If you just look at the US it
generates $45 billion annually through technology licensing.
Worldwide technology licensing may generate $100 million annually.
Looking at the US patents obtained by Indian assignees from 1995
till 2005, you find a steady increase in the number of patents except
for 2004, when there was a slight dip. However, if you just look at
the Indian patents granted to Indian applicants the figures here indicate
that applicants who obtained patents in India have also obtained
patents in other jurisdictions. One major jurisdiction is the US and
amongst these the CSIR ranks first. It has the largest share of all
patents granted to Indian assignees by the US.
You can just have a quick look at the differences between patent laws
in the US and India. As regards patentable subject matter, there are
inclusions and exclusions. As far as inclusions are concerned, anything
that has a human hand shall become a patentable subject matter.
Anything under the sun, which has a human hand, can be patented
particularly in the US. As a consequence we find right from the oil-
eating bacteria of Chakravarti up to the State Street Bank case, various
inventions have been patented including the business method. As far
as exclusions are concerned there are very broad exclusions. Abstract
ideas, physical phenomena and the products of nature are excluded
from patentability.
However, when we come to India, you find patentable subject matter
defined more in terms of product and process patents. However,
products for food, medicines and drugs became patentable after 2005.
As far as exclusions are concerned in section 3, we have a very long
list of exclusions, keeping in mind our economic, socioeconomic and
cultural aspects. Inventions that are contrary to public order are
excluded. Administrative arrangements are excluded. Medical
procedures would be completely outside the purview of protection.
Derivatives of known substances, unless significantly different in
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efficacy, are outside the purview of protection. Plants and animals,
except microorganisms are still outside protection. Business methods
are not patentable. We have added here that particular products that
are traditional knowledge are also outside the purview of patent law.
Mr. Tarun Das was referring to the disclosure requirement regarding
sources of materials in patent applications. India has been pushing
for full disclosure on sources of materials. This is a bone of contention
in WTO. India is insisting on inclusion of this particular requirement
under the Patent Law itself, whereas the US has been consistently
opposing it. I don’t know will happen. When I last interacted with
the representatives from US Industry they had not changed their views.
That is the impression I got in a direct dialogue with them. Well this
is as far as patentability criteria are concerned.
Even on utility and novelty we have certain specific differences. For
example, the US guidelines on “specific substantial and credible
utility” are more difficult to interpret especially in biotechnology
inventions. We have a clearer focus on industrial applications.
When it comes to a question of novelty the US has a twelve-month
grace period during which a product can be on sale (“on sale bar”)
before the patent can be filed. The US also gives a twelve-month
grace period for filing patents after publication. Early conception of
the invention also gets priority in the US. On utility, as far as India is
concerned, if you just satisfy the industrial application criteria it would
be sufficient. We don’t have the grace period for “on sale bar”- which
means that if a product is on sale it cannot be patented. Similarly the
grace period for publication is limited to scientific publication and not
all publications. Early conception has no value unless you file. In
India we follow the “first-to-file system”.
As for as ‘non-obviousness’ is concerned we recently made certain
specific changes Whereas US Patent Law considers economic
considerations as of secondary importance, we have given it primary
significance after the 2005 amendment that broadens the threshold
of non-obviousness in deciding on patentability.
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As far as the procedure is concerned we have certain specific
differences, which would affect the cost of litigation and not just the
quality of the patent. Interference proceedings that deal with identical
or similar inventions by two different parties are in place in the US
whereas we don’t have such interference proceedings. Re-
examination and re-issue procedures are in place in the US. We do
not have that. The US does not have opposition proceedings but we
have both pre-grant and post-grant opposition proceedings.
When it comes to a question of infringement we do not have a sufficient
body of jurisprudence knowledge that has been developed in India.
In the US, “claims construction”, the application of the “doctrine of
equivalence” and “prosecution history estopel” determines
infringement of patents. In India, we do not have case laws. We have
also not accepted “prosecution history estopel.”
There are also differences in how the two countries provide defences
for dealing with infringement actions. In the US inequitable conduct
(not disclosing material information relevant to the grant of the patent),
patent misuse and research exemptions (for drug approval,
philosophical use or idle curiosity) are defences that can be used
against infringement actions. In India too inequitable conduct is a
ground for revocation of the patent. No patent misuse provisions are
available in India. As far as research exemptions are concerned, the
drug approval exemption is broader in India than in the US. General
research exclusions are also available for research and for education.
Therefore research exemptions in India are broader in scope in
comparison to the US. This is also in the interest of our own industry.
US industry and US academia have several concerns on Indian
Patent Law. Mr. Tarun Das referred to this also. We in India have to
look at the social costs of the strengthened patent regime when we
confer patent rights. How do we deal with the social costs?
Compulsory licensing in case of a failure to work the patent is one
provision that is available. We have this new clause - Section 92 (A)
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– according to which an Indian company can get a compulsory license
for manufacturing and exporting drugs to address public health
problems to countries without manufacturing capacity. This is in
consonance with Para 6 of the Doha framework dealing with drug
exports to countries without manufacturing capacity. This is a matter
of concern to the US.
The US industry and academia also have concerns about the last
item shown on this slide. Under the Indian Patent Act generic producers
of new drugs (mailbox applications) can continue to produce these
drugs and only need to pay reasonable royalties to the patent holders
of these drugs.
There have also been several occasions where changes to US Patent
Law have been influenced by earlier Indian legislation. The Patent
Reforms Act of 2005 is a Bill introduced in the US House of
Representatives on June 8th 2005. The proponents of the proposed
changes have been high technology (IT) companies. They have
suggested several changes. These include changes in “first inventor
to file”, changes in the definition of “priority”, elimination of the
“best mode” requirements, elimination of the 18-month publication
exception and allowing assignees to file patents without the signatures
of the inventors. These are some of the major changes that have been
suggested to US Law.
If you just go back two or three years, India had also suggested
these changes because of the enormous cost of filing infringement
suits and also because of the quality of patents. Priority of invention
would no longer be determined by reference to the invention date
but rather by the date of filing. Novelty would be destroyed by 3
categories of events. If the invention is made known to the public by
the inventor 1 year before the filing date, or if the invention is made
known to the public by a 3rd party anytime before the filing or if the
invention is in a patent issued or filed by another inventor, novelty
would be destroyed.
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There are also 3 categories of limitations to “prior art”. The proposed
definition of “publicly known” to what is “reasonably and effectively
accessible” is somehow going to limit the scope of “prior art”. The
elimination of the “best mode” provision removes some subjective
issues from litigation and is aimed at international harmonization.
Ask and consent assignee filing is another change being proposed.
Under this, proposed assignees can file regardless of the inventor’s
amenability. This change reduces the formalities. They have also
proposed a post-grant opposition system. It would allow anyone to
challenge the patent itself without going through a litigation process.
A nine-month window following patent grant is there for opposing a
patent. As of now the complete burden (including litigation) is imposed
on the opposer. Grounds on which opposition can be filed include all
issues of invalidity (utility, novelty, statutory bars, non-obviousness,
sufficiency of disclosure etc.). These are all the grounds on which
opposition can be filed. These changes to US patent law may bring
their system more in tune with our Indian system. The USPTO decision
on the challenge to the patent is supposed to be taken within
one year.
As we can see this draft Bill is being discussed by the US House
Judiciary’s Committee’s Sub-committee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property.
Let us now take a very quick look at Copyright Law. As far as the
subject matter is concerned, we find it is very broadly and clearly
defined in US law as original works of authorship that is fixed in any
tangible means of expression covering a variety of creative works.
Indian copyright law covers original literary, dramatic, musical and
artistic works. Sound recordings and cinematographic works are also
covered.
As far as “fair use” doctrine is concerned we find that specific
guidelines have been laid down by judicial interpretations in the form
of a “cumulative effect test”. The purpose and character of the use
of the material, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
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substantiality of the portion used and the effect of the use on potential
market or value of the copyrighted work are the factors taken into
account in applying the “cumulative effect test”. As far as India is
concerned we do not have specific tests but purposes under which it
could be considered as “fair dealing” are indicated.
With regard to Digital Rights the US has the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). It refers to Internet-related issues. Since
the US is a member of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), it has come
out with this particular DMCA covering a wide range of rights for
the Copyright holder as well as the Digital Rights holder on the
Internet. We do not have any similar parallel Act in our country since
we are not parties to the WCT or the WPPT.
There are some differences in the duration of the copyright as we can
from this slide. I shall skip this since it is not necessary.
I shall touch briefly on Trademark Law. The Indian Trademark Law
perhaps is quite effective in safeguarding US interests and US Law
is also quite capable of protecting our interests.
As far as Integrated Circuit is concerned there are no substantial
differences that we find between the two legislations. Since India is
also emerging as a producer of integrated circuits we thought we
would like to have this legislation in place. The register has already
come into existence.
I will close after looking at one final aspect. Protection of confidential
data provided for gaining market approval is an issue that the US
has been raising quite often. A TRIP (under section 7 Article 39) has
mandated that such protection be provided. We do not have a separate
legislation for general data protection in our country. We find that
the US has the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (covering personal financial
data) and the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act that
covers personal health information. The US has protected clinical
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data since 1984. One of the concerns of the US is that India should
grant such a protection. We do not have any distinct protection for
clinical data in our country - no legislation whatsoever.
Well, IPR is an area where Indian and American interests intersect.
Hence harmonization and effective enforcement to ensure a strong
foundation in the lasting economic and political partnership between
the two countries is the need of the hour. Thank you very much for
your kind attention.
Chair: Thank you, Professor Ramakrishna. Now we have Professor
M.J.Vinod from the Department of Political Science Bangalore
University to summarise and initiate discussions.
Discussant - Prof M.J.Vinod
Mr. Chairman, all of you will agree with me that we had three very
interesting and useful presentations. There are a few issues that I
think can be raised and this perhaps can be further elaborated in the
discussions. One could look at certain broader issues that have been
raised in all the three papers, particularly, focusing on the theme of
the session viz., IPRs and WTO.
One issue that has been coming up repeatedly is the whole question
of ‘what can be patented’ and ‘what cannot be patented.’ Professor
Ramakrishna raised this issue in his presentation itself. I think it is
also necessary to look into the whole problem of proliferation of
applications for patents and the fact that it could also lead to a situation
where we have all types of frivolous claims being made. Even in the
US there is a report of the US Federal Trade commission, which
says that almost a hundred applications are filed everyday. This could
be a future possibility in India as well.
Coming to the question of the Patent Amendment Act 2005, some
substantial changes have been made in terms of India’s commitments
in keeping with the WTO requirements. I think a few problems can
surface here. One is the question of the extent to which the introduction
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of the ‘product’ patent in India as of January 1st 2005 could perhaps
result in creating spurious monopolies for commodities or products
which are basically in the realm of day- to- day use by the citizens of
our country, and what type of implications it could have. Mr. Tarun
Das raised the question of the commonalities or the convergences
between India and the United States when it comes down to patents -
he has provided us a new rationale to seriously ponder over. Perhaps
we should look in the direction of strengthening the patent regime in
India. While we do this, we also cannot be blind to certain concerns.
One of those concerns, I think, is the question of ‘compulsory
licensing’, and the ‘procedures’ that we could think of in terms of
compulsory licensing. We need to look into these areas, and make
them more understandable from the point of view of the common
man and thereby enhance its effectiveness. Moreover, the procedures
tend to be rather ambiguous. Hence the need for greater clarity about
these procedures. This needs to be pursued within a reasonable time
frame.
Professor Chanda raised issues pertaining to the divergent views
India and the United States have about public health. This is indeed
an extremely important issue as well as an area of concern. There is
a certain anxiety today about the impact of the Patent Amendment
Act 2005 on drug prices in India as well as the availability of some of
these drugs. Of course, going by the technicalities, the drugs
introduced between 1995 and 2005 will not be affected to the extent
that royalty would have to be paid by the drug manufacturers. But
the problem is one where at this stage we have no idea about what
constitutes a ‘reasonable’ royalty and ‘what is not a reasonable’
royalty. As far as the old generic problem is concerned, perhaps we
need to look into the old drugs, which are not affected by the act. Yet
the rate of obsolescence of the old drugs, I think, is very fast and this
would have its own impact on the public health institutions and
arrangements that we have within our country. So Indian
pharmaceutical companies could lose the opportunity to develop
processes for drugs that are patented. Now, the fact is that we will
have to go through the process of compulsory licensing to actually
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manufacture these drugs within our country. So, the main catch here
- I don’t know whether I should use the word ‘catch’- is that the
drugs which will not be patented, are those that do not already exist
in the market. I think there is a major challenge that we face on that
front both for the present and as far as the future is concerned.
In terms of the US domestic laws, I just have a few comments to
make before I wind up. Professor Ramakrishna did refer to the
comparative basis of the Indian and the United States domestic laws.
He gave us a very broad, sweeping understanding of it. There are a
few issues that I would like to raise. One is that the various Acts
passed by the US Congress from time- to- time, especially since 1980
- culminating with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, have probably to be corroborated with various judgments of
the United States Supreme Court and only then, I think we could
understand them in a holistic sense. That is something that we have
to do constantly to really understand the effectiveness of these domestic
Acts. The second point I would like to make is regarding the Common
Law System that exists in the United States and the impact this has
had on the patent laws that have been passed by the US Congress or
the judgments of the US Supreme Court. Again I would urge our
attention on this issue. Moreover, there is the distinction that is made
between the ‘product of nature’ and the ‘product of man’ in the US
perspective. Hence from the US perspective anything under the sun
that is made by man can be patented. In this respect the two countries
have differences over what ‘we have’ and ‘what will come into place
in the future.’
We also need to grapple with the notion of utility and the question of
applying these concepts to the Indian perception of inventions and
discoveries. This is where I think, there are certain issues that we
need to look into, viz., how the Americans look at the ‘cost of
invention’, how they look at the ‘cost of discoveries.’ Differences
can be brought out in terms of the European experience too vis-à-vis
the American experience. The Indian experience perhaps is slightly
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different in terms of what we consider as an invention and what we
consider as a discovery, and the type of impact it has in terms of the
responses we come up with, in keeping with the requirements of the
WTO as far TRIPS is concerned.
In a nutshell I think we have had three very good presentations. But,
the fact is that the patent laws/perceptions have evolved over the
years. In spite of the WTO conditionalities, ‘patents’ may not be
perceived as an ‘absolutist concept’. The entire debate over patents
has reflected particular national interests, traditions, cultures and
belief systems. It has also reflected differing levels and stages of
techno-economic development on the ground. Therefore, there are
still many grey areas to be investigated in spite of India agreeing to
the conditionalities of the WTO as far as TRIPS is concerned. My
ultimate question is can we consider the Indian Patent Amendment
Act 2005 as an ‘absolutist’ law? Thank you.
Chair: After the excellent summing up by Professor Vinod, I have
very little to say but I wish to make only two observations. Shri
Tarun Das and Professor Ramakrishna spoke about TRIPS,
harmonization of intellectual property rights, so on. Professor Rupa
Chanda raised some of the non-tariff barriers, which have been
hindering the promotion of trade between India and the United States
Harmonisation of IPR has been taking place over a period of time.
TRIPS is a major example for that. But this harmonization is taking
place as per the US model. That is probably something inevitable,
after all, these powerful people call the shots in nationally and
internationally. The concerns of developing countries are that these
are some of their vital interests that have to be taken note of. For
example, Ramakrishna raised the issue of protecting the traditional
knowledge disclosure requirement of prior information which have
been obtained from other sources by the patent applicant and so on.
 As far as non-tariff barriers which have been constraining Indo-US
trade are concerned, the World Trade Organisation provides a
mechanism for that. After all, when we speak about technical barriers
to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures etc. it is well understood
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that every state has the right to protect its vital national interest. But
this protection of vital interest should not be turned into protectionism.
WTO provides for some kind of dispute settlement mechanism. Again,
of course, this has been very extensively used, but the problem has
been from the United States side to some extent in the sense that the
United States does not really – no – there have been occasions when
the United States sought to defy the rulings of the World Trade
Organisation. Of course, it is for other countries really, developing
countries, European countries, I mean other developed countries to
join together to strengthen the World Trade Organisation mechanism.
With this now I will open for questions and answers.
Question: One of the recent industrial accidents, which occurred in
Bhopal, revealed the tardiness with which claims and compensations
for the affected families were actually disbursed. I wonder what is
likely to happen in terms of the US legal system in terms of corporate
accountability. You know, it is such a great word. But when it comes
down to overseas operations of such companies like Union Carbide
in the past and I hope it is not repeated in the future. What are the
safeguards available, legal or otherwise, to protect the interests of
populations which are devastated. You know, a few thousand people
died there. Thank you.
Chair: Well. I am afraid whether the question is covered by any of
the presentations made so far. As far as this particular Bhopal issue
is concerned, the United States rescinded jurisdiction over this Union
Carbide but it found that Indian courts are better suited to try the
case. I think that this issue has not been really covered by any of the
presentations.
Question: I would like the Chairman to tell us as to what is the
degree of interface between institutions like the National Law School
and our Ministries of Commerce and Trade, particularly when it comes
to fine-tuning our own responses to some of the complex issues at
the WTO. In fact that is an issue which you are the right person to
tell us something about that.
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Chair: I think there has been quite a bit of collaboration between the
governmental departments and academic institutions. Government
wants academic institutions to provide some kind of research inputs
for various policy decisions, which they have to take. There is a
greater awareness on the part of the government. But we are still not
out of the groove of the past.
First of all there are two questions here, whether academic institutions
are rising up to the expectations of the government. Lots of things
have to be improved upon in our academic infrastructure as well, to
make the research more focused upon the practical problems and
come up with the proper solutions. There is also a mindset that the
government knows everything and not much is required from outside.
Lots of things have to be improved from both the sides.
Prof. Rupa Chanda: I think that the government is changing its
attitude quite a bit. I am part of the Expert Group on services with
the Ministry of Commerce and we have extremely interactive
discussions. At least that part of the Ministry of Commerce has been
taking all kinds of stakeholders on board in different sectors. For
instance, the work I did on the movement of people became our
position paper at the WTO and that is now the basic paper which is
being used for a coalition of countries that have an interest in this
issue. Similarly there are other academics that are working on the
off shoring issues. There has been a tremendous involvement by
them. Next week, for instance, there is a meeting with the Ministry
of Health on this whole health services issue, medical tourism, the
movement of nurses, because of the nurses’ shortage in developed
countries. So they are taking us on board. Similarly, even at the WTO
ministerial there is for instance, there were academics they’re as
part of the thing. So it is improving. I wouldn’t say how it used to be
that government knows best and academics don’t know anything
know It is also for the academics to get actively involved in public
policy issues.
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Question: This is a question to you, Professor Chanda. It is an
issue which Dr. Siddhartha and I have discussed with various people,
concerning security. As foreign companies increase the proportion of
investment they make in this country or set up industries here, when
they make products which are of interest to, let us say, the Indian
Armed Services or generally of national strategic interest, it looks as
if there is no legal regime in India, whereby products that they make
in India on our soil can, when necessary, be used by our defence
services. That is to say, somebody sets up an industry here make
something and say,” No, I can’t give it to you because US Law does
not permit me to give you what I am making here”. I am sure Dr.
Siddhartha can put it in much more precise way than I can. I may be
right or wrong, Dr. Siddhartha. What is the legal position? Why is it
that in our Companies Act these issues are not considered more
seriously? I mean, if I can’t buy a valve made by a sophisticated
company set up here, on my aircraft, shouldn’t I have the right to
say, “No, Sorry, you can’t make it here. Or you must actually by law
supply it to me and I will pay you what the price is”.
Chair: Are you saying that Government of India cannot buy a product
made in India? This is something strange to me. What is my right?
If it is open to any private person, why can’t government buy it? Or
government can procure it through some private party.
Question:  It is an American company which is making something.
Chair: No, no. American companies making something for sale in
India or outside India. Is it not? I mean, they can’t be sold within
India. Is that what you are saying?
Question: That is precisely the point. It seems to me that there is a
blind spot in the Indian Companies Act about goods, commodities,
systems that are actually required by the security industries in the
country. Part of the reason must be that for a long time we have had
no private sector doing this at all. It was only the public sector industry.
So the Companies Act doesn’t even consider this possibility. But
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then in the case of, for example, if you wanted to buy a Moog valve,
they won’t sell it to you. It’s made here, in this country.
Answer: (Dr. V. Siddhartha) While it is unfortunately true that you
cannot buy. Recently in one of the joint ventures which the DRDO
set up with a foreign company they put that clause in because it
doesn’t exist in India that the technology which comes from abroad
but gets manufactured in India can be sold specifically the Indian
Armed Forces. This was specially put otherwise it doesn’t exist.
Our Company Law does not have this in general terms, only as a
part of your agreement that you make for one particular system. We
can have corresponding legislation to prevent this from happening.
The way we do that is to simply copy US legislation .The US has
legislation called the External Foreign Provisions. The External
Foreign Provisions will point to that which is illegal for any person
operating in the United States to impose any conditions at all on any
person in the United States with regard to the end use of those
commodities or products which are made inside the United States
regardless of the source of technology. The US, Britain, Canada,
right across the border, they have what are known as Extraterritorial
Measures Preventions Acts, which prevent foreign companies
because of the external foreign provisions. If you impose such
conditions, we are allowed to do one of three things. Starting from
shutting you down, throw you out, etc. It is a long list of things and
prevents you from accessing our markets on products unconnected
with what you are making in this country. In other words, similar to
what, for example, the United States says and has said in the past,
“If you don’t accept our textiles, we will prevent the import of
pickles”. We can do the same thing. Now, cross-sectoral sanctions.
It is up to us to read every comma, full stop, semicolon, start drafting
the thing, presenting it to the United States and saying, “Now, you
tell me how is this different from what you yourself are doing”. If
you don’t do that and if you are lazy, you must expect all of this that
is happening.
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Question: Sir, I have a point. In December you find an IPR
agreement, which relates to defence products with Russia. That,
essentially, is to put a certain amount of constraint on your freedom
to exploit even for your own requirement in terms of upgrade or
exploitation and further development etc. without paying substantially
to the original designer of the product. Now this IPR can become a
significant barrier in the Indo-US relation in terms of our ability to
access technology as well as to exploit it in our own way for further
development. So what kind of a mechanism or what kind of a solution
are we looking at?
Chair: Have specific restrictions as you have indicated have been
imposed?
Question: I must also add that fundamentally major military products,
critical products are not patented, for very obvious reasons.
Question: I am just coming up with a related question. i.e. When
there is outsourcing of R&D either relocation of R&D facility by a
majority multinational owned lab to India or outsourcing from a
multinational to an Indian company to develop a certain product,
what is the patent provision which applies, what happens to the
individual inventor i.e. the person or persons who actually developed
the product, do they have a patent right to that? It has a big economic
impact because of further diffusion, further entrepreneurship -
somebody who has worked in a lab, Indian or MNC lab is developing,
doing R&D for outsource R&D, then that person can spin off and
become an entrepreneur and set up his own company, if he has
some IPR rights in what he has done. If he does not, then it affects
the spread of technology within India. So between the company and
the individual who works in that lab, whether it is an Indian or an
MNC-owned lab, what is the intellectual property right of the
individual?
Answer: I shall take up the second question first and then move on
to the first one. As regards the off shoring of activity or outsourcing
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of activities to the Indian countries are concerned there are two or
three specific issues that have come up, what is the kind of contractual
arrangement that has happened between the two entities- is one major
factor which determines the extent of use of IPRs. If I can just narrate
a specific instance that has happened in Bangalore itself. One of the
biotech companies, which is a contract research organization, which
has been working on specific product in India, which is completely
outsourced by the American company, the Indian scientists are
working on it, but the contractual arrangement explicitly indicates
that any IPR generated in the course of the experiment in India shall
be assigned completely to the sponsor company. At the time of contract
they have signed the particular agreement and automatically you find
that by virtue of the contract the IPR would belong to the sponsor
company. This is what has been happening. However, we find a
general trend in these companies, these days that as the research
activities on specific products gets over, those informations have been
utilized plus they come out with a new proposal, develop a new product
and in the course of developing new product they have developed
their own IPR strategies to ensure that the company in India would
retain the IPRs.
Chair: Well thanks; time allocated for this session is over. So, hence
the session is closed. Whatever questions you have, speakers are
available. You can contact them later.
Summary of the session
Trade between India and the US is currently at about $ 40 billion - $
25 billion in products and $15 billion in services. Trade is growing
and India is seen as a major destination for US investment. The
balance of trade is currently in India’s favour. Higher tariff protection
by India is also seen as a problem by the US.
India is emerging as an important player not only in IT but also in
other areas like drugs, and auto components. Opportunities in the
US health care industry currently worth about $ 1.5 trillion could be
the next big market. There are many areas including nuclear power
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in which India can emerge as a big player. India is becoming
increasingly important to the US.
One of the current issues engaging the attention of both sides is the
movement of people between India and the US. Visa quotas and
security driven rules of the post 9/11 world could become barriers.
There continue to be problems between India and the US with some
provisions of the TRIPS arrangements. These have to do with rules
of licensing of drugs during epidemics and issues related to protecting
bio-diversity. Improvements in Indian internal processes and greater
transparency in rules and procedures are seen as important by the
US. Labour laws in India could also become a constraint for greater
trade. In the larger context of the relationship these are relatively
minor blimps. However, there is a need for India to improve the
efficiency of its legal system.
Prof. Vijayalakshmi: Thank you all very much. I want to thank all
of you for making this a great success. I know I am the villain of this
piece, but we do have a small change in the programme. We are
wrapping up right now and that won’t take many minutes. I think in
a few minutes we are trying to conclude this workshop because
there have been requests on popular demand that they have to leave
and so we want to thank all of the panelists and the Chair for being
so gracious in allowing a very good discussion. I think it has been an
excellent idea to have this session because it has really followed
both technical and the details of intricacies of judicial systems and so
on. So what we were looking for in some way has been realized.
We shall just take a couple of minutes to recap for all of you and for
us really to, as organizers of this workshop, this has been very sobering
I must say this last couple of days We have had some extraordinary
elements creeping in - foundational elements - of new strategic
thinking on Indo-US relations. I am not talking about the lack of
strategic culture alluded to by people but I am saying there was a
foundational element here and that was the aim of this workshop
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and it will be pursued continuously. We have also gone some distance
in covering or uncovering the black box that has accompanied
discussions on Indo-US relations. The multidimensional approach
we thought would work has been vindicated by the proceedings of
this workshop. I think it has worked, because we have been enriched
by the depth and scope of the discussions. Though they look as if
they are very specific issue areas but they actually have had some
tremendous connectivity that we can see and established. We also
have found that there is tremendous scope for Indo-US relations to
expand. But the walk that we have to walk from the ground reality
to its potential is going to be the tough road which requires serious
strategic thinking. Even more importantly what we discovered is the
need to have strategic decision making. We look to all of you for
continued support because this is an initiative that we just began and
we are hoping for ripple effect from this workshop. We are hoping
that this will act as a force multiplier – and we will bring out a more
strategic decision making in this country and establish a more
integrated approach to the very complex landscape of Indo-US
relations in the years to come. What was the history is quite clear
but now, I think, there have been so many new dimensions and the
matrix is not two-dimensional any more. We have a very quick word
of appreciation from Mr. Arvind Kumar who will propose a vote of
thanks individually to all of you and thank you all very much for
making this workshop go some way in what we hoped would be a
great dialogue, nationally – let me also say that we hope to bring out
a report, so any writings of yours that you would like to send to us,
we would be very happy to include. Thank you all very, very much
and I just hope to see you all again.
Vote of Thanks - Arvind Kumar: On behalf of the Director and
the Faculty of this Institute and the organizing team of this national
workshop on Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations, I have a
pleasant task to propose a vote of thanks to each one of you. Let me
at the outset thank Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Chairman of Task Force
on Global Strategic Developments and all the members of the Task
Force, Dr. Tarun Das, Professor Rama Rao, Air Marshal Patney,
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Commodore Bhaskar, Professor Ananth for taking time off from
their schedules and participating in this workshop. I thank all the
Chairs, Speakers, Discussants and the Rapporteurs for their
participation. This workshop was a great success because of all
these contributions. I particularly thank Ambassador Lalit Mansingh,
Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Shri Vijay Nambiar, Dr. Lawrence
Prabhakar, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, Professor Manoj Pant,
Dr. Sridharan, Admiral Jacob, Professor Samraj, Major General
Dipankar Banerjee, Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy, Professor
Rao, Professor Narasimha, Dr. Siddhartha, Dr. Banerjee, Professor
Jayagovind, Professor Tarun Das, Professor Rupa Chanda,
Professor T. Ramakrishna and Professor Vinod for their useful and
important insights without which this workshop would not have
achieved the articulated objectives. I also take this opportunity to
thank Ambassador Venkateswaran, Ambassador Nazareth,
Ambassador Krishnan, Ambassador Ranganathan and Ambassador
Khaleeli for their participation at this workshop. I thank all the invitees
Dr. Santhanam, Dr. Ramchand, Dr. N. Prabhakar, Dr. Anuradha
Reddy for sparing time out of their schedules and made this function
a great success. This workshop would not have been possible without
the generous support from ISRO. I thank ISRO and more particularly
Shri Madhavan Nair for taking time out of his hectic schedule and
chairing yesterday’s evening talk. I also would like to make a special
mention of participation from ISRO scientific community, Dr. Rajeev
Lochan, Dr. Sridharamurthy, Dr. Ninan, Dr. Sundaramaiah, Dr. S.
Satish, Dr. Gopalakrishnan for their paticipation. I also would like to
make a special mention of Shri Krishnamurthy and Shri Guru Prasad
for helping us in managing the media. I also would like to thank our
administrative staff Captain Joseph, Sriram, Miss Lalitha, Srinivas
Aithal, Miss Girija, Miss Gayathri and Mr. Sasidharan who has been
sitting here since yesterday helping us arrange the logistics  inside
the auditorium. I like to make a mention of our Dean Prof. Rajagopal,
who never said no to anything and was always behind us and readily
agreed to support all our endeavours in the planning and organization
of this workshop. Once again I thank each one of you for making
this workshop a grand success. Thank you.
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Observations and Policy Implications
We can conceptualise the relationship between India and the US as a
set of interdependent and linked forces along the five dimensions that
are the major themes of the Workshop. These dependencies and the
relative strength of the forces shaping the relationship can be
conceptualized as a network of relationships with each of the nodes
representing a particular force. Figure 1 is a conceptual representation
of the current state of Indo-US relations.
Figure 1 shows that the economic and legal nodes and the link between
them has moved away from a bilateral Indo-US focus towards a
multi-lateral WTO mode of working. Bi-lateral economic and trade
relations can therefore be viewed as a subset of the larger emerging
global trade regime.
With a significant decline in direct US aid to India this has meant that
trade and economic relations have not suffered because of negatives
in bilateral geo-political or strategic relations. Legal regimes for

































trade compulsions rather than by bilateral Indo-US geo-political
relationships.
The dynamic growth exhibited by some export driven sectors of the
Indian economy, has also created a strong pro-India lobby in the US.
While the current interests of this lobby may be largely economic it
can and will emerge as a significant force that can serve as a counter
to any future downturns in political or strategic relations between the
two countries.
One could expect this lobby to proactively change the contours of
other dimensions of the relationship so as to see a greater convergence
of US interests with Indian interests.
In contrast to the economic and legal nodes, the political, military
and strategic technology nodes are largely driven by bilateral
government-to-government level interventions.
These nodes of the relationship form a closed dynamic loop that has
operated relatively independent of the economic and legal loop.
Though sanctions and control regimes (dual use items, MTCR, NSG)
also affect the economic and legal nodes, their impact on commercial
trade is relatively small in the larger context of trade between the
countries.
The formal and informal sanction regimes in high technology trade
and transfer have however affected potential opportunities for
cooperation both in the military and high technology areas like space
and nuclear energy. They have also clouded perceptions and influenced
the political and military nodes negatively on both sides.
Apart from economic forces, the other major positive force shaping
the contours of the relationship is the military to military cooperation
that we have witnessed over the last ten years.
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This cooperation has withstood the negative impact of the 1998
nuclear tests and seen a major strengthening after the Al Qaida
sponsored 9/11 attacks in the US. US geo-political and strategic
interests along with its economic interests are forcing it to take India’s
military capabilities more seriously.
For the US to get India on its side it has to alter the negative feedback
loop linking the strategic high technology node with the political and
military nodes into a positive feedback loop. India has to be able to
trust the US as a reliable partner if the relationship has to come good
and flourish in the future. The US rightly believes that if it can alter
this loop through the nuclear deal it will be able to significantly change
the contours of the relationship. This would of course be the first
step towards a partnership and would need to be followed up with
other initiatives that build on this new relationship.
If the deal does not go through it is likely to reinforce the existing
negative feedback loop between the political, military and strategic
nodes and have a major impact on bilateral ties between the two
countries. The agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation would be
crucial for altering the current negative dynamic that is influencing
the relationship between the two sides.
The civilian nuclear deal encompasses all dimensions of the
relationship between the two countries. It is therefore a test case for
the new emerging partnership between the two countries. It is
obviously important for India but it is arguably as important for the
US too.
Figure 2 below represents the altered relationship that would result if
the nuclear deal goes through and is followed up by positive moves
from both sides.
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Given this understanding of the dynamic of the contours of the Indo-
US relationship we would assume that the negotiating position of the
Indian side on the specifics of the nuclear deal appears to be
reasonably strong. We should, therefore, not assume that we are
bound to take whatever the US offers. Within reasonable bounds
the US would be amenable to look at the strategic part of the Indian
interest favourably. This gives India more negotiating leverage than
what many analysts think.
If the deal goes through and both countries respond positively to
their mutual concerns and agree to work on the basis of converging
common interests we would expect a positive spiral of trust beginning
to emerge from the relationship. It could herald the beginning of a
new relationship between the two countries.
If the civilian nuclear deal does not go through, bilateral relations
between the two countries in the political, military and strategic
cooperation domains will be negatively affected. It is also likely that
the potential for economic cooperation and the positive role it could
play in reinforcing the relationship between the two countries in key
areas like energy will not be fully realized.































Signed on June 28, 2005 in Washington DC by
Minister of Defense of India, Pranab Mukherjee
& Secretary of Defense of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld
New Framework For The US - India Defense Relationship
1. The United States and India have entered a new era. We are
transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and
shared national interests. As the world’s two largest democracies, the
United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and
economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security,
and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries
are building a US-India strategic partnership in pursuit of these
principles and interests.
2. Ten years ago, in January 1995, the Agreed Minute on Defense
Relations Between the United States and India was signed. Since
then, changes in the international security environment have challenged
our countries in ways unforeseen ten years ago. The US-India
defense relationship has advanced in a short time to unprecedented
levels of cooperation unimaginable in 1995. Today, we agree on a
new Framework that builds on past successes, seizes new
opportunities, and charts a course for the US-India defense
relationship for the next ten years. This defense relationship will
support, and will be an element of, the broader US-India strategic
partnership.
3. The US-India defense relationship derives from a common belief
in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seeks to advance
shared security interests. These interests include:
– maintaining security and stability;
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– defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism;
– preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
associated materials, data, and technologies; and
– protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea
lanes.
4. In pursuit of this shared vision of an expanded and deeper US-
India strategic relationship, our defense establishments shall:
A. conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges;
B. collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their
common interest;
C. strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote
security and defeat terrorism;
D. expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote
regional and global peace and stability;
E. enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction;
F. in the context of our strategic relationship, expand two-way
defense trade between our countries. The United States and
India will work to conclude defense transactions, not solely
as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen
our countries’ security, reinforce our strategic partnership,
achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, and
build greater understanding between our defense
establishments;
G. in the context of defense trade and a framework of technology
security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology
transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and
development;
H. expand collaboration relating to missile defense;
I. strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond quickly
to disaster situations, including in combined operations;
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J. assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful
peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other
countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations;
K. conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense
transformation;
L. increase exchanges of intelligence; and
M. continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from
the US Department of Defense and India’s Ministry of
Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on
international security issues of common interest, with the
aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared
objectives, and developing common approaches.
5. The Defense Policy Group shall continue to serve as the primary
mechanism to guide the US-India strategic defense relationship. The
Defense Policy Group will make appropriate adjustments to the
structure and frequency of its meetings and of its subgroups, when
agreed to by the Defense Policy Group co-chairs, to ensure that it
remains an effective mechanism to advance US-India defense
cooperation.
6. In recognition of the growing breadth and depth of the US-
India strategic defense relationship, we hereby establish the Defense
Procurement and Production Group and institute a Joint Working
Group for mid-year review of work overseen by the Defense Policy
Group.
– The Defense Procurement and Production Group will
oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co-production
and technology collaboration, broadening the scope of its
predecessor subgroup the Security Cooperation Group.
– The Defense Joint Working Group will be subordinate to
the Defense Policy Group and will meet at least once per
year to perform a midyear review of work overseen by the
Defense Policy Group and its subgroups (the Defense
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Procurement and Production Group, the Joint Technical
Group, the Military Cooperation Group, and the Senior
Technology Security Group), and to prepare issues for the
annual meeting of the Defense Policy Group.
7. The Defense Policy Group and its subgroups will rely upon this
Framework for guidance on the principles and objectives of the US-
India strategic relationship, and will strive to achieve those objectives.
Signed in Arlington, Virginia, USA, on June 28, 2005, in two copies
in English, each being equally authentic.
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Annexure II
Joint Statement between President
George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh
18 July 2005
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today declare
their resolve to transform the relationship between their countries
and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed
to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new
relationship between India and the United States will promote stability,
democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world. It will enhance
our ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of
mutual concern and interest.
Building on their common values and interests, the two leaders resolve:
- To create an international environment conducive to
promotion of democratic values, and to strengthen
democratic practices in societies which wish to become more
open and pluralistic.
- To combat terrorism relentlessly. They applaud the active
and vigorous counterterrorism cooperation between the two
countries and support more international efforts in this
direction. Terrorism is a global scourge and the one we will
fight everywhere. The two leaders strongly affirm their
commitment to the conclusion by September of a UN
comprehensive convention against international terrorism.
The Prime Minister’s visit coincides with the completion of the Next
Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, launched in January
2004. The two leaders agree that this provides the basis for expanding
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bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclear energy and
dual-use technology.
Drawing on their mutual vision for the US-India relationship, and our
joint objectives as strong long-standing democracies, the two leaders
agree on the following:
For the Economy
- Revitalize the US-India Economic Dialogue and launch a
CEO Forum to harness private sector energy and ideas to
deepen the bilateral economic relationship.
- Support and accelerate economic growth in both countries
through greater trade, investment, and technology
collaboration.
- Promote modernization of India’s infrastructure as a
prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy.
As India enhances its investment climate, opportunities for
investment will increase.
- Launch a US-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture
focused on promoting teaching, research, service and
commercial linkages.
For Energy and the Environment
- Strengthen energy security and promote the development
of stable and efficient energy markets in India with a view
to ensuring adequate, affordable energy supplies and
conscious of the need for sustainable development. These
issues will be addressed through the US-India Energy
Dialogue.
- Agree on the need to promote the imperatives of
development and safeguarding the environment, commit to
developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient, affordable,
and diversified energy technologies.
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For Democracy and Development
- Develop and support, through the new US-India Global
Democracy Initiative in countries that seek such assistance,
institutions and resources that strengthen the foundations
that make democracies credible and effective. India and the
US will work together to strengthen democratic practices
and capacities and contribute to the new U.N. Democracy
Fund.
- Commit to strengthen cooperation and combat HIV/AIDs
at a global level through an initiative that mobilizes private
sector and government resources, knowledge, and expertise.
For Non-proliferation and Security
- Express satisfaction at the New Framework for the US-
India Defense Relationship as a basis for future cooperation,
including in the field of defense technology.
- Commit to play a leading role in international efforts to
prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The US welcomed the adoption by India of legislation on
WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill).
- Launch a new US-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds
on the experience of the Tsunami Core Group, to strengthen
cooperation to prepare for and conduct disaster relief
operations.
For High-technology and Space
- Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement,
building on the US–India High-Technology Cooperation
Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training,
and the establishment of public-private partnerships.
- Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation
and launch, and in the commercial space arena through
mechanisms such as the US-India Working Group on Civil
Space Cooperation.
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- Building on the strengthened nonproliferation commitments
undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian
organizations from the Department of Commerce’s Entity
List.
Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting
growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner,
the two leaders discussed India’s plans to develop its civilian nuclear
energy program.
President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over
India’s strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and
stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology,
India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such
states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to
achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes
its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security.
The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust
US laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends
and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear
reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage
its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. India has
expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The
United States will consult with its partners considering India’s
participation. The United States will consult with the other participants
in the Generation IV International Forum with a view toward India’s
inclusion.
The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would
reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and
practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military
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nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a
declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily
its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and
adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities; continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment
and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and
supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring
that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials
and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
The President welcomed the Prime Minister’s assurance. The two
leaders agreed to establish a working group to undertake on a phased
basis in the months ahead the necessary actions mentioned above to
fulfill these commitments. The President and Prime Minister also
agreed that they would review this progress when the President visits
India in 2006.
The two leaders also reiterated their commitment that their countries
would play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear,
chemical, biological and radiological weapons.
In light of this closer relationship, and the recognition of India’s
growing role in enhancing regional and global security, the Prime
Minister and the President agree that international institutions must
fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since
1945. The President reiterated his view that international institutions
are going to have to adapt to reflect India’s central and growing role.
The two leaders state their expectations that India and the United
States will strengthen their cooperation in global forums.
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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanks President Bush for the
warmth of his reception and the generosity of his hospitality. He
extends an invitation to President Bush to visit India at his convenience
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Annexure III
India-US Joint Statement, 02 March 2006
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
today expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States
and India have made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet
the global challenges of the 21st century. Both our countries are linked
by a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of
national diversity, human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand
prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide; and a desire to
increase mutual security against the common threats posed by
intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The successful transformation of the US-India relationship will have
a decisive and positive influence on the future international system
as it evolves in this new century.
Reviewing the progress made in deepening the global partnership
between the United States and India since their Joint Statement of
July 18, 2005, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirm their
commitment to expand even further the growing ties between their
two countries. Consistent with this objective, the two leaders wish to
highlight efforts the United States and India are making together in
the following areas, where they have:
For Economic Prosperity and trade
(1)  Agreed to intensify efforts to develop a bilateral business climate
supportive of trade and investment by:
1. Welcoming the report of the US-India CEO Forum, agreeing
to consider its recommendations aimed at substantially broadening
our bilateral economic relations, and directing the Chairs of the Indo-
US Economic Dialogue to follow up expeditiously with the CEO
Forum;
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2. Endorsing the efforts of the US-India Trade Policy Forum to
reduce barriers to trade and investment with the goal of doubling
bilateral trade in three years;
3. Agreeing to advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and
investment flows by holding a high-level public-private investment
summit in 2006, continuing efforts to facilitate and promote foreign
direct investment and eliminate impediments to it, and enhancing
bilateral consultations on various issues including tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, and preventing the illicit
use of the financial system.
(2)  Sought to expand cooperation in agriculture by:
1. Launching the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture with a three-
year financial commitment to link our universities, technical
institutions, and businesses to support agriculture education, joint
research, and capacity building projects including in the area of
biotechnology.
2. Endorsing an agreed workplan to promote bilateral trade in
agriculture through agreements that: lay out a path to open the US
market to Indian mangoes, recognize India as having the authority to
certify that shipments of Indian products to the United States meet
USDA organic standards, and provide for discussions on current
regulations affecting trade in fresh fruits and vegetables, poultry and
dairy, and almonds.
(3) Reaffirmed their shared commitment to completing the WTO
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) before the end of 2006, and agreed
to work together to help achieve this outcome.
For Energy Security and a clean environment
(1) Welcomed the successful completion of discussions on India’s
separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the
commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear
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cooperation. This historic accomplishment will permit our countries
to move forward towards our common objective of full civil nuclear
energy cooperation between India and the United States and between
India and the international community as a whole.
(2) Welcomed the participation of India in the ITER initiative on
fusion energy as an important further step towards the common goal
of full nuclear energy cooperation.
(3) Agreed on India’s participation in FutureGen, an international
public-private partnership to develop new, commercially viable
technology for a clean coal near-zero emission power project. India
will contribute funding to the project and participate in the Government
Steering Committee of this initiative.
(4) Welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate, which will enable India and the US to
work together with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable
development and meet increased energy needs while addressing
concerns of energy security and climate change. The Partnership will
collaborate to promote the development, diffusion, deployment and
transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient technologies and
practices.
(5) Welcomed India’s interest in the Integrated Ocean Drilling
Program, an international marine research endeavor that will
contribute to long-term energy solutions such as gas hydrates.
(6) Noting the positive cooperation under the Indo-US Energy
Dialogue, highlighted plans to hold joint conferences on topics such
as energy efficiency and natural gas, to conduct study missions on
renewable energy, to establish a clearing house in India for coal-bed
methane/coal-mine methane, and to exchange energy market
information.
296
For Innovation and the Knowledge Economy
(1) Emphasizing the importance of knowledge partnerships,
announced the establishment of a Bi-National Science and Technology
Commission which the US and India will co-fund. It will generate
collaborative partnerships in science and technology and promote
industrial research and development.
(2) Agreed that the United States and India would work together to
promote innovation, creativity and technological advancement by
providing a vibrant intellectual property rights regime, and to
cooperate in the field of intellectual property rights to include capacity
building activities, human resource development and public awareness
programs.
(3) Agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space,
including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and
earth science. The United States and India committed to move forward
with agreements that will permit the launch of US satellites and
satellites containing US components by Indian space launch vehicles,
opening up new opportunities for commercial space cooperation
between the two countries.
(4) Welcomed the inclusion of two US instruments in the Indian
lunar mission Chandrayaan-1. They noted that memoranda of
understanding to be signed by ISRO and NASA would be significant
steps forward in this area.
(5) Welcomed the US Department of Commerce’s plan to create
a license exception for items that would otherwise require an export
license to end-users in India engaged solely in civilian activities.
For Global Safety and Security
(1) Noted the enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the
two countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that
must be fought and rooted out in every part of the world.
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(2) Welcomed the increased cooperation between the United States
and India in the defense area, since the New Framework for the
US-India Defence Relationship was signed on June 28, 2005, as
evidenced by successful joint exercises, expanded defence
cooperation and information sharing, and greater opportunities to
jointly develop technologies and address security and humanitarian
issues.
(3) Reaffirmed their commitment to the protection of the free flow
of commerce and to the safety of navigation, and agreed to the
conclusion of a Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security
in the maritime domain, to prevent piracy and other transnational
crimes at sea, carry out search and rescue operations, combat marine
pollution, respond to natural disasters, address emergent threats and
enhance cooperative capabilities, including through logistics support.
Both sides are working to finalize a Logistics Support Agreement at
the earliest.
(4) Welcomed India’s intention to join the Container Security
Initiative aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure
more secure and reducing the risk of shipping containers being used
to conceal weapons of mass destruction.
(5) Reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
(6) Building on the July 2005 Disaster Relief Initiative, noted the
important disaster management cooperation and their improved
capabilities to respond to disaster situations.
(7) Recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security
and greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic
interdependencies, including to protect electronic transactions and
critical infrastructure from cybercrime, terrorism and other malicious
threats.
298
Deepening Democracy and Meeting International Challenges
(1) Recalled their joint launch of the UN Democracy Fund in
September 2005 and offered the experience and expertise of both
Governments for capacity building, training and exchanges to third
countries that request such assistance to strengthen democratic
institutions.
(2) Welcomed the decision of India and the United States to designate
a representative to the Government Advisory Board of the
International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) located in
Budapest to facilitate cooperative activities with ICDT.
(3) Agreed that the Virtual Coordination and Information Centres
set up in September 2005 should be further strengthened and a bilateral
meeting aimed at developing a practical programme for utilization of
its services be held soon.
(4) Expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval
processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at the global
level and encourage greater corporate participation to meet this
challenge, including the establishment of the Indo-US Corporate Fund
for HIV/AIDS.
(5) Agreed to expand bilateral efforts and continue cooperation in
the area of medical research and strengthen technical capacity in
food and drug regulation in India as well as address the concern on
avian influenza, including agreement to reach out to the private sector,
develop regional communications strategies, and plan an in-region
containment and response exercise. The President welcomed India’s
offer to host the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza meeting in 2007.
(6) Welcomed India’s membership in the Coalition Against Wildlife
Trafficking, a partnership through which we will collaborate in the
fight against illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts; we also
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welcome the opportunity to strengthen longstanding work together
on the conservation of wildlife through cooperation on park
management and ecotourism.
President Bush thanked Prime Minister Singh and the people of India
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